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This article is the third installment of an attempt to analyze
and criticize the constitutional work of the Supreme Court in historical sequence, from the lawyer's point of view.'
In the twelve years of its existence before the appointment of
John Marshall as Chief Justice, the Supreme Court began to develop lasting principles of constitutional adjudication, but it decided few significant constitutional questions. In the first decade of
Marshall's tenure, apart from Marbury v. Madison,2 the Court's
constitutional docket consisted almost entirely of relatively minor
matters respecting the powers of the federal courts. Although imt Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I should like to thank my
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I See Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1789-1801, 48 U. CHI. L. REv.
819 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Currie, Supreme Court, 1789-1801]; Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal Courts, 1801-1835, 49 U. CH. L.
REv. 646 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Currie, FederalCourts, 1801-1835]. These articles form

the beginning of a study to be published in book form by The University of Chicago Press.
1 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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portant issues of federal jurisdiction confronted the Justices until
Marshall's death in 1835, after 1810 the constitutional docket was
dominated for the first time by cases raising important substantive
issues respecting state and congressional powers: Fletcher v. Peck,3
McCulloch v. Maryland4 Gibbons v. Ogden,5 Brown v. Maryland,6
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,7 and many others.
These decisions are the subject of the present article.
With the replacement of the old Federalists William Cushing
and Samuel Chase by Gabriel Duvall and Joseph Story in 1811, the
Court consisted of two Justices appointed by President AdamsMarshall and Bushrod Washington-and five appointed by Presidents Jefferson and Madison-William Johnson, Brockholst Livingston, Thomas Todd, Duvall, and Story. These seven men were
to sit together until 1823.8 As on jurisdictional issues,9 they were to
speak with remarkable unanimity on other constitutional questions, and usually through the medium of Marshall himself. Major
differences of opinion first surfaced in Ogden v. Saunders ° in
1827; they became increasingly frequent as Marshall's earlier colleagues were supplanted by Smith Thompson, Robert Trimble,
John McLean, and Henry Baldwin,1 1 and at the end of the Marshall period three important constitutional cases had to be put off
until the Taney period 1 2 because the illness of Duvall and Johnson
prevented any decision from commanding a majority of the whole

Court.,3

10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
6 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
8 The terms of the Justices as well as their political party affiliations and the names of
the Presidents who appointed them are given in G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW app. A, at A-1 to A-2 (10th ed. 1980). The terms of the Justices of the
Marshall era are presented graphically in Currie, Federal Courts, 1801-1835, supra note 1,
at 649 n.26.
" See generally Currie, Federal Courts, 1801-1835, supra note 1.
'" 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
11For a chronology of the Justices, see sources cited supra note 8. James Wayne sat
with Marshall during the Chief Justice's last term in 1835, see 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) v (1835), but
the Court was shorthanded that year and decided no constitutional cases, see infra note 13.
12 Appointed by President Jackson in 1836, Roger Taney remained Chief Justice until
his death in 1864. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 8, app. A, at A-2.
3 Briscoe v. Commonwealth's Bank, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 118, 122 (1834) (also withholding
judgment in Mayor of New York v. Miln) ("The practice of this court is, not (except in
cases of absolute necessity) to deliver any judgment in cases where constitutional questions
are involved, unless four judges concur in opinion, thus making the decision that of a majority of the whole court." Id.). Story and Charles Warren reported, without citation, that the
'
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Many of the decisions of this period are household words.
Written criticism of the opinion-writing techniques they reflect,
however, is surprisingly rare; it is to that agreeable task that I now
turn.
I.

THE CONTRACT CLAUSE AND NATURAL LAW

The first set of substantive constitutional questions to command the serious attention of the Marshall Court, and the largest
single group of cases presenting such questions during the entire
Marshall period, were those under the clause of article I, section
10, forbidding the states to pass any "Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."' 4 While various Justices had made earlier sug-

gestions about the meaning of this clause as an aid in construing
other constitutional provisions, 5 the first case to confront the
Court with the clause itself was Fletcher v. Peck'8 in 1810.
A. Fletcher v. Peck
In 1795 the Georgia legislature evidently was bribed to enact a
statute directing the Governor to convey most of what is now Alabama and Mississippi for less than two cents an acre. The next
year a new legislature irately repealed the grant. Peck later acquired some of these so-called "Yazoo" lands and deeded them to
Fletcher with covenants of good title. Fletcher sued in federal
court for breach of covenant, arguing that the original sale was invalid or had been lawfully rescinded. The Supreme Court rejected
same was true of the Charles River Bridge case. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36
U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 583-84 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting); 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT
IN UNITED STATES HISTORY

790 (rev. ed. 1926).

According to Marshall's biographer, "Thompson, McLean, and Baldwin thought the
[Briscoe] and [Miln] laws Constitutional; Marshall, Story, Duval [sic] and Johnson believed
them invalid." 4 A. BEVERIDGE, LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 583 (1919) (citing no authority).
Marshall optimistically directed reargument at the 1835 Term "under the expectation that a
larger number of the judges may then be present," Briscoe, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 122, but
Johnson died and Duvall resigned, see 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) v (1835). Though the former was
replaced by James Wayne, the Court refused to decide the cases until the second vacancy
was filled. 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 85 (1835). The cases were finally decided in 1837. Briscoe v. Bank
of Kentucky, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837); New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837);
Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, para. 1.
"
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798) (separate opinion of Chase, J.) (construing the ex post facto clause of U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, para. 1); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 465-66 (1793) (separate opinion of Wilson, J.) (interpreting U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2).
,e 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
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both contentions. 17

The interesting objection to the initial grant was that it was
vitiated by the alleged bribery.18 Whether a court could ever set
aside a law on this ground, Marshall wrote, "may well be doubted,"
and there would be "much difficulty" in administering any such
rule: "Must it be direct corruption? or would interest or undue influence of any kind be sufficient? Must the vitiating cause operate
on a majority? or on what number of the members?""9 The question "how far the validity of a law depends upon the motives of its
framers,

'20

as Marshall put it, was to be a pervasive one for the

Court, transcending the bribery question and not susceptible to a
simple answer. 2 ' It seems clear in Fletcher that there was nothing
in the federal Constitution to make bribery a basis for striking
down state legislation. Although such a limit might conceivably
have been implicit in the Georgia constitution, Marshall made no
attempt to tie the argument to that document, and he already had
said the conveyance satisfied the state constitution. 2
Marshall found it unnecessary to decide, however, whether
bribery might invalidate the law; the state was not a party, and to
decide "collaterally and incidentally" a "solemn question ...

re-

specting the corruption of the sovereign power of a state" would be
"indecent, in the extreme."23 The Court did not use the modern
term "standing," but in effect it denied standing to assert the right
17

Id. at 134, 139. For the interesting background of the litigation, see 3 A. BEVERIDGE,

supra note 13, at 546-602; G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, 2 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES 336-53 (1981); 1 C. WARREN, supra note 13, at 392-99; and especially C.
MAGRATH, YAzoo passim (1966).
18 Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 129.
19 Id. at 130. Justice Johnson in his separate opinion was even more emphatic, not only
pointing to "insuperable difficulties" but terming the suggested inquiry an "absurdity" and
concluding in circular fashion that legislative acts "must be considered pure . . . because
there is no power that can declare them otherwise." Id. at 144.
20

Id. at 130.

21 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-45 (1976) (equal protection viola-

tion requires a showing of racially discriminatory purpose); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 114 (1941) (regulation of interstate commerce "not a forbidden invasion of state power
merely because . . . its motive . . . is to restrict the use of articles of commerce within the
states of destination"); see also infra notes 330-37 and accompanying text (discussing the
"pretext" passage in McCulloch v. Maryland).
22 Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 128-29. He concluded, moreover, by holding that
Georgia had owned the disputed lands despite their reservation for the use of the Indians in
a royal proclamation of 1763. Id. at 139-43. Justice Johnson dissented from this conclusion.
Id. at 145-47.
-1Id. at 130-31. Elsewhere the Court suggested that bribery or fraud would be no basis
for invalidating the claim of a later bona fide purchaser at common law, id. at 133-34, but
this was not the expressed reason for refusing to determine whether the sale was invalid.
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of a third party.2 Possibly in so doing the Court was influenced by
the fear that this was, as Justice Johnson suggested, "a mere
feigned case."12 5 Today the Court would dismiss a collusive suit for
want of a case or controversy, 26 but collusion is hard to establish.
The danger that it may pass undetected may support the prophylactic decision not to allow litigation of the rights of third parties,
though that is not an inflexible rule today.

2, Cf. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975) (taxpayers may not assert rights of
victims of exclusionary zoning); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943) (physician lacks
standing to assert patient's due process claims). Indeed just the year before Fletcher the
Court had refused to allow a litigant to argue the treaty rights of others. Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344, 347 (1809). Nevertheless, Fletcher did decide on the
merits that Georgia had no power to rescind the grant. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 139;
see infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text. Its reluctance to pass on the rights of the
absent state was, without much explanation, confined to the bribery question.
11 Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 147. John Quincy Adams, who had argued for Peck,
reported that both Marshall and Livingston had privately expressed "the reluctance of the
Court to decide the case at all, as it appeared manifestly made up for the purpose of getting
the Court's judgment." 1 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 546 (C. Adams ed. 1874), quoted
in 1 C. WARREN, supra note 13, at 395. Marshall reportedly said from the bench that the
pleadings revealed "that at the time when the covenants were made the parties had notice
of the acts covenanted against." 1 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, supra, at 547, quoted in
C. MAGRATH, supra, note 17, at 66. If Cranch's report is anywhere near complete, Luther
Martin's argument for Fletcher overlooked the two most important issues in the case. See 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) at 115, 124-25; C. MAGRATH, supra note 17, at 69 (explaining that Martin
"was so drunk during its presentation that Marshall had the Court adjourn until the counsel
regained his sobriety"). After the defendant lost in the Supreme Court on a technicality,
Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 125-27, the plaintiff agreed to allow him to amend his pleadings, id. at 127, and the case was reconsidered. See also G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, supra
note 17, at 344-45, adding that the amount in controversy originally stated in the complaint
had been subsequently altered to conform with statutory minima, but arguing that the suit
was not improper because such actions were and still are "an appropriate method of removing clouds on land titles."
With what has been variously characterized as naivet6, id. at 344, and as sarcasm, G.
DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT 75 (1970), Justice Johnson consented to decide the case because of his confidence that "the respectable gentlemen
...
engaged for the parties ... would never consent to impose a mere feigned case upon
this court," Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 147-48. Marshall's opinion did not mention the
problem at all. Beveridge praised the Court for reaching the merits because the times demanded that a message be sent to the states about their federal obligations. He also judged
it improper for Johnson to shift responsibility to the attorneys: if not prepared to denounce
the case "for what everybody believed it to be, and what it really was," he should have said
nothing at all. 3 A. BEVERIDGE, supranote 13, at 592-93. Compare the Court's earlier willingness to entertain an apparently collusive controversy over the validity of the federal carriage
tax in Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796), discussed in Currie, Supreme
Court, 1789-1801, supra note 1, at 853-54.
" See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943).
27 See, e.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953) (seller of home may assert
buyer's right to freedom from racial discrimination). Professor Warren viewed the Court's
refusal to pass on the bribery question as a significant victory for state rights despite the
ultimate invalidation of the repealing act: had the Court ruled otherwise, "a wide door
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At the constitutional level the more interesting issue was
whether the legislature had power to revoke the grant after it had
been made. On this question Marshall's opinion bristles with references suggesting unwritten limitations derived from natural law.
He began by invoking "certain great principles of justice, whose
authority is universally acknowledged," 2 8 without relating them to
any particular document. After adverting to the traditional equitable rights of bona fide purchasers,2 9 he stated flatly that "when absolute rights have vested" under a statutory contract, "a repeal of
the law cannot devest those rights."3 0 He went on to say that "[i]t
may well be doubted, whether the nature of society and of government does not prescribe some limits to the legislative power; and,
if any be prescribed, where are they to be found, if the property of
an individual, fairly and honestly acquired, may be seized without
compensation. 3 1 This led him to add that the validity of the repeal "might well be doubted, were Georgia a single sovereign
power. ' ' 2 He concluded that it was the Court's unanimous opinion
that "Georgia was restrained, either by general principles which
are common to our free institutions, or by the particular provisions
of the constitution of the United States," from revoking its grant.3 3
Johnson, concurring specially with respect to the invalidity of the
repeal, flatly renounced reliance on the Constitution: "I do it, on a
general principle, on the reason and nature of things: a principle
34
which will impose laws even on the Deity.
All of this is reminiscent of Justice Chase's famous dictum in
Calder v. Bull 5 that "[t]here are certain vital principles in our free
republican governments, which will determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power. '3 6 Just what Chase

would have been opened for the attack upon State legislation in countless instances." 1 C.
WARREN, supra note 13, at 397. See also G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 348,

calling the decision on the bribery issue "an important and far-reaching limitation on the
power of the judiciary insofar as the separation of powers was concerned" and relating it to
an attempt by Marshall "to dissociate law and the Court from politics."
" Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 133.
29 Id. at 133-35.

11 Id. at 135. On the question whether there were any bona fide purchasers, see C.
MAGRATH, supra note 17, at 16-19. The validity of the repeal was decided on demurrer,
however, which assumed such purchasers existed.
11 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 135.
32 Id. at 136.
3Id.

at 139.

Id. at 143.
35 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386 (1798).
34

36 Id. at 388. See E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 66 (1948), arguing that the

notion of natural law limits on legislative power was embraced "at one time or other by all
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meant by that has been disputed.37 Similarly, it is not clear that
Marshall meant in Fletcherto say the courts could set aside legislation that they found contrary to natural law. The statement that
repeal cannot "devest" rights seems to be one of fact rather than of
law, for it follows a declaration that legislatures "cannot undo" "an
act . . done" and is followed by the statement that "the act of
annulling them, if legitimate, is rendered so by a power applicable
to the case of every individual in the community. 3 8 For the suggestion that the repeal was of doubtful validity even apart from
the federal Constitution, Marshall offered a positivistic
explanation:
To the legislature, all legislative power is granted; but the
question, whether the act of transferring the property of an
individual to the public, be in the nature of the legislative
power, is well worthy of serious reflection.
It is the peculiar province of the legislature, to prescribe
general rules for the government of society; the application of
those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty
of other departments.3 "
Thus he seems to have been suggesting not that the repeal offended natural law, but that it was not authorized by the grant of
legislative power in the Georgia constitution.4 0 Finally, even the ulof the leading judges and advocates of the initial period of our constitutional history, an era
which closes about 1830."
37 See Currie, Supreme Court, 1789-1801, supra note 1, at 872 & n.340, and the sources
cited therein.
33 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 135 (emphasis added).
3" Id. at 136. He had already analogized the legislature's action to a judgment setting
aside a fraudulent conveyance and described it as "judging in its own case." Id. at 133. This
was a sweeping enough suggestion; one of the grounds of decision in Calder had been based
upon the recognition that in Connecticut, at least, the legislature did have authority to perform judicial functions. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 395 (Paterson, J.), 398 (Iredell, J.), 400-01 (Cushing, J.). Marshall made no effort to distinguish the Georgia and Connecticut constitutions.
Moreover, it is not clear that the revocation was any less legislative an act than the original
grant; it was certainly as "general," and one wonders whether Marshall meant to outlaw all
private bills. Yet Marshall put his finger on a limitation of potential significance for the
federal Constitution as well: the separate grant of "judicial power" to the courts may imply
that there are certain things Congress may not do under its "legislative powers" even
though they otherwise constitute, for example, regulations of commerce. See also E. CORWIN,
JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION 148 (1919), arguing that a remark of Madison's at
the Constitutional Convention indicated an intention to protect against special legislation
by Congress.
40 Despite a disclaimer of authority in Calder to pass on state law questions in reviewing state court decisions, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 392, Chase may have been suggesting the same
thing- "it is against all reason and justice, for a people to intrust a legislature with such
powers; and therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it," id. at 388. See also 3
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timate declaration of invalidity under "either" the Constitution or
"general principles" need not reflect an alternative holding based
on natural law. Not only might these "general principles" be those
Marshall had suggested should be read into the state constitutional
delegation of legislative power; this was also his statement of the
"unanimous" opinion of the Court. The reference to "general principles" was necessary to make this statement true of Justice Johnson; it need not imply that other Justices agreed with him. 41
In any event, one clear basis of the Fletcher decision, if not
the sole basis,4 was that the repealing act violated the provision of
article I, section 10, that "[n]o State shall . . pass any. . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts. 4 3 One problem with this

conclusion was that Marshall had just suggested that the act in
question was not "legislation," and one ground of decision in Calder v. Bull had been that the comparable reference in the same
clause to ex post facto "Law[s] ' ' 44 applied only to "legislative"

acts. 5 The Fletcher opinion did not advert to this difficulty.
Marshall did, however, address two important arguments
against the applicability of the contract clause. The first question,
as he saw it, was whether a "grant" was a "contract.

' 46

He con-

cluded that it was: Blackstone had said not all contracts were executory, and the grant "implies a contract" by the grantor "not to
reassert" the right conveyed.47 Moreover, "[iut would be strange if
a contract to convey was secured by the constitution, while an absolute

conveyance

remained

unprotected.

'48

Justice

Johnson

agreed that a grant was a contract but could not agree that it im1393-1394, at 26869 (Boston 1833); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8-1, at 428 (1978).
41 See G. DUNNE, supra note 25, at 75, terming this sentence evidence of "Marshall's

J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§

skill in welding essentially divergent views into the 'unanimous opinion of the court'" in
light of Johnson's opinion.
42 Both Professors Warren and Hale said flatly the repeal act was held unconstitutional
on the basis of the contract clause. 1 C. WARREN, supra note 13, at 396; Hale, The Supreme
Court and The Contract Clause (pt. 2), 57 HARv. L. REV. 621, 633-34 (1944). But see L.
TRIBE, supra note 40, § 8-1, at 429 ("Marshall straddled the fence between pure natural law,
implied limitations, and formal interpretation of explicit constitutional commands. . . .
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, para. 1.
44 Id.
45 Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 395 (Paterson, J.), 398 (Iredell, J.), 400-01 (Cushing, J.).
4' Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 136.
47 Id. at 136-37. Counsel had so argued, id. at 123, and so had Hamilton in a legal
opinion relating to the same grant 15 years before, see C. MAGRATH, supra note 17, at 22;
Marshall did not cite Hamilton. For an effort to evaluate Marshall's conclusion in terms of
common law and continental use of the terms "contract" and "obligation," see W. HUNTING,
THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 19-39 (1919).
" Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 137.
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posed any continuing "obligation": 49 a conveyance "is most generally but the consummation of a contract, is functus officio the moment it is executed, and continues afterwards to be nothing more
than the evidence that a certain act was done."50
Johnson's position is tempting. One dispossessed by his grantor might be expected to sue for ejectment, not for breach of contract. 1 In essence the repealing statute took property from its
owners without compensation; Marshall himself had so characterized it in his discussion of limits derived from "the nature of society."5 2 Uncompensated takings were separately prohibited by the
fifth amendment," which applied only to the federal government,
as the Court was soon to hold. 54 One might infer from this separate
treatment that the Framers had embraced the traditional distinction between contract and property,5 5 and that the repealing act in
Fletcher had not impaired a contractual obligation. 8
Nevertheless Marshall's conclusion is not without plausibility.
Though Marshall cited nothing for his crucial statement that a
19 Id. at 144.
50

Id. at 145. Johnson added that he feared the Court's interpretation might preclude

the exercise of the power of eminent domain, id., a plausible concern that the Court would
later allay, see, e.g., West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 531-34 (1848).
Johnson also expressed a more general fear that the decision might unduly interfere with
the traditional and "beneficent" powers of the states to "affect[] existing contracts." Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 145. This concern seems essentially independent of the questions
resolved in Fletcher; whether or not state grants were protected by the clause, later cases
would confirm Johnson's lament, id., that "where to draw the line, or how to define and
limit the words, 'obligation of contracts,' will be found a subject of extreme difficulty." See
infra notes 155-77 and accompanying text (discussing Sturges v. Crowninshield).
11 See Trickett, Is a Grant a Contract?,54 Am. L. REV. 718, 729 (1920), arguing that
when A conveys a horse to B "B has no right in personam against A, but only the right in
rem, which is precisely the same as to A, as it is to any other human being." It is noteworthy
in light of later decisions that Marshall did not ask whether Georgia law either recognized
such a promise or characterized a grant as a contract. See infra notes 203-58 and accompanying text (discussing Ogden v. Saunders).
51 Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 135-36, quoted supra at text accompanying note 31.
63 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[nior shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation").
Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), discussed infra notes 482507 and accompanying text.
"' See, e.g., 2 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 1006 (3d ed. London 1869) (1st
ed. London 1861-63) ("The confusion of contract and conveyance, by elliptical or improper
expression, is one of the greatest obstacles in the way of the student" (emphasis in
original)).
54 See, e.g., J. SHIRLEY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CAUSES AND THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES 312-13, 404-10 (1895); Hutchinson, Laws Impairing the Obligation of
Contracts, 1 S.L. REV. (n.s.) 401, 414-16 (1875), both criticizing this portion of the Fletcher
decision. To Beveridge, however, the Court followed the Constitution's "plain command."
3 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 13, at 594.
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grantor implicitly promised not to retake the property, Coke had
said long before that the ordinary words of conveyance implied a
warranty of title, 57 and later commentators have affirmed that such
a warranty barred a claim by the grantor himself.5 That Fletcher
makes some takings also contract impairments does not mean the
taking clause has no independent field of operation; the same authorities tell us the normal warranty in a private deed does not
protect against the wrongful act of a third party.59 Moreover, Marshall buttressed his conclusion with a strong argument of improbability: the Framers were not fools, and it would make no sense to
allow states to undermine the purpose of the clause by requiring
restitution after a contract was performed.6 0 This is a respectable
means of argument if not carried too far;6 ' Marshall had used it
most effectively before in Marbury v. Madison. 2 But the application of this reasoning in Fletcher contrasts strikingly with the
treatment of the same theme in Hepburn v. Ellzey,6 3 where Marshall had conceded it was "extraordinary" that District of Columbia citizens appeared to be excluded from the diversity jurisdiction
and yet refused to give a broad reading to the term "State" in article III,'4 calling the apparent absurdity "a subject for legislative,
not for judicial consideration." 5

67E. COKE,FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND; OR A COMMENTARY
UPON LITTLETON § 733, at 384a (2d ed. London 1629) (1st ed. London 1628).
" See, e.g., S. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 148 (1969); A.
SIMPSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 118-19 (1969); H. TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY § 681, at 705 (abr. ed. 1940).
" See, e.g., H. TIFFANY, supra note 58, § 681, at 705. See also R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 1 908 (abr. ed. 1968).
" Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 137, quoted supra text accompanying note 48. But
see Trickett, supra note 51, at 729 ("[I]s it not as strange, that the property rights of a
vendee were protected against a vendor, and the property rights of others not protected at
all?").
"1 It had been carried too far in the carriage-tax case of Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 171 (1796). See Currie, Supreme Court, 1789-1801, supra note 1, at 856-57. Marshall might have made the result more literally plausible had he argued in addition that
revocation effectively impaired the obligation of the previous contract to sell.
62 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1801). Marshall argued that to require courts to enforce unconstitutional laws "would be to overthrow, in fact, what was established in theory; ...
would seem, at first view, an absurdity too gross to be insisted on," id. at 177; and "would be
giving to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits," id. at 178. See also Currie, Federal
Courts, 1801-1835, supra note 1, at 651-61. For a prominent later example, see Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 377 (1821), discussed in Currie, Federal Courts, 1801-1835,
supra note 1, at 687-94.
63 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1805).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, para. 2.
" Hepburn, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 453. See Currie, Federal Courts, 1801-1835, supra
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Finally, the Court said, the clause applied to the state's own
contracts as well as to private ones. The words of the Constitution
drew no distinction between public and private obligations; 6 other
provisions such as the ex post facto clause 7 clearly limited the activity of the state itself," and the original provision of article III
allowing states to be sued" implied that the state could not avoid
liability by the simple act of legislatively repudiating its own contracts.70 We might add that the purpose of protecting creditor expectations seems as applicable to public as to private contracts.
Later statutory cases were to invoke the maxim that provisions limiting preexisting powers should not be construed to include governments unless they specifically say 80.71 Marshall him7
self was to suggest in Sturges v. Crowninshield
that the Framers
may have had certain types of private contracts particularly in

note 1, at 671-73.
6"Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 137.
47 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, para. 1.
do Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 138. The analogy is flawed. No one disputed that the
contract clause limited state legislative action; the question went to the scope of that limitation. At one point Marshall came close to suggesting that the rescinding act violated the ex
post facto clause itself: "This . . . act would have the effect of an ex post facto law. It
forfeits the estate of Fletcher for a crime not committed by himself, but by those from
whom he purchased." Id. One leading student of the contract clause thought this passage
showed Marshall "was uncertain as to precisely why the repeal act was invalid, although he
was very sure that it was invalid." B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
34 (1938). Because the legislature did not declare anything Peck had done a crime, application of the ex post facto clause in Fletcher would have been difficult to square with Calder
v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dal].) 386 (1798), which Marshall did not cite. See Currie, Supreme Court,
1789-1801, supra note 1, at 867-70. Moreover, the sentence following that passage suggests
that he was merely using the ex post facto clause as the basis for another absurdity argument directed to the interpretation of the contract clause: "This cannot be effected in the
form of an ex post facto law, or bill of attainder; why, then, is it allowable in the form of a
law annulling the original grant?" Fletcher,10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 139. See Hale, supra note
42, at 635 (Marshall "did not assert ... that the rescinding act was in fact an ex post facto
law, but only that it had the same effect and that therefore the contract clause should be
construed to cover it.").
" That is, U.S. CONsT. art. III, para. 1, as construed by the Court in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), before the adoption of the eleventh amendment. See Currie,
Supreme Court, 1789-1801, supra note 1, at 831-39.
70 Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 139. The argument could be turned around: if, as the
adoption of the eleventh amendment suggests, the Court was wrong in holding article II
made the states suable, see Currie, Supreme Court, 1789-1801, supra note 1, at 831-39,
Marshall's own principle that for every right there is a remedy, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803), implies that the state was not forbidden to impair its own
obligations.
71 E.g., Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 225 (1957) (anti-injunction
provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976)); United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258,
270 (1947) (Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-110, 113-115 (1976)).
71 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
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mind.73 Moreover, in proposing adoption of the clause in the Constitutional Convention, Rufus King had advocated "in the words
used in the Ordinance of Congs [sic] establishing new States, a
prohibition on the States to interfere in private contracts";7 4 the
provision of the Northwest Ordinance from which he drew this
' On the other
clause was expressly limited to "private contracts."75
hand, the Convention ultimately used more general terms; it is unclear whether it meant to reject the Ordinance's limitation or to
express the same idea in different words. 76
Thus, as in many of his jurisdictional opinions,77 it is difficult
to say whether Marshall was right or wrong in Fletcher; he managed without very much explanation and without referring to
available authority 8 to resolve both doubtful issues in favor of an
expansive meaning of the contract clause. This feat he accomplished in an apparently feigned case, largely on the basis of policy, notwithstanding his invocation of the already familiar shibboId. at 204. See infra notes 155-202 and accompanying text.
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 439 (rev. ed. M. Farrand
1937) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as CONVENTION RECORDS].
71 Northwest Territory Ordinance and Act of 1787, art. II, ch. 8, § 1, 1 Stat.
51, 52 n.(a)
(1789).
11 See E. CORWIN, supra note 39, at 167-68, arguing on the basis of a general reference
73

71

to the Philadelphia Debates that only private contracts were meant to be included, and B.
WRIGHT, supra note 68, at 3-16, tracing the occasional references to the clause both at Philadelphia and in the state ratifying conventions. Wright reported that two Anti-Federalist
assertions that the clause embraced public contracts "were denied by members of the Convention, and their denials were not challenged." Id. at 16; see id. at 15-16 (citing 3 J. ELLIOT,
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTI-

474 (statement of Patrick Henry), 477-78 (Governor Randolph's reply that the clause
had been included because of "frequent interferences of the state legislatures with private
contracts") (2d ed. Philadelphia 1861) (1st ed. Washington, D.C. 1827-30); 4 J. ELLIOT,
supra, at 190 (statement of James Galloway), 191 (W.R. Davie's answer that "[tihe clause
refers merely to contracts between individuals")).
7 See generally Currie, Federal Courts, 1801-1835, supra note 1.
71 See G. DUNNE, supra note 25, at 75, terming Fletcher an example of "characteristic
soldier's prose-terse, lucid, persuasive, and free of a single legal citation." To one leading
student of the case, Marshall's opinion contained "little that was original." C. MAGRATH,
supra note 17, at 82. Not only had Hamilton said it all before, see supra note 47, but both
Justice Paterson on circuit, Van Horne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 28 F. Cas. 1012 (C.C.D. Pa.
1795) (No. 16,857), and the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, Derby v. Blake, decided in
1799 and belatedly reported at 226 Mass. 618 (1917), had reached similar conclusions. See
also C. MAGRATH, supra note 17, at 52-53, 82-83. The same position had also been taken in
congressional debates over compensation of the Yazoo claimants, see B. WRIGHT, supra note
68, at 23-24, and Justice Wilson had assumed in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,
465 (1793), that the clause applied to public obligations. These earlier views may help to
explain the fact that although some Republicans condemned the decision, it came as no
surprise to the Bar. G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 348, 351; 1 C. WARREN,
supra note 13, at 396.
TUTION
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leth that a law ought "seldom, if ever" to be held unconstitutional,
"in a doubtful case." 9
B. New Jersey v. Wilson
In return for a surrender of other land claims, New Jersey had
conveyed a tract in trust for the Delaware Indians pursuant to a
statute providing that "'the lands to be purchased for the Indians
aforesaid, shall not hereafter be subject to any tax'" and could not
be conveyed.80 Some years later, at the request of the Delawares,
the legislature authorized the land to be sold. New Jersey proceeded to repeal the tax exemption and impose a tax on the purchasers; the Supreme Court in 1812 held without dissent that the
state had impaired the obligation of contract.81
Marshall treated the case as an easy one: Fletcher v. Peck had
settled that the contract clause included state contracts;8 2 there
was consideration for the promise; the exemption was attached to
the land, and the state had not demanded its surrender as the
price of consent to the resale.83 None of this was particularly surprising, though a later Court might have agreed with the state
court that the exemption was personal84 or had been extinguished
with the restraint on alienation. 5 As in Fletcher, Marshall did not
7,Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 128 (discussing the validity of the original grant
under the Georgia constitution). The first Supreme Court appearance of this maxim seems
to have been in Justice Chase's opinion in Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175
(1796), where it may have played some part in sustaining the challenged law. See Currie,
Supreme Court, 1789-1801, supra note 1, at 855. For other early examples see id. at 866,
881.
It has been said that Fletcher was "the first case in which the Court had held a State
law unconstitutional." 1 C. WARREN, supra note 13, at 392. Yet the Court had struck down a
state law under the supremacy clause for conflict with a treaty as early as 1796, Ware v.
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796), and Justice Chase's opinion in that case explicitly endorsed federal judicial review of state legislation, id. at 236-37. See also Currie, Supreme
Court, 1789-1801, supra note 1, at 863-64.
'o New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164, 165 (1812) (quoting Act of Aug. 12,
1758 (colony of New Jersey)).
81 Id. at 166-67.

See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 166-67.
84 Cf., e.g., Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Miller, 114 U.S. 176, 183-84 (1885) (so construing a
promise of "no taxation upon the property of the said company" until its profits reached a
certain level).
Il State v. Wilson, 2 N.J.L. 282, 286-87 (Sup. Ct. 1807 term) (Rossell, J.), 291 (Pennington, J.), rev'd, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812). See also Given v. Wright, 117 U.S. 648,
655 (1886), where taxation of land in the same tract was allowed on the basis of "long acquiescence" by the owners: "If the question [decided in Wilson] were a new one we might
regard the reasoning of the New Jersey judges as entitled to a great deal of weight. ..."
SI
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stop to inquire whether his characterization of the transaction conformed to state law; in contrast to later Justices, 6 he seems to
have thought the existence and interpretation of agreements for
contract clause purposes entirely a matter of federal law. Nor did
he suggest that it might be relevant that the tax exemption had
been granted by the colonial government in the King's name in
1758,7 long before the contract clause was adopted. As we shall
see, however, such temporal questions posed interesting problems
in the application of the clause.8 8
What was most striking about Wilson was that no doubt was
suggested as to the validity of the tax exemption in the first place.
In Fletcher,while affirming that a legislature had authority to convey land, 9 Marshall had conceded that, "so far as respects general
legislation," "one legislature cannot abridge the powers of" the
next, 90 and Johnson had acknowledged that a sovereign could not
part with its "right of jurisdiction.""1
Neither Justice identified the source of this limit; perhaps
they viewed it as implicit in the state constitution,92 or perhaps it
was another manifestation of natural law. 93 Their suggetion was to
be picked up by later Justices who would use it to hold that the
state could not validly promise that future legislators would not
outlaw a lottery.94 A promise not to tax is hard to distinguish in
this respect from a promise not to regulate, and an occasional Justice was to argue after Marshall was gone that tax exemptions were
also invalid.' But neither Marshall nor Johnson seems to have

" See, e.g., Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938) (whether the
state had bound itself by contract is a question "primarily of state law" which the Supreme
Court should review only with deference "in order that the constitutional mandate may not
become a dead letter"). See also infra notes 203-58 and accompanying text (discussing
Ogden v. Saunders). For general discussion of the relation of state law to the contract clause
see Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause (pt. 3), 57 HARv.L. REV. 852, 852-72

(1944).
87 See

Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 165.
" See infra notes 125-54 and accompanying text (discussing Trustees of Dartmouth
College); G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 599-600 (suggesting the problem).
89 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 132 (1810).
90 Id. at 135.
91 Id. at 143 (Johnson, J., concurring).
92 See Piqua Branch of State Bank v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369, 392-405 (1853
Term) (Catron, J., dissenting).
93 See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 819-20 (1880).
" Id. at 821.

95E.g., Piqua Branch of State Bank, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 404-05 (Catron, J., dissenting). Justice Catron asserted that the point had not been litigated in New Jersey v. Wilson.
Id. at 401. In this he was partly right; while counsel had plainly contended in the state court
that the legislature could not grant a perpetual exemption, State v. Wilson, 2 N.J.L. at 285,
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thought Wilson was affected by their principle that sovereignty
could not be surrendered, and the decision was to survive.96
C.

Terrett v. Taylor

The Episcopal Church had acquired land in Virginia before
the Revolution. In 1776 the state legislature had confirmed the
Church's title to the land; in 1784 it had incorporated the Church;
in 1786 it had repealed the act of incorporation while reserving the
Church's property rights.9 7 In 1798, however, the legislature repealed the 1776 and 1784 statutes as "inconsistent with the principles of the constitution and of religious freedom," 98 and in 1801 it
asserted the right to all Church property."9 The Supreme Court, in
an 1815 opinion by Justice Story, held the property still belonged
to the Church. 0 0
The Court gave straightforward reasons for this conclusion.
The 1786 statute revoking the Church's charter had not purported
to disturb its property rights, and the 1798 repeal of confirmatory
statutes had left intact the Church's preexisting title. 01 The 1801
statute had been passed after the land in question became a part
of the District of Columbia "under the exclusive jurisdiction of
congress."1 02 Therefore, "as to . . . property within that district,
the right of Virginia to legislate no longer existed."1 0 3 One is
tempted to interpret this last passage as a questionable constitutionalization of Story's well-known views concerning the territorial
limits of government power in general,1 04 but with respect to the
the case was submitted in the Supreme Court "upon a statement of facts, without argument," 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 164. For later instances of the Court's wrestling with the tax
exemption issue, see B. WRIGHT, supra note 68, at 73-75. See also Hale, supra note 42, at
654, who defends the Court: "[W]hen a state grants a tax exemption, it unquestionably
surrenders ... part of its sovereign power-the power to tax the exempted property. But to
deny its power to grant the exemption by contract would be to take from it a sovereign
power of perhaps greater moment."
"See B. WRIGHT, supra note 68, at 73-75; Hale, supra note 42, at 640-53.
'
Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 44 (1815).
" Act of Jan. 24, 1799, ch. 246, 1 Va. Acts 388 (S.Pleasants Jr. & H. Pace 1803).
" Terrett, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 48.
100 Id. at 55. Justices Johnson and Todd did not participate. See id. at 45.
101Id. at 51.
101 Id. at 52.
103

Id.

1"

See J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18, at 20 (2d ed. Boston

1841) (1st ed. Boston 1834). See also Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (holding

that the fourteenth amendment's due process clause forbade application of Louisiana law to
a contract made outside its borders); see generally R. CRAMTON,D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 403-519 (3d ed. 1981).
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District of Columbia it was a paraphrase of the explicit terms of
article I, section 8.105
Story's gratuitous additional observations, however, are of special interest. The 1798 and 1801 statutes, he wrote, were ineffective
to divest the Church of property for another reason:
That the legislature can repeal statutes creating private corporations, or confirming to them property already acquired
under the faith of previous laws, and by such repeal can vest
the property of such corporations exclusively in the state...
we are not prepared to admit; and we think ourselves standing
upon the principles of natural justice, upon the fundamental
laws of every free government, upon the spirit and letter of
the constitution of the United States, and upon the decisions
of most respectable judicial tribunals, in resisting such a
10 6
doctrine.
There it is again: the principles of "natural justice" seem to
have been invoked, as perhaps they had been in Calder and in
Fletcher, as a basis for disregarding acts of a state legislature. 10 7
This time Story was speaking for the whole Court. At most, however, his reliance on natural justice was an alternative holding; possibly he only meant to express his moral outrage along the way to
his clear conclusion that the Virginia statutes offended "the constitution of the United States."' 1 8
But why did the statutes offend the federal Constitution?
Story referred to no specific provision; he gave no reasons; he cited
none of those "decisions of most respectable judicial tribunals" to
which he adverted. The provision most nearly applicable was the
contract clause, which had just been read in Fletcher v. Peck to
include grants of land by the state. 10 9 The difficulty was that in
Terrett the Church's land had not been acquired from the state; it
had been "purchased of a certain Daniel Jennings" in 1770.110
Thus the attempted confiscation seems to have been a garden variety taking of private property uncomplicated by the contractual
105

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl.17 (empowering Congress to "exercise exclusive Legisla-

tion in all Cases whatsoever, over such District ... as may . . .become the Seat of the

Government of the United States").
106 Terrett, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 52.
107 See supra notes 28-41 and accompanying text.
108 Terrett, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 52.

109See supra notes 42-70 and accompanying text. Chancellor Kent viewed this as the
basis of Terrett as well. 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 415 (4th ed. New York
1840) (1st ed. New York 1826).
110 Terrett, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 43.
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implications of an original state grant. If Story was suggesting that
every taking of property was an impairment of contract, he was
significantly extending Fletcher,and he owed us an explanation."'
To the extent that the Court relied upon the statutes incorporating the Church and confirming its title as contracts not to disturb the Church's property,1 1 2 it was necessary to reject the argument that those statutes had been invalid at the outset under the
religion clauses of the Virginia constitution; 113 if the alleged contract was invalid, there was no obligation to impair. This reconstruction may explain the relevance of the apparently gratuitous
remarks Story made about those clauses in the course of the Ter" One might argue that the expropriation impaired the private contracts by which the
Church had obtained the property. In his treatise Story was later to say without explanation
or authority that a state law "annulling conveyances between individuals, and declaring,
that the grantors should stand seized of their former estates,. . . would be as repugnant to
the constitution, as a state law discharging the vendors from the obligation of executing
their contracts of sale." 3 J. STORY, supra note 40, § 1370, at 242. Cf. supra notes 42-70 and
accompanying text (discussing Marshall's argument about public grants in Fletcher). It
seems harder to infer a warranty against state action in a private deed than in a public one;
at common law a warrantor was not responsible for the tortious act of a third party. See R.
POWELL, supra note 59, 1 908; H. TIFFANY, supra note 58, § 681, at 705. Further, the state in
Terrett, in contrast to the example given in Story's treatise, had not attempted to undo a
private transaction by giving the Church's property back to its original owners.
112 At one point in the opinion Story treated the 1776 act confirming the Church's interest as a "new grant" on the assumption that the Revolution had destroyed the Church's
original title. Terrett, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 50. Even on this assumption, however, it was
not clear that this "grant" was a contract, since unlike that in Fletcher, there was nothing to
indicate it had been made for consideration. Moreover, the crucial assumption that the
Revolution had divested the Church was expressly repudiated on the same page of the opinion. Id. Nevertheless, Story expressly referred to the repeal of the confirming statute in his
statement of unconstitutionality, quoted supra at text accompanying note 106; perhaps he
viewed that law as a contract in which the state promised (for what consideration?) to respect the Church's interest.
Story added that the state had no power to deprive the Church of its property by repealing its corporate charter, see Terrett, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 50, and he accompanied this
pronouncement with a general discourse on the inviolability of corporate charters. Forfeiture of a franchise for "misuser" or "nonuser" would be all right, as the common law to that
effect was "a tacit condition" in every charter; new governments might abolish "such exclusive privileges. . . as are inconsistent with the new government"; and there might be extensive powers to modify the charters of "public corporations which exist only for public purposes, such as counties, towns, cities, &c." Id. at 51-52 (emphasis in original). The
implication seemed to be that otherwise the charter itself was protected, as the Court was
soon to hold only after appropriate explanation. See infra notes 125-54 and accompanying
text (discussing Trustees of Dartmouth College). But the conclusion in Terrett was only
that a repeal of the charter could not operate to vest property in the state-a conclusion
that was itself unnecessary since, as Story stressed, the statute revoking the charter had
expressly declined to interfere with the Church's property rights. See supra note 101 and
accompanying text.
,"I Cf. supra note 98 and accompanying text (quoting the repealing statute, which cited
the religion clauses as the reason for the repeal).
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rett opinion. 1 14 Direct Supreme Court encounters with the compa-

rable provisions of the first amendment were far in the future;" 5
Story's observations are therefore of some significance for first
amendment law despite the somewhat different wording of the
state and federal provisions."'
The legislature had been mistaken, Story said, in thinking
that either the existence of religious corporations or the grant of
property for church purposes offended the guarantee of" 'free exercise'" or the declaration that "'religion can be directed only by
the reason and conviction, not by force and violence.' "7 The legislature "could not create or continue a religious establishment
which should have exclusive rights and prerogatives, or compel the
citizens to worship under a stipulated form or discipline, or to pay
taxes to those whose creed they could not conscientiously believe."" 8 However,
the free exercise of religion cannot be justly deemed to be restrained by aiding with equal attention the votaries of every
sect to perform their own religious duties, or by establishing
funds for the support of ministers, for public charities, for the
endowment of churches, or for the sepulture of the dead."-9
Modern establishment clause 120 doctrine has departed from the
dicta endorsing state subsidies to all religions,' 2 1 but today it might
well offend the free exercise clause' 22 to deny churches alone the
123
benefits of the corporate form.
I1" The statement in J. MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
198 (1971), that "Story struck down the rescinding statute as violating the free exercise of
religion and the rights of property guaranteed by the Virginia constitution and bill of
rights" seems to be in error.
115 See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
116 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof") with VA. CONST. art. I, § 16
("[t]hat religion.., and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and

conviction ... and ... all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion according

to the dictates of conscience").
117 Terrett, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 48-49 (quoting the Virginia Bill of Rights).
1'8 Id. at 49.
119 Id.

U.S. CONST. amend. I. See supra note 116.
See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (striking down grants to churchrelated primary and secondary schools). But cf. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)
(upholding tax exemptions for church property).
122 U.S. CONST. amend. I. See supra note 116.
123Cf. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (state may not exclude clergymen from
legislature). See generally Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1 (1961).
I20
121
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Thus Story in his first constitutional opinion for the Court revealed some of Marshall's less attractive traits: unwillingness to
confine himself to narrow grounds of decision, vague and con12 4
clusory resolution of important new constitutional questions,
failure to deal with the applicable precedents, and a strong suggestion of willingness to set aside legislation incompatible with his
conception of "natural justice."
D.

Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward

Dartmouth College was established by royal charter in 1769.
The charter appointed twelve trustees, gave them authority to govern the college, and empowered them to choose their successors. In
1816 the New Hampshire legislature passed a series of statutes increasing the number of trustees to twenty-one, authorizing the
Governor to appoint the nine new members, and subjecting important decisions of the trustees to a new Board of Overseers largely
chosen by the Governor. In an action by the old trustees to reclaim
corporate books from an officer appointed under the new law, the
state court upheld the statutory changes;12 5 the Supreme Court in
1819 reversed. 12 6
"I

See B. WRIGHT, supra note 68, at 39 ("[Elven the Marshall court was hesitant to call

[the 1776 act] a contract. But if it was not a contract, where in the national Constitution
does one find an applicable clause?"); see also G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, supra note 17, at
404 (stating that both Fletcher and Terrett were based on "the contract clause and the
doctrine of vested property rights"). In Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 292
(1815), which Story's treatise cites in the same breath with Terrett, 3 J. STORY, supra note
40, § 1385, at 258 & n.1, he was even more vague about the basis of his conclusion; the
unexplained statement that a statute "could not afterwards be repealed" "so far as it
granted the glebes to the towns," 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 336, followed a discussion of the
inability of the Crown at common law to resell granted lands without the consent of their
owner. Id. at 334. The Court and Story himself were later to suggest that Terrett had been
based on the contract clause. See Piqua Branch of State Bank v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.)
369, 389 (1853 Term); 3 J. STORY, supra note 40, § 1358, at 258 & n.1.
25 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 1 N.H. 111 (1817), rev'd, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518 (1819). This opinion is interesting for its rejection of the argument that the
repeal offended the law-of-the-land clause of the state constitution, see N.H. CONST. pt. 1,
art. XV, a first cousin of due process:
[H]ow a privilege can be protected from the operation of a law of the land, by a clause
in the constitution declaring that it shall not be taken away, but by the law of the land,
is not very easily understood. . . . It is evident, from all the commentaries upon it by
English writers, that it was intended to limit the powers of the crown, and not of
parliament.
1 N.H. at 129 (emphasis in original). Webster responded by quoting Blackstone's statement
that "laws of the land" meant general legislation, not an act "'to confiscate the goods of
Titius"' alone. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 580-81 (quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*44).
'26 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). For the
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Though it evidently attracted little notice at the time outside
New England, 2 7 this case later became a cause c6l bre, and the
Court made much of it. Marshall's opinion consumes thirty
pages; 128 Washington and Story uncharacteristically felt obliged to
add lengthy explanations of their own;'29 Duvall, who after eight

years of silence may have lost the ability to express himself, unpardonably dissented without opinion. 130 Yet the arguments the
Justices were at most pains to refute seem today to have bordered
on the frivolous. Marshall directed the bulk of his ammunition' 3 '
against the lower court's suggestion that because Dartmouth had
been established for the "public" purpose of education it was
really a "public" corporation that could be abolished as readily as
cities and towns; 1' 2 Washington and Story plowed the same ground
background of the case see 4 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 13, at 220-81; 1 C. WARREN, supra
note 13, at 475-92, and see generally the disorganized but detailed J. SHIRLEY, supra note 56,
as to which Beveridge's cautionary evaluation rings true to at least the "harried reader,"
4 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 13, at 258 n.2. The legal arguments and other relevant materials
have been collected by Timothy Farrar. T. FARRAR, REPORT OF THE CASE OF THE TRUSTEES
OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE AGAINST WILLIAM H. WOODWARD (Boston 1819).
127 See 4 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 13, at 237, 275-76.
128 Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 624-54.
12' See id. at 654 (Washington, J.), 666 (Story, J.). Livingston concurred "for the reasons stated by the Chief Justice, and Justices Washington and Story," id. at 666; Johnson
concurred for the reasons stated by Marshall, id. (despite his dissent from the contract
clause reasoning of Fletcher, see supra note 22 and accompanying text). Todd was absent
the whole Term "on account of indisposition." 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at iii n.1. Todd has been
reported as opposing the trustees when the case was first argued. See, e.g., 4 A. BEVERIDGE,
supra note 13, at 225. This report evidently is based upon Webster's uncertain surmise. See
1 C. WARREN, supra note 13, at 480.
SO See Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 713. Irving Dilliard rejects as "manifestly unfair" the allegation that Duvall was "'probably the most insignificant

of all Supreme Court judges.'" Dilliard, Gabriel Duvall, in 1 THE JUSTICES

OF THE UNITED

STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969, at 428
BATES, THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT

(H. Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969) (quoting E.
109 (1936)). Indeed, Dilliard affects to give Duvall extra points for declining to reveal his reasons, suggesting that by his "blunt entry"
Duvall "showed what he thought of Webster's long oratorical plea before the bench and of
Chief Justice Marshall's pioneering decision." Id. at 420. Dilliard does not suggest which
Justice or Justices he thinks more insignificant than Duvall.
131See Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 627-41.
122 Trustees of Dartmouth College, 1 N.H. at 132-34. Story had conceded in Terrett v.
Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 52 (1815), that a legislature might have power to alter "public
corporations which exist only for public purposes, such as counties, towns, cities, &c ...
securing however, the property for the uses of those for whom, and at whose expense, it was
originally purchased" (emphasis added). To suggest that the state's relationship with a private school was analogous to that with its own political subdivisions, however, seems little
more than a play on the word "public." Among other things, as Washington said of a law
creating a governmental body, "there is in reality but one party to it." Trustees of
Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 661.
To the interesting analogy of the marriage "contract," also employed by the court below, see Trustees of Dartmouth College, 1 N.H. at 132-33, both Marshall and Story re-
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twice again, 3 3 the latter embellishing Marshall's first principles
with extensive citation. For the rest, the opinions busied themselves largely with additional lightweight objections: that the trustees had no personal interest in the charter,13 4 that the corporation
did not exist until the charter was issued and hence could not be
party to it, 135 and that state control did not significantly alter the
charter.'3 6
The essence of the transaction, it seems, was an uncompensated taking. As Marshall said, the statutes appear to have transferred "[t]he whole power of governing the college" from the charter trustees "to the executive of New Hampshire"; 3 7 they had
turned a private school into a public one.' 8 As an original matter
one might have doubted that takings of property could be fitted
into the contract clause.' 9 The same objection, however, could
have been made both in Fletcher v. Peck 40 and in Terrett v. Taylor.1 4 1 Moreover, by invalidating an expropriation of property that
had not been acquired from the state, Terrett had seemed to ap-

sponded that divorce was no impairment but a remedy for breach; the latter strongly suggested that a unilateral divorce without fault would be unconstitutional, while the former
reserved the question. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 629 (Marshall,
C.J.), 696-97 (Story, J.).
133 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 659-62 (Washington, J.), 668-82, 693-95 (Story, J.).
See id. at 641-50, 653-54 (Marshall, C.J.), 697-98 (Story, J.).
1" See id. at 690-706 (Story, J.).
", See id. at 650-53 (Marshall, C.J.), 662-65 (Washington, J.), 707-12 (Story, J.), answering the arguments of John Holmes, id. at 604-05, and of William Wirt, id. at 613-14.
:37 Id. at 652.
" Webster repeatedly stressed in his argument for the trustees that they had been
effectively deprived of their property, id. at 556, 558, 567, 573, 577-80, 587-88; Justice Washington said the same thing, id. at 664-65. The state court had protested that to invalidate
the statutes in question would mean the state could not impose any new duties on existing
corporations or "legislate at all, on the subject of corporations, without their consent."
Trustees of Dartmouth College, 1 N.H. at 127. The Supreme Court was later to uphold
public-utility regulation although it interfered with the freedom of the owners to manage
their property. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n Cases, 116 U.S. 307 (1886); Munn v. Illinois, 94
U.S. 113 (1867); cf. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83-84 (1980) (state
may require shopping center to allow distribution of pamphlets). Yet even the modern decisions recognize that no formal assertion of government title is necessary to constitute a taking. E.g., id. at 82-83 (dictum); cf. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (government may not require that private marina be open to public without charge). Justice
Washington recognized this point: "Would the difference have been greater in principle, if
the law had appropriated the funds of the college to the making of turnpike roads . . .
Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 665.
" See generally Doe, A New View of the Dartmouth College Case, 6 HARv. L. REV. 161
(1892), in which a later New Hampshire Chief Justice contended that the vice of the state's
action lay in transferring control of college property, not in repealing the charter.
See supra notes 17-79 and accompanying text.
11 See supra notes 98-124 and accompanying text.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[49:887

proach the position that every taking was an impairment of contract.142 In relying instead upon the charter as a contract, Marshall
without discussion may have rejected this broad reading of Terrett, but because he did not cite that case, it is difficult to say what
he thought it held. He did not cite Fletchereither, though its holding that a completed grant from the state was a contract resolved
two of the most potent difficulties with his similar characterization
143
of a corporate charter.
Yet there were significant differences between Fletcher and
Dartmouth College, scarcely adverted to in the opinions, that seem
to have prevented the result from being a foregone conclusion. 4
45
In the first place, despite Justice Washington's bare assertion, it
seems less obvious in the case of a charter than in that of a land
transfer that the grant is implicitly irrevocable; to the modern
reader a charter may look rather more like a temporary permit or
license. Dartmouth's charter, however, seemed to preclude that inference, for it provided not only that the trustees should constitute
the corporation "'forever hereafter,'" but that their number
42 See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.

143Marshall's failure to cite Fletcher may help to explain why Washington and Story
broke their silence, as both remedied the omission. See Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 656-57 (Washington, J.), 682-83 (Story, J.). Webster, who had unaccountably been permitted to devote the greater part of his long-winded argument to questions of
state law he conceded were not before the Court, see id. at 557-88, had invoked not only
Fletcherand Terrett, but New Jersey v. Wilson as well, id. at 590-91. Echoed by Washington, see id. at 663-64, he had particularly stressed Story's Terrett dicta implying that a
corporate charter was a contract that normally could not be revoked, see supra note 112.
Marshall ignored these too. In Marshall's defense it should be said that neither counsel nor
the court below had denied that state grants could constitute contracts in appropriate cases.
See Trustees of Dartmouth College, 1 N.H. at 132 (distinguishing Fletcher and Wilson as
having involved "express contract[s]").
"' Massachusetts Chief Justice Isaac Parker, writing to Webster after the argument,
was unable to see how the college could lose, "considering the principles already adopted by
the court." Letter from Isaac Parker to Daniel Webster (April 28, 1818), quoted in J. SHIRLEY, supra note 56, at 251. See also 4 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 13, at 223 ("After . . .
Fletcher... and. . . Wilson, nobody could have expected from John Marshall any other
action than the one he took in the Dartmouth College case."); Hagan, Fletcher vs. Peck, 16
GEo. L.J. 1, 2-3 (1927) ("The Dartmouth College case simply applied the rule of Fletchervs.
Peck to a corporate charter."). Beveridge also reported, however, that Webster thought little
of the contract clause argument and saw to the institution of related federal court actions in
hopes of getting the state law questions to the Supreme Court. 4 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note
13, at 251-52. The "belief was general," he added, that review of the state court decision was
"a feeble and forlorn hope." Id. at 238-39. Despite Fletcher and Terrett, Webster did not
ask the Court to strike down the repeal on grounds of natural justice, presumably because
those cases had originated in lower federal courts, and the Court's jurisdiction therefore had
been broader.
'"' Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 658 (Washington, J.).
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should "'hereafter and forever'" be "'twelve and no more.' "1148
Yet the charter was a royal one antedating the contract clause, and
the state court had persuasively held that the King could not have
precluded the charter's legislative repeal.14 7 If the extent of a contractual obligation is defined by the law in force at the time of its
creation, as the Court was soon to hold over Marshall's partial objection, 148 then it could be argued strongly that there had no more
been an obligation not to alter the college charter than there would
have been if the document had expressly provided for its own
9
repeal.

14

The second serious problem was consideration, which Story
alone addressed in detail. Unlike a sale of land, the grant of a charter seems likely prima facie to be a one-sided transaction. Story's
assertions to the contrary notwithstanding,150 there seems to be little in the language of the college's charter to indicate the King had
bargained for anything in return, be it the donation of private assets to the corporation or the implicit undertaking, confected by all
three opinions,151 to administer the college according to its stated

purposes. Story further argued, unnecessarily in light of his conclusion just stated, that no consideration was necessary, but in so do146

Id. at 525 (quoting charter of Dartmouth College). But see J. SHIRLEY, supra note

56, at 433 (terming these expressions merely "formal").
147 Trustees of Dartmouth College, 1 N.H. at 134.
148 See infra notes 203-58 and accompanying text (discussing Ogden v. Saunders).
149 See J. SHIRLEY, supra note 56, at 398; Hagan, The Dartmouth College Case, 19 GEO.
L.J. 411, 420 (1931). Webster argued that the applicability of the clause to a pre-Revolution
grant had already been decided. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 591
(citing as authority New Jersey v. Wilson, where the point had not been addressed). He also
contended (as a matter of state law, which should have been irrelevant) that the legislature
had not inherited Parliament's power to annul charters, which he described as "sovereign"
rather than "legislative." Id. at 558-61. See also Doe, supra note 139, at 213-16 (arguing
that even after adoption of the contract clause New Hampshire's legislature lacked authority to promise not to exercise its regulatory power); cf. supra notes 80-96 and accompanying
text (discussing New Jersey v. Wilson).
To be distinguished from the problem in Trustees of Dartmouth College is the Marshall decision in Owings v. Speed, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 420 (1820), that the contract clause
did not invalidate contractual impairments enacted before the Constitution took effect.
Though the language of the clause clearly speaks only to future impairments ("No State
shall. . . pass any. . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .. .. " U.S. CONST. art I,
§ 10, para. 1), it is not expressly limited to future contracts. Contrast U.S. CONsT. amend.
XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States . . . . " (emphasis added)). See also Currie,
Supreme Court, 1789-1801, supra note 1, at 878-79 (discussing applicability of the ex post
facto clause to statutes enacted before the Constitution).
150 Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 685-87 (paraphrasing the
charter's statement "'considering the premises,'" id. at 524, as "in considerationof the
premises in the introductory recitals," id. at 685 (emphasis added)).
"' See id. at 642 (Marshall, C.J.), 658-59 (Washington, J.), 688-90 (Story, J.).
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ing he seems to have leapt from the undeniable premise that a gift
is irrevocable to the dubious conclusion that it is for that reason a
contract within the meaning of the Constitution.1 52
The issues of consideration and duration thus seem to have
been the principal stumbling blocks after Fletcher to the conclusion that corporate charters were protected by the contract clause;
but Marshall basically ignored them, perhaps because counsel for
the state had never clearly made the appropriate arguments. 153 Indeed, the court below, basing its decision on its characterization of
the college as a "public" institution and on the pre-1789 charter
date, had strongly hinted that the charter of a corporation for private profit could not be altered. 54 Thus, as in so many earlier
cases, the Court in Dartmouth College settled important and difficult questions of constitutional law with hardly any discussion, and
this time it simultaneously made mountains out of constitutional
molehills.
E.

Sturges v. Crowninshield

Sturges sued to collect on promissory notes; Crowninshield's
defense was a discharge granted by a New York court under a state
law, enacted after the notes had been given, "'for the benefit of
insolvent debtors and their creditors.' "55 On questions certified by
the federal circuit court, the Supreme Court in an 1819 Marshall
opinion held the purported discharge unconstitutional. 156
The basis of the decision was once again the contract clause,
and this time it seemed to fit like a glove. The notes were contracts
between private parties; they had created obligations to pay specified sums of money; the discharge released the obligations and
152 [T]he constitution did intend to preserve all the obligatory force of contracts, which

they have by the general principles of law. . . . [W]hen a contract has once passed,
bona fide, into grant, neither the king nor any private person, who may be the grantor,
can recal [sic] the grant of the property, although the conveyance may have been
purely voluntary.
Id. at 683. For an argument that there was no consideration in Dartmouth College and that
the contract clause did not forbid the rescission of a gift, see Thompson, Abuses of Corporate Privileges, 26 AM. L. REV. 169 (1892).
,53See Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 600-15 (Messrs. Holmes
and Wirt).
"' See Trustees of Dartmouth College, 1 N.H. at 118-20 (discussing the matter evidently as one of state law).
I" Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 122 (1819) (quoting Act of April 3,
1811, ch. 248, 1813 N.Y. Laws 468 (Southwick 1813)).
", Id. The court reached the same conclusion in Farmers & Mechanics' Bank v. Smith,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 131 (1821), a case involving a Pennsylvania statute.
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thus impaired them. 157 Perhaps, as Justice Livingston had said in
upholding the New York law on circuit, 158 the Framers had been
motivated in drafting the clause by laws authorizing the issuance
of paper money, allowing the tender of worthless property, and extending the time for payment; but, as Marshall responded, they
had employed more general terms in the Constitution. 5 9
[I]f, in any case, the plain meaning of a provision, not contradicted by any other provision in the same instrument, is to be
disregarded, because we believe the framers of that instrument could not intend what they say, it must be one in which
the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the
case, would be so monstrous, that all mankind would, without
hesitation, unite in rejecting the application. 16 0
Livingston had also concluded that it was too late to challenge
state insolvency laws because they had been universally accepted
since the adoption of the Constitution,' 6" and in this connection
counsel 6 2 properly invoked the opinion sustaining the circuit duties of the Justices in Stuart v. Laird. e3 Marshall replied that
most of the insolvency laws cited merely released the debtor from
prison, while the provision before him discharged the obligation itself. 16 Significantly, however, he elected not to base the validity of
laws of the former description upon mere acquiescence. Misstating
157

Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 197-98 (adding that the obligation was not impliedly

limited to payment out of property in possession when the contract was made). Justice
Washington had reached the same conclusion on circuit in Golden v. Prince, 10 F. Cas. 542
(C.C.D. Pa. 1814) (No. 5509); Marshall did not cite him.
'58 Adams v. Storey, 1 F. Cas. 141, 145-46 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1817) (No. 66) (praising insol-

vency laws as universal and just). Marshall did not advert to this decision.
,5'Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 204-05.
160Id. at 202-03. Marshall employed similar language in Dartmouth College, prefaced
by the statement:
It is not enough to say, that this particular case was not in the mind of the Convention,
when the article was framed, nor of the American people, when it was adopted. It is

necessary to go farther, and to say that, had the particular case been suggested, the
language would have been so varied, as to exclude it, or it would have been made a
special exception.

Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 644. See supra notes 96124 and accompanying text.
"' Adams v. Storey, 1 F. Cas. at 146-47.
162 Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 162, 165-66; see also id. at 165 (quoting the maxim
"communis error facit jus').
143 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) ("[P]ractice, and acquiescence under it, for a pe-

riod of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an
irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the construction."). See Currie, Federal Courts,
1801-1835, supra note 1, at 661-65.
164 Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 203.
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the unambiguous argument of counsel, he declared practice before
1789 irrelevant"6 5 and relied on original intent: "To punish honest
insolvency by imprisonment for life, and to make this a constitutional principle, would be an excess of inhumanity which will not
readily be imputed to the illustrious patriots who framed our con-

stitution, nor to the people who adopted

it. '' 1 6

Moreover, impris-

onment was "no part of the contract" but at most "a means of
inducing [the debtor] to perform it," and "[w]ithout impairing the
obligation of the contract, the remedy may certainly be modified as
1 67
the wisdom of the nation shall direct. 1
The dictum endorsing retroactive laws releasing debtors from
prison became an alternative holding in Justice Thompson's 1827
opinion in Mason v. Haile,' on the ground that they "act merely
upon the remedy, and that in part only."' 6 9 Marshall himself was
later to come close to making the extraordinary concession in a
desperate dissent that the state could abolish all remedies for preexisting contracts. 1170 Yet any sharp distinction between obligation
and remedy was difficult to square with Marshall's insistence in
Marbury v. Madison1 7 1 on the intimate relationship between rights
and remedies, 17 2 and, in striking down laws restricting the rights of
landowners to recover against squatters in Green v. Biddle,1 3 Jus-

'65 "If the long exercise of the power to emit bills of credit did not restrain the convention from prohibiting its future exercise, neither can it be said that the long exercise of the
power to impair the obligation of contracts, should prevent a similar prohibition." Id.
I" Id. at 200.
,67 Id. at 200-01.
'68 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 370 (1827).
,69 Id. at 378 (citing Sturges). Justice Washington, dissenting, did not dispute the
Court's reasoning as a general principle. He argued that the debtor's release from prison
impaired the obligation and not merely the remedy because the contract in suit was a bond
conditioned on his remaining in custody. Id. at 380-81 ("restraintof the person is the sole
object of the contract" (emphasis in original)). Thompson responded that the statutory release satisfied the bond's condition that the prisoner remain until "lawfully discharged." Id.
at 375, 377.
170 Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 351 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting):
[TIhe constitution. . . prohibits the States from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts; it does not enjoin them to enforce contracts. Should a State be sufficiently insane to shut up or abolish its Courts, and thereby withhold all remedy, would
this annihilation of remedy annihilate the obligation also of contracts? We know it
would not.
He appeared to take it back in the next breath, suggesting it would be unconstitutional "if a
State shall not merely modify, or withhold a particular remedy, but shall apply it in such a
manner as to extinguish the obligation, without performance. " Id. at 352; see infra notes
215-37 and accompanying text.
17! 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
172 See id. at 163, 177-78; Currie, Federal Courts, 1801-1835, supra note 1, at 651-61.
173 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
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tice Washington went to the opposite extreme: "If the remedy afforded be qualified and restrained by conditions of any kind, the
right of the owner . . is impaired .... "I"
No one seriously contended, however, that the clause forbade
changes in the minutiae of court procedure for enforcing existing
agreements; the Court therefore was unable to avoid drawing lines
to determine which remedial modifications had such a significant
impact as to impair the obligation itself. 75 Marshall's concession in
Sturges that laws opening the debtors' prisons were valid may
have been inescapable in light of practice, but his explanation that
they went merely to the remedy suggested that remedial changes
might embrace far more than procedural details.17 Later decisions
would exploit this opening as an avenue for making substantial in177
roads upon the protection afforded by the clause.
Before reaching the contract clause question in Sturges, the
Court had unnecessarily resolved another issue of major importance. Sitting on circuit five years before, Justice Washington had
held Congress's power to adopt "uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies" 7 8 exclusive because state laws "would be dissimilar
174 Id. at 76. The case was decided twice. Story had put the point more modestly in
reaching the same result in 1821, before the rehearing: "If those acts so change the nature
and extent of existing remedies, as materially to impair the rights and interests of the owner, they are just as much a violation of the compact, as if they directly overturned his rights
and interests." Id. at 17.
Green was significant also for its conclusion that a compact between Virginia and Kentucky was protected by the contract clause, id. at 92 (citing Fletcher); the contrary argument, Washington said, "was not much pressed," id. Counsel had argued that the clause was
"intended merely for the protection of private rights," id. at 37, as it had been applied in all
prior cases. Madison had described the sentence containing it as a "bulwark in favor of
personal security and private rights." THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 282 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). As Marshall said in Sturges, however, the Framers had used broader words.
See the argument in B. WRIGHT, supra note 68, at 46-47, 76, that it was "far-fetched" to
hold a compact a contract but harmless because, as later cases were to hold, congressional
approval made the compact a federal law entitled to precedence under the supremacy
clause. Johnson concurred in Green based on the state constitution, not on the contract
clause. Green, 2 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 94-107 (Johnson, J., concurring).
178 See, e.g., Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843); see also B. WRIGHT, supra
note 68, at 107-18; Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause (pt. 1), 57 HARv.L.
REv. 512, 534-37 (1944). Compare this issue with the question of the extent to which the
application of state procedural rules in state court actions based on federal statutes is precluded because of their effect on substantive federal rights. E.g., Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R.,
342 U.S. 359 (1952) (requiring jury to decide question of fraud in release of FELA claim).
"' Marshall might have limited the impact of his concession had he picked up counsel's
suggestion that imprisonment was a purely nominal remedy that did not significantly improve the chances of collection. Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 155.
177 See, e.g., Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U.S. 143 (1883) (allowing retroactive repeal of a usury
law).
178

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 4.
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and frequently contradictory."' 79 Hamilton had said the same of
the similarly worded power to adopt "an uniform Rule of Naturalization,"' 0 since otherwise "there could not be a UNIFORM
RULE,"' 8 ' and in Chirac v. Chirac'8 2 the Supreme Court itself had
declared without explanation that the exclusivity of the naturalization power "ought not to be controverted.' ' 8 3 Moreover, counsel
argued, the tenth amendment implied that all federal powers were
exclusive, for it reserved to the states only those powers "'not delegated to the United States by the Constitution.' ,184
Marshall was unimpressed. Express provisions such as that
forbidding state treaties, he began, showed "the sense of the Convention to have been, that the mere grant of a power to Congress,
did not imply a prohibition on the States to exercise the same
power."1 1 5 Marshall conceded, however, as Hamilton had argued in
The Federalist,s" that such a grant was implicitly exclusive whenever its "terms" or its "nature" so required. 8 7 Although this was
obvious enough in the case of government debts and the establishment of federal courts,' 8 8 Marshall could easily have argued that
concurrent bankruptcy powers were not so absurd as to overcome
the presumption that when the Framers meant federal power to be
exclusive they said so. Instead he took a narrower view based apparently on his familiar precept that the Framers had done noth'7 Golden v. Prince, 10 F. Cas. 542, 545 (C.C.D. Pa. 1814) (No. 5509). The suggestion
that Story had reached the same conclusion in 1812, G. DUNNE, supra note 25, at 9 (citing
Babcock v. Weston, 2 F. Cas. 306 (C.C.D.R.I. 1812) (No. 704)), seems erroneous; Story
merely refused to respect a legislative stay pending final decision whether to grant a discharge and questioned a state's power to bind an outsider suing in federal court. Despite the
reporter's interpolated citation in Babcock to decisions rendered as late as 1827, the original
report shows the case was actually decided in 1812. See Babcock v. Weston, 1 Gall. 168
(C.C.D.R.I. 1812).
280

181

U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl.4.
THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 199 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis in

original).

81215 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259 (1817).
183 Id. at 269 (Marshall, C.J.).

"I'Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 124 (Mr. Daggett) (quoting U.S.
188

Id. at 193 (Marshall, C.J.).

CONST.

amend. X).

188 Cited by neither the Court nor counsel, Hamilton had argued for exclusivity when
the Constitution "granted an authority to the Union to which a similar authority in the
States would be absolutely and totally contradictoryand repugnant." THE FEDERALIST No.
32, at 198 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis in original).
387

Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 193.

Counsel conceded the exclusivity of Congress's powers in these areas and in the
more controversial area of regulating commerce. Id. at 167-78 (Mr. Ogden). See infra notes
365-417 and accompanying text (discussing Gibbons v. Ogden). See also Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 49-50 (1825) (dictum) (states cannot directly regulate procedure
of federal courts), discussed in Currie, Federal Courts, 1801-1835, supra note 1,at 713-16.
388
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ing undesirable.1 8 9 It was admitted, he said, that states might enact
"insolvent" laws; the distinction between these and "bankrupt"
laws was so indistinct that "much inconvenience would result"
from holding the bankruptcy power exclusive. 190
That was all. Marshall could have demolished the tenth
amendment contention by noting the incongruity of holding that a
provision designed to protect state authority had actually impaired
it. 91 He could have countered Washington's textual argument by
invoking counsel's analogy 9 2 of the provision for "uniform" federal
taxes, 9" which obviously was a limit only on Congress and not on
the states. He also could have argued, with counsel and with Livingston's circuit opinion upholding the law involved in Sturges, 9 "
that the Court's recognition of the exclusivity of naturalization had
been based solely on statute,1 95 that Justices Wilson and Blair had
upheld state naturalization in 1792 before the enactment of a prohibitory federal law,198 and that the alleged exclusivity of the natus See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text (discussing Fletcher v. Peck).
Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 194-96. In reaching this conclusion, Marshall incidentally proclaimed that the bankruptcy power would enable Congress to pass laws discharging
only the person of the debtor, or operating at the debtor's instance, though both were said
to be "insolvent" rather than "bankrupt" laws in contemporary parlance. Id. at 194. Livingston, in contrast, had doubted Congress had power to pass laws discharging anyone but
"traders," and he had declared that "a bare inspection of the act," also involved in Sturges,
"will leave no doubt in the mind of any one to which class it belongs." Adams v. Storey, 1 F.
Cas. 141, 142 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1817) (No. 66).
191 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 449-50, 458-59, 790 (J. Gales ed. 1789); infra notes 292-364
and accompanying text (discussing McCulloch v. Maryland).
"I Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 174 (Mr. Ogden).
193 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (Congress's power "To Lay . . . Duties, Imposts and
Excises" subject to limitation that they "be uniform throughout the United States").
194 Adams v. Storey, 1 F. Cas. 141, 143-44 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1817) (No. 66).
,g' The act in force at the time of the state's attempted naturalization in Chirac provided that an alien could become a citizen "on the following conditions, and not otherwise."
Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 414, 414 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C. (1976)); see Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 169-72 (Mr. Ogden). Marshall had
said in Chirac that it was argued that the state law had been "virtually repealed by the
constitution of the United States, and the act of naturalization passed by Congress." Chirac
v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 269. Moreover, as Marshall noted, the exclusivity of federal
authority had not been denied by counsel in Chirac, id., and the entire passage was unnecessary to the result since the party asserting state power to confer citizenship prevailed on
another ground.
'" Collet v. Collet, 6 F. Cas. 105, 106-07 (C.C.D. Pa. 1792) (No. 3001) (Wilson and
Blair, Circuit Justices; Peters, District Judge) (invoking the uniform-tax analogy), cited in
Adams v. Storey, 1 F. Cas. at 141, 143. See also United States v. Villato, 28 F. Cas. 377
(C.C.D. Pa. 1797) (No. 16,622), where Justice Iredell suggested that "if the question had not
previously occurred, [he] should be disposed to think, that the power of naturalization operated exclusively, as soon as it was exercised by congress," id. at 379 (dictum) (emphasis
added).
,
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ralization clause was based upon an argument, inapplicable to
bankruptcy, 197 that the power to confer citizenship would enable
one state to foist undesirables onto another by virtue of the privileges and immunities clause of article IV. 198 Not only were Marshall's arguments a good deal less than complete, but the narrow
basis of his conclusion left the door open for his later dictum that
the commerce power might be exclusive,1 99 and thus to a whole raft
of decisions striking down state laws on the ground that they encroached on congressional authority.
Perhaps most interesting is what Sturges tells us about the
internal practices of the Marshall Court. As we have seen, Livingston had disagreed on circuit with the conclusion that the New
York law offended the contract clause, and Washington had rejected the conclusion that the bankruptcy power was concurrent.
Neither registered a dissent in Sturges, but there is extrinsic evidence that neither was persuaded to abandon his position. 0 0 Moreover, later statements by Johnson have led observers to conclude
that he agreed with Livingston.0 1 Thus what the reports tell us
was just another pronouncement of the Harmonious Seven turns
out to have reflected the thinking of only three or four of their
number, and we are left wondering on how many other occasions
202
the Justices elected to suppress fundamental differences of view.
Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 148 (Mr. Hunter); Adams v. Storey, 1 F. Cas. at 143.
See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."). This was Madison's argument, THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 269-71 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961), echoed by
counsel in Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 264 (Mr. Harper), and by Chancellor Kent in his
treatise, 1 J. KENT, supra note 109, at 424. This argument was to play a significant role in
the Dred Scott decision, Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405-07, 417-18, 422-23
(1857); its validity had been denied by Blair and Wilson in Collet: "[T]he state which communicates the infection must herself be first infected; and in this, as in all other cases...
the principle of self-preservation will inculcate every reasonable precaution." 6 F. Cas. at
106-07.
'9 See infra notes 365-417 and accompanying text (discussing Gibbons v. Ogden).
200 See infra note 209 and accompanying text (discussing Ogden v. Saunders); 1 LIFE
AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 326 (W. Story ed. 1851) ("All the Judges, except judge Livingston, concurred in this opinion").
201 See, e.g., D. MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON 117 n.33, 216 (1954) (citing Ogden
v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827)). In Ogden, Justice Johnson denied the federal
power was exclusive and said Sturges "partakes as much of a compromise, as of a legal
adjudication." Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 272-73. He said the "minority" in that case
had surrendered their position that retroactive laws were permissible rather than "risk the
whole." Id. at 273. In addition, he described insolvency laws as just and said it was "no
objection" to the "correctness" of his argument that it was said to be "as applicable to
contracts prior to the law, as to those posterior to it" and thus inconsistent with Sturges: "I
entertained this opinion then, and have seen no reason to doubt it since." Id. at 284.
202 Washington also revealed in Mason v. Haile, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 370, that it had
197
198
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Ogden v. Saunders

In Sturges the Court had held without recorded dissent that
the contract clause prohibited the discharge of debts contracted
before enactment of an insolvency law.20 3 Eight years later it held
by a vote of four to three that a state was free to discharge obligations incurred to its own citizens after the law was passed.0 4
Ogden was the only constitutional case in thirty-five years in
which Marshall signed a dissent, and he took Story and Duvall
with him.2 0 5 Headless for the first time, the majority reverted to
the pre-Marshall practice of seriatim opinions. Washington, who
had never before broken publicly with the Chief,20 8 delivered a
solid opinion 207 whose becoming modesty2 0 8 contrasted sharply
with Marshall's habitual certainty. In revealing that he had always
thought the federal bankruptcy power exclusive, 20 9 Washington
also exhibited admirable self-restraint; for by respecting the precedential effect of what was really only a dictum in Sturges, he cast
the deciding vote to uphold a law he believed invalid. The relatively independent Johnson was the most discursive,21 0 pausing to
1
tell us not only his views on issues already resolved in Sturges,'
but also that his predecessors had been wrong to limit the ex post
facto clause to criminal matters.21 2 The newcomers Thompson 1 3
and Trimble,' whose disagreement with Marshall was an omen,
"never been my habit to deliver dissenting opinions in cases where it has been my misfortune to differ from those which have been pronounced by a majority of this Court," and that
he did so in that case only out of "regard for my own consistency" in light of the perceived
conflict between Sturges and the case before him. Id. at 379. Washington added that he had
"prepared no written opinion" in Mason. Id. at 382. His saying so may suggest that by 1827
this had become a departure from the norm.
'13See supra notes 155-202 and accompanying text.
204 Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). The case is discussed briefly in 1
C. WARREN, supra note 13, at 686-93, and in
206 Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 332.

4 A.

BEVERIDGE,

supra note 13, at 480-82.

,o"In a letter to Jefferson, Johnson had said that Marshall and Washington were "commonly estimated as one judge." Letter from William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 10,
1822), quoted in D. MORGAN, supra note 201, at 182.
207 See Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 254.
20 "[Mly labors.., have led me to the only conclusion by which I can stand with any
degree of confidence; and yet, I should be disingenuous were I to declare ... that I embrace
it, without ... a doubt of its correctness." Id. at 256.
,01Id. at 264.
210 See id. at 271. For an earlier prominent difference of opinion between Johnson and
Marshall, see supra notes 6-60 and accompanying text (discussing Fletcher v. Peck).
2,1Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 272-81, 284; see supra note 201.
222 Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 286.
213 Id. at 292. Thompson had replaced the deceased Livingston in 1823.
"I Id. at 313. Trimble, whose opinion in Ogden was perhaps the most convincing, had
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added important refinements to Washington's arguments at various points; but basically all four opinions said much the same
things.
The Constitution protected not contracts as such, the majority
observed, but only their "Obligation." The existence and extent of
the obligation were determined by the law in force at the time of
the agreement; that law was state law, and it included the insolvency provision. It was as if the contract itself had provided that
insolvency would discharge the debt. It would be "something of a
solecism," said Washington, to hold that the law creating an obligation impaired it at the same time. 21 5 The vice the Framers had
meant to attack was retroactive legislation, which was "oppressive,
unjust, and tyrannical"; 2 1e there was nothing unjust about affording relief in accordance with rules accessible to the parties at the
time of their agreement.2 17
Through much of his dissenting opinion Marshall seemed to
flirt with the idea that the Constitution protected agreements
whether or not they were recognized by state law: "[I]ndividuals do
not derive from government their right to contract, but bring that
right with them into society; that obligation is not conferred on
contracts by positive law, but is intrinsic, and is conferred by the
act of the parties. 2 18 The implication, supported by Webster's argument that the Framers' purpose had been not simply to protect
vested rights but "to establish confidence, credit, and commerce,"2 1 9 seemed to be that the contract clause guaranteed a freedom of contract resembling that which later Justices were to dis-

been appointed after Todd's death in 1826.
115Id. at 260 (Washington, J.).
21 Id. at 266 (Washington, J.).
217 Id. at 256-60, 266-67 (Washington, J.). See also id. at 283-85 (Johnson, J.), 297-303,
308-10 (Thompson, J.), 316-21, 324-27 (Trimble, J.). Webster had argued that the parties to
a contract made before the insolvency law might equally have expected that such a law
might be passed, id. at 245-46, but the ex post facto provision showed that at least in the
criminal context the Framers had not found his equation convincing. Washington's policy
argument also enabled him to explain why the Framers had, as he concluded, permitted
prospective bankruptcy laws while forbidding those allowing tender other than in gold or
silver: while the former merely afforded a person "by misfortunes. . . reduced to poverty"
the chance "to become once more a useful member of society," the latter were "always unjust" because, "unsupported . . . by the plea of necessity," they relieved "the opulent
debtor" as well. Id. at 269-70 (Washington, J.); see also id. at 288-89 (Johnson, J.).
218 Id. at 346 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
219 Id. at 247-48 (Mr. Webster); see also id. at 335-36 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (while
the ex post facto clause is "in its very terms, confined to pre-existing cases," the contract
clause "is expressed in more general terms ... which comprehend, in their ordinary signification, cases which occur after, as well as those which occur before, the passage of the act.").
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cover in the due process clause:22 0 a state impaired the obligation
of contract not only when it destroyed a pre-existing contractual
duty, but 1 whenever it denied legal effect to the parties'
22
intentions.
Although the words of the clause seem capable of bearing this
interpretation, 2 and although no one provided direct evidence to
22
refute Webster's assertions respecting the Framers' intentions, 1
this aspect of Marshall's opinion proved to be nothing but a distraction, for he ended by abandoning it in the face of its insupportable consequences. As the majority pointed out, no one had ever

doubted that the states could pass prospective statutes of frauds or
of limitations, or outlaw usury or penalty clauses in future contracts. 2 4 If the whole "power to pass prospective laws, affecting
220 E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See B. WRIGHT, supra note 68, at 50,

52; Isaacs, John Marshall on Contracts:A Study in Early American Juristic Theory, 7 VA.
L. REV. 413, 426 (1921) (finding it ironic that "although Marshall was overruled in his attempt to find [liberty of contract] in the Constitution where it was written, a juristic tendency of a later day. . . succeeded in finding it in clauses where it had not been written"
(emphasis in original)).
I' If this was true, the case was not the same as if the parties had stipulated for discharge in the event of insolvency, for only in the latter instance would a discharge accomplish the intentions of the parties.
122 Each side attempted, without much success, to derive support from the relation of
the clause to other arguably similar provisions. See, e.g., Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 26566 (Washington, J.) (noting that a single clause proscribed both contractual impairments
and the retroactive ex post facto laws and bills of attainder, while prospective bans on coinage, bills of credit, and legal tender were lumped together elsewhere); id. at 335-36 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (observing that the retrospective ex post facto and bill of attainder
provisions were both applicable only to criminal matters, while the other civil prohibitions
all had prospective force). Justice Washington maintained that the text had been "so maturely considered" that the placement of each clause gave an important clue to its meaning.
Id. at 268. Yet the document of which he was speaking contains two distinct requirements
that direct taxes be apportioned and places the power to govern the District of Columbia
and the territories in entirely separate articles.
"13 The Convention debates, still unavailable at the time, are less than conclusive. Rufus King had moved "to add, in the words used in the Ordinance of Congs [sic] establishing
new States, a prohibition on the states to interfere in private contracts." 2 CONVENTION
RECORDS, supra note 74, at 439. To Mason's objection that "[tihis is carrying the restraint
too far," id. at 440, Wilson replied that "retrospective interferences only are to be prohibited," id. (emphasis in original). But the Northwest Ordinance provision that King had proposed to copy, and that Wilson was discussing, expressly referred to "private contracts or
engagements. . . previously formed." Northwest Territory Ordinance and Act of 1787, art.
II, ch. 8, § 1, 1 Stat. 51, 52 n.(a) (1789) (emphasis added). As with the question of public
contracts, see supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text (discussing Fletcherv. Peck), we do
not know whether the Convention later dropped the explicit limitation because it was undesirable or because it was understood. Justice Chase had used the assumed retrospection of
the contract clause to show that the ex post facto provision must be limited to criminal
matters to avoid redundancy. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798), discussed in
Currie, Supreme Court, 1789-1801, supra note 1, at 868-69. Nobody cited Chase in Ogden.
2 Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 257, 259, 261 (Washington, J.), 286-87 (Johnson, J.),
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contracts, was denied to the states," said Washington, "it is most
wonderful, that not one voice was raised against the provision...
by the jealous advocates of state rights," 22 5 -especially because, as
Thompson added, Congress did not seem to have been given power
to do it either.2 2 6
Unwilling, as in the case of debtor's prison, 227 to overthrow so
much accepted practice, Marshall conceded the majority's basic
premise: acknowledging state power "to regulate contracts" and
"to prohibit such as may be deemed mischievous, ' 228 he attempted
instead to distinguish the Court's analogies. Statutes of limitations,
he urged, extinguished merely the remedy and not the right; even
Sturges had recognized that the law of remedies was subject to
modification. 229 The Court had already held, however, that the remedial label was no talisman permitting indirect destruction of the
obligation; 2 0 both Washington and Trimble pointed out that Marshall himself had expressly denied in Sturges that statutes of limitation could be applied retroactively.2 1 Moreover, some of the
Court's examples could not fairly be characterized as remedial.
Marshall had another explanation for them: usury laws and statutes of frauds "precede the obligation of the contract" and "declare the contract to be void in the beginning"; an "obligation must
exist before it can be impaired, 23 2 but a discharge in bankruptcy

299 (Thompson, J.), 326 (Trimble, J.).
Id. at 268 (Washington, J.); see also id. at 258 (Washington, J.), 305 (Thompson, J.).
228 See id. at 308 (Thompson, J.). Counsel had made this point as well. Id. at 236-37.
We do not know exactly who made the argument; although Wheaton reported at length his
and his colleague Webster's arguments against the law, id. at 214-26, 237-54, he impartially
reduced the combined arguments of his seven distinguished adversaries to an amalgam of
ten pages without individual attribution, see id. at 227. Unlike Thompson, Professor Crosskey, who believed the commerce clause gave Congress general authority over contract law,
see infra note 377, found it not at all absurd to think the states had been ousted from the
field entirely; in his view, Ogden v. Saunders was wrongly decided, 1 W. CRossKEY, POLITICS
AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 359 (1953).
222 See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
228 Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 347 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
229 Id. at 348-54 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). It was in this connection that he was to
make the sweeping suggestion that the Constitution did not require the states "to enforce
contracts." Id. at 351; see supra notes 155-77 and accompanying text (discussing Sturges v.
Crowninshield). Washington argued that a bankruptcy discharge was equally "remedial" in
that, like a time limitation, it must be pleaded and could be defeated by a subsequent promise unsupported by consideration. Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 262-63 (Washington, J.);
see also id. at 287 (Johnson, J.).
20 See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text (discussing Green v. Biddle).
2I Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 262 (Washington, J.) (citing Sturges, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 207), 326-27 (Trimble, J.).
232 Id. at 348 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
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"defeat[s] a contract once obligatory. 2 3 3 As Trimble argued, however, "a power competent to declare a contract shall have no obligation, must necessarily be competent to declare it shall have only
a conditional or qualified obligation"; 34 the law effectively made
continued solvency a condition of the original obligation, and the
23 5
discharge therefore took nothing from the creditor.
At this point Marshall was on the ropes, but he came up with
a startling analogy of his own that must give pause to those who
share my sense that the majority was right. If the clause merely
protected existing expectations, said Marshall, the state could
make it inapplicable to all future agreements by enacting that
agreements "should be discharged as the legislature might prescribe. ' 23 6 Principled grounds for distinguishing the prospective
bankruptcy law are not easy to find; and thus the contending Justices seem to have demonstrated that either to uphold the law or
not to uphold it would lead to consequences so absurd that they
27
could not have been intended.
23 Id. See also id. at 337 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that an insolvency law
had "no effect whatever" on a contract "until an insolvency should take place, and a certificate of discharge be granted").
23, Id. at 323 (Trimble, J.).
215 Id. at 323-24 (Trimble, J.); see also id. at 308 (Thompson, J.). Compare Hale, supra
note 175, at 521-22, 528-31 (criticizing Marshall's efforts) with 4 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note
13, at 481 (terming the Ogden dissent one of Marshall's "most powerful" opinions).
'3' Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 339 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 338
(less shocking argument that if the bankruptcy law determined the obligation of contracts
made after its enactment, it could not be repealed as applied to them). Washington conceded this latter point. Id. at 260-61 (Washington, J.).
23 Marshall commendably conceded that the question had been settled neither by
Sturges nor by its companion case of McMillan v. McNeill, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 209 (1819),
despite the statement in the latter case that it was immaterial that the law had been
"passed before the debt was contracted," id. at 213. In McMillan the contract had been
"made in a different state, by persons residing in that state, and consequently without any
view to" the insolvency law in question. Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 333 (Marshall, C.J.,
dissenting). Thus the application of the law in McMillan had had retrospective effect after
all; the case fell within the purpose of protecting vested rights even though it was hard to
say the state had "passed" a law impairing the obligation of contracts. Cf. Owings v. Speed,
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 420 (1820) (holding the clause inapplicable to an impairment occurring
before 1789). In any event, McMillan affords support for the argument that retroactive application of the law of even an interested state may be unconstitutional, despite the Court's
later holding to the contrary in Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964). See B.

CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 625-26 (1963) (arguing that it was "just

as unreasonable, and just as much an impairment of the obligation of contracts, to apply the
law for the protection of the new resident with an out-of-state contract as to apply it for the
protection of an old resident with a contract antedating the statute"). But see Currie, Full
Faith and Credit, Chiefly to Judgments: A Role for Congress, 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 89, 93-94
(taking it back).
Washington and Thompson argued with some force that the issue in Ogden was at least
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Having furnished the one-vote margin for upholding the
state's power to provide for the discharge of future debts owing to
its own residents,"' Justice Johnson wrote a mysterious cadenza in
which he cast the decisive vote against applying the law even prospectively against a creditor from another state.2 39 It seems certain
that this opinion was not based upon the contract clause; to determine what it was based on is appreciably more difficult.
Johnson devoted a good deal of attention to demonstrating
that American courts rejected the British conflict-of-laws principle
that a discharge by the place of contracting was binding on foreign
creditors, 240 but he had declared at the outset that the question
was whether the discharge had been valid when rendered.2 4 1 Because the Court had made clear much earlier that state authority
was not limited 242 by what Johnson kept referring to as "international" law,24 - it seemed incumbent on him to suggest that there
was something in the Constitution to impose on New York the
Court's conclusions as to the proper choice of law. Later passages
seemed to suggest he saw deficiencies of notice 24 4 and possibly of
personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state creditor, 24 5 as well as interference with federal court judgments that Johnson did not say

doubtful, and, therefore, in light of the Court's many previous statements about doubtful
cases, the statute ought to be upheld. Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 270 (Washington, J.),
294 (Thompson, J.). Thompson further suggested that, since the words did not forbid it, the
Court should do what sound policy required. Id. at 310 (Thompson, J.). Marshall ventured a
general approach to constitutional interpretation:
To say that the intention of the instrument must prevail; that this intention must be
collected from its words; that its words are to be understood in that sense in which
they are generally used by those for whom the instrument was intended; that its provisions are neither to be restricted into insignificance, nor extended to objects not comprehended in them, nor contemplated by its framers;-is to repeat what has been already said more at large, and is all that can be necessary.
Id. at 332 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
238 This holding disposed of a number of cases argued together with Ogden. See 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) at 357.
239 Id. at 358 (Johnson, J.) (disposing of Ogden itself); see id. at 213-14.
240 Id. at 359-66 (Johnson, J.).
24 Id.
at 358. Johnson expressly declined to consider whether a valid discharge could be
disregarded in another forum: "The question ... steers clear of that provision in the constitution which purports to give validity in every state to the records, judicial proceedings, and
so forth, of each state." Id.
242 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DaUll.) 199, 299 (1796) (Chase, J.), discussed in Currie,
Supreme Court, 1789-1801, supra note 1, at 860-61.
242 E.g., Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 359 (Johnson, J.) ("The question is one partly
international, partly constitutional.").
24 Id. at 365-66 (Johnson, J.).
243 Id. at 366 (Johnson, J.) ("on what principles can a citizen of another State be forced
into the Courts of a State").

The Supreme Court: 1801-1835

1982]

existed.246 Yet the due process clause, on which we would rely for
notice and personal jurisdiction today,24 apparently applied at the
time only to federal action. 24 8' The further possibility that in these
allusions Johnson was anticipating the natural law notions later
pronounced in Pennoyer v. Neff249 seems to yield on closer reading
to the conclusion that notice problems merely illustrated that
there was "good reason" for limiting state power over foreign
creditors.2 50
Johnson's one concrete constitutional reference was to "the
provision.

. .

which gives the power to the general government to

establish tribunals of its own in every State, in order that the citizens of other states or sovereignties might therein prosecute their
rights under the jurisdiction of the United States. '251 The purpose
of this clause, he thought, was "to confine the States, in the exercise of their judicial sovereignty, to cases between their own citizens" to prevent "jealousy, irritation, and national complaint or retaliation. 2 52 Johnson seems to have been suggesting, in other
words, that article III gave the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction
of diversity cases.2 53 This remarkable and unsupported suggestion
was contrary to the explicit assurances of The Federalist,254 to

thirty-eight years of uninterrupted practice based upon the laws
enacted by the First Congress, 2 55 and to Justice Washington's conclusion in Houston v. Moore256 that the constitutional grant of federal-question jurisdiction was not exclusive. 57 So far as I am aware
it has never surfaced in any other context since.258
246

Id. at 367 (Johnson, J.).
e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (no-

217 See,

tice); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (jurisdiction).
248 See infra notes 524-51 and accompanying text (discussing Barron v. Mayor of
Baltimore).
249 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
250

Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 365 (Johnson, J.).

2

Id. at 359 (Johnson, J.) (referring to U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 1).

252 Id. (Johnson, J.).
253 See also id. at 368-69 (Johnson, J.) (describing the discharge as contrary to "the

judicial powers granted to the United States"); Hale, supra note 175, at 524 (Johnson's
reasoning may imply that the discharge was limited by "the constitutional grant of federal
judicial power").
254 THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (A. Hamilton).
255 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (current version in relevant part at
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976)) (diversity jurisdiction "concurrent with the courts of the several

States").
256 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820), discussed in Currie, FederalCourts, 1801-1835, supra
note 1, at 702-05.
:57 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 32 (Washington, J.).
25 One would have thought Johnson spoke only for himself; for although he said he
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G. Later Cases
Ogden v. Saunders represents a watershed in contract clause
litigation, for it finally set a limit to expansive construction of the
clause. Before Ogden, the Court had only once rejected a contract
clause claim, holding the clause inapplicable to a law passed before
the Constitution took effect.259 Meanwhile the Court not only had
invoked the clause to invalidate retroactive bankruptcy laws' 0 and
changes in the law of remedies that seriously obstructed contractual obligations,261 but had stretched it to cover land grants, 2 cor'
porate charters,26

and interstate compacts.2

64

The contract clause

remained a potent limitation throughout the nineteenth century,265
but Ogden established the important principle that it did not apply to prospective laws, and other decisions beginning the same
year increasingly upheld even retroactive legislation respecting
contracts. 6
One method of upholding such legislation was to take advantage of the Sturges dicta allowing "remedial" changes that did not
go to the essence of the obligation; on this ground the Court allowed relief for imprisoned debtors in Mason v. Haile.67 A second
method was narrow construction of the contract: the Kentuckyhad been "instructed by the majority finally to dispose of this cause," Ogden, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) at 358 (Johnson, J.), Marshall and the others agreeing with Johnson's result had
already given ample grounds for their vote, and Johnson did not say they agreed with his
reasons. Story later said, however, in an opinion for the Court, that Johnson had spoken for
all four of them. Boyle v. Zacharie, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 635, 643 (1832); see also id. at 348
(Marshall's response to counsel). The holding of Johnson's coda to Ogden was reaffirmed in
Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223 (1864); although the Court reported Johnson's reasoning, it added:
Insolvent laws of one State cannot discharge the contracts of citizens of other
States, because they have no extra-territorial operation, and consequently the tribunal
sitting under them, unless in cases where a citizen of such other State voluntarily becomes a party to the proceeding, has no jurisdiction in the case.
Id. at 234.
219 Owings v. Speed, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 420 (1820); see supra note 149.
20 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819); see supra notes 155-202
and accompanying text.
2"1 Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823); see supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
202 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); see supra notes 17-79 and accompanying text.
2M2Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); see
supra notes 125-54 and accompanying text.
20
Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823); see supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
265 See B. WRIGHT, supra note 68, at 91-93.
200 See infra notes 267-78 and accompanying text.
267 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 370 (1827); see supra notes 168-69 and'accompanying text.
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Virginia compact that had been held impaired by anti-squatter
legislation in Green v. Biddle6 8 was held in Hawkins v. Barney's
Lessee269 unimpaired by such "reasonable" regulation of the land
titles it protected as the enactment of a new seven-year statute 2of
70
limitation; a state land grant was held in Jackson v. Lamphire
not to imply a promise that the state would not enact a statute
imposing a limit on the time during which persons might challenge
recorded decisions respecting land titles; and, despite McCulloch v.
Maryland's famous aphorism about the power to tax and the
power to destroy,2 71 a state bank charter was held not to imply an
27
immunity from state taxation in Providence Bank v. Billings. 1
Marshall relied in the latter case on the common practice of taxing
corporations,2 7 noted that the bank's argument would also exempt
land granted by the state from taxation,27 4 and laid down the general principle that because of the "vital importance" of the taxing
power "its abandonment ought not to be presumed. 2 7 5 Finally, in
Satterlee v. Matthewson27 ' and in Watson v. Mercer,2 7 the Court
relied on the language of the contract clause itself in holding that
it did not forbid laws retroactively creating contracts, though the
purpose of the clause might apply; only "impair[ment]" of contractual obligations was prohibited.27 8
Justice Johnson's separate opinion in Satterlee warrants brief
attention. Finding unrelated grounds upon which to concur, he
protested that, although
[t]o give efficacy to a void contract, is not.

. .

violating a con-

268 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823); see supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
269 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 457, 465-66 (1831) (Johnson, J.).
270 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 280, 290 (1830) (Baldwin, J.).
171

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 (1819); see infra notes 273-78

and accompanying text.
272 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 563-64 (1830) (Marshall, C.J.), distinguishing McCulloch on the
ground that it had relied on the supremacy clause and the absence of state power over the
creatures of Congress. The contract clause, however, gives state charters the same priority
over later state laws that the supremacy clause gives federal charters over state law.
27I Id. at 561.
274 Id. at 562.
275 Id. at 561.
174

27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380 (1829) (Washington, J.).

27 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 88 (1834) (Story, J.).
2178See Satterlee, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 413 (Washington, J.) ("it surely cannot be con-

tended, that to create a contract, or to destroy or impair one, mean the same thing"). But
see Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978), holding it an impairment of
contract to increase the obligations of an employer under a pension plan: "[I]n any bilateral
contract the diminution of duties on one side effectively increases the duties on the other."
Id. at 245 n.16. See also Hale, supra note 175, at 515-17 & n.24.
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tract, . . . it is doing infinitely worse; it is advancing to the
very extreme of that class of arbitrary and despotic acts,
which bear upon individual rights and liabilities, and against
. . .which the Constitution most clearly intended to interpose
a protection.7 9
He appended a lengthy note that concluded with a reference to the
principle of "the equity of a statute," suggesting that the contract
clause might apply because the retroactive creation of a contract,
while "out of the letter" of the clause, was "within the same mischief" it was designed to prevent.180 Despite the freewheeling natural law views he had expressed in Fletcher v. Peck,28' however,
Johnson acknowledged he had "serious doubt" whether the "equity of a statute" idea could be applied to the Constitution.2 8 2 Instead he rested his case on the ex post facto clause, attacking "that
unhappy idea, that the phrase 'ex post facto,' in the Constitution
'28 3
of the United States was confined to criminal cases exclusively,
and arguing that Calderv. Bull had not, as commonly supposed, so
decided. 8 " Because the opening quotation from his opinion suggests he had decided to strike down the law before he discovered
the clause of the Constitution upon which he could pin the result,285 this retreat from earlier natural law pronouncements may
indicate that he had acquired not modesty but dissimulation.
Washington, writing for the majority, did not respond directly
to the ex post facto argument; he said, however, that the Constitution did not forbid the divesting of vested rights as such. 8 8 Wash-

279.Satterlee, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 414-15 (Johnson, J.).
280 Id. at 687 app. No. 1 (original ed. Philadelphia 1829).
281 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 143-48 (1810) (Johnson, J., concurring); see supra note 34
and accompanying text. Arguing that Fletcher was Johnson's "one notable appeal. . . to
natural law," Professor Morgan pointed to Johnson's earlier acknowledgment that" '[t]here
are certain eternal principles of justice which never ought to be dispensed with, and which
courts... never can dispense with but when compelled by positive statute,"' D. MORGAN,
supra note 201, at 211 & n.25 (quoting Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 486 (1813)
(Johnson, J., dissenting)), and to Johnson's later statement that he had once given "'too
much weight to natural law and the suggestions of reason and justice in a case which ought
to be disposed of upon the principles of political and positive law, and the law of nations,'
id. at 227 (quoting Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 258 (1830) (Johnson, J.,
dissenting)).
282 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 687 app. No. 1 (original ed. Philadelphia 1829).
283 Satterlee, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 416 (Johnson, J.) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.
1).
284 Id. at 681, 682 app. No. 1 (original ed. Philadelphia 1829). See Currie, Supreme
Court, 1789-1801, supra note 1, at 866-71 (discussing Calder).
285 See supra text accompanying note 279.
288 Satterlee, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 413 (Washington, J.).
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ington added that nothing in Fletcher was to the contrary. After
quoting one of Marshall's more florid natural law passages, Washington emphasized that Fletcher had reviewed a federal rather
than a state court decision; he seems to have read Marshall as talking about the state constitution.A7 Thus by 1829 the Justices seem
to have become more reluctant than in the early days of contract
clause litigation to look outside the Constitution for limits on state
power.2 8 The new attitude is reflected in Watson v. Mercer,2 89
where, in upholding retroactive validation of a conveyance against
both ex post facto and contract clause objections, Story was to repeat, despite Terrett v. Taylor, s° that "the mere fact that it divests antecedent rights of property" did not bring a statute into
conflict with the federal Constitution.9 1
In short, after leaping to give the contract clause a debatably
broad reading in Fletcher v. Peck and the next few cases, the
Court, largely with Marshall's acquiescence, declined to undertake
further extensions of its underlying principle beyond the ordinary
meaning of particular contracts or of the clause itself.
II.

CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY AND IMPLICIT LIMITATIONS ON

STATE POWER

A. McCulloch v. Maryland
Maryland imposed a tax of one to two percent on the issuance
of notes by banks established "'without authority from the
state.' "" The Bank of the United States, chartered by Act of
Congress and owned in part by the United States,
issued notes
without paying the tax. The state court penalized the Bank's cash187

Id. at 413-14.

8 Later in the same Term, however, Story was to say without pointing to anything in
the Constitution that New Hampshire could not authorize an executrix to sell land in Rhode
Island because "[tihe legislative and judicial authority of New Hampshire were bounded by
the territory of the state." Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 655 (1829).
'8" 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 88 (1834).

190 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815); see supra notes 77-95 and accompanying text.
"' 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 110-11. Johnson, nearing the end of his time, was absent. Id. at
iii. Story did not mention his contrary, unsuccessful efforts in Satterlee but relied on supporting precedent. See id. at 110-11. See also 3 J. STORY, supra note 40, § 1392, at 266-68

(reaffirming that the Constitution did not invalidate all retroactive legislation).
2, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 321 (1819) (quoting Act of Feb. 11,
1818, ch. 156, § 1, 1 Md. Laws 679, 679 (Dorsey 1840)). The obligation could be discharged
by an annual payment of $15,000. Act of Feb. 11, 1818, ch. 156, § 1, 1 Md. Laws 679, 679
(Dorsey 1840).
"I" See Act of Apr. 10, 1816, ch. 44, § 1, 3 Stat. 266, 266 (expired by its terms in 1836),
providing that 20% of the shares should belong to the United States.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[49:887

ier; the Supreme Court in the famous 1819 Marshall opinion unanimously reversed. 94
Since McCulloch claimed federal incorporation as his defense,
Congress's authority to establish the Bank was in issue, and the
Court sustained it. As in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,293 practice was
invoked to illustrate contemporary understanding: "The principle
now contested was introduced at a very early period of our history,
has been recognised by many successive legislatures, and has been
acted upon by the judicial department, in cases of peculiar delicacy, as a law of undoubted obligation";29 6 Congress had created a
similar bank as early as 1791.29 Thus the issue could "scarcely be
considered as an open question, entirely unprejudiced by the former proceedings of the nation. . . . An exposition of the constitution, deliberately established by legislative acts, on the faith of
which an immense property has been advanced, ought not to be
lightly disregarded. 2 98 As in Martin, however, and in contrast to
2 9 9 practice was not asserted to be conclusive.
Stuart v. Laird,
Even
long acquiescence, Marshall acknowledged, would not justify "a
bold and daring usurpation," but "a doubtful question ... in the
decision of which the great principles of liberty are not concerned,
. . . if not put at rest by the practice of the government, ought to
receive a considerable impression from that practice."3 0 0 He went
on to find constitutional support for the Bank as an original
matter.
Marshall began his discussion by conceding that the federal
government was one of "enumerated powers," which could "exercise only the powers granted to it." 301 The tenth amendment, reserving to the states "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution,"3 0 2 simply confirmed this conclusion in
order to "quiet[] the excessive jealousies which had been excited"; 0 3 it did not, unlike the provision in the Articles of Confed-

"2
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). The case is set in context by
4 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 13, at 282-339, and by 1 C. WARREN, supra note 13, at 499-500.
295 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 351-52 (1816); see Currie, Federal Courts, 1801-1835, supra

note 1, at 681-87.
"2 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401.
"7 Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191 (expired by its terms in 1811).
"' McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401.
'"
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 308 (1803), discussed in Currie, Federal Courts, 1801-1835,
supra note 1, at 661-65.
300 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401.
301 Id. at 405.
302 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
31' McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406.
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eration reserving powers not "expressly" given Congress, 3 '
preclude finding that Congress had "incidental or implied powers. 3 0 5 To avoid prolixity, the Constitution contained only "its
30
It
great outlines" and designated only "its important objects.2
was "not denied, that the powers given to the government imply
the ordinary means of execution. 3 0 7 A federal corporation was permissible, therefore, if it was an "essential," "appropriate," "direct"
means of carrying out powers explicitly given to Congress. 0 8
This view of incidental powers Marshall found confirmed by
the authorization to make "'all laws which shall be necessary and
proper, for carrying into execution'" powers elsewhere granted the
United States.3 0 9 This clause was not a limitation on the power
that would otherwise have existed, but a grant; a sufficient motive
for its inclusion was "to remove all doubts respecting the right to
legislate on that vast mass of incidental powers which must be involved in the constitution, if that instrument be not a splendid
bauble. '3 10 Nor was the clause itself limited to "those single means,
without which the end would be entirely unattainable";3 "necessary" was a term admitting "of all degrees of comparison," in contrast to the prohibition of state import duties not "'absolutely
necessary'" for executing inspection laws. 12 In summary: "Let the
end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution,
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and

:04 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. 2.

05 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406. See also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 790 (J. Gales ed.
1789) (Madison, opposing a motion to add the word "expressly" to what became the tenth
amendment, argued "there must necessarily be admitted powers by implication, unless the
constitution descended to recount every minutia").
"" McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407. It was in this context that Marshall uttered
that greatly admired and essentially vacuous bon mot: "we must never forget that it is a
constitution we are expounding." Id. (emphasis in original). See Kurland, Curia Regis:
Some Comments on the Divine Right of Kings and Courts to Say What the Law Is, 23
ARIz. L. REv. 582, 591 (1981), arguing that whenever an opinion quotes this passage "you
can be sure that the court will be throwing the constitutional text, its history, and its structure to the winds in reaching its conclusion." One might have thought, as a later Justice has
written, that "precisely because 'it is a constitution we are expounding,' we ought not to
take liberties with it." National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 647
(1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 407 (1819)) (first emphasis added, second emphasis in original).
307McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 409.
:05 Id. at 409-11.
09 Id. at 411-12 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.18).
310 Id. at 420-21.
11 Id. at 414.
31 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, para. 2) (emphasis in original).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[49:887

spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."3 1 3
In all of this I find Marshall at his most persuasive. The natural inference of incidental powers was confirmed in The Federalist;3 14 the necessary and proper clause removes any doubt; a requirement of indispensable necessity would have been so confining
that it could hardly have been intended. Marshall's examples of
unquestioned laws inconsistent with that strict reading were compelling: surely if Congress may establish courts and executive departments it may punish perjury and prescribe oaths of office;
surely the power to tax to pay the debts includes the power to
transport money from place to place.3 15 Marshall's final statement
regarding the extent of incidental powers is remarkably careful and
hard to improve upon in the light of a century and a half of
experience.
What is surprising is that Marshall treated all this as an open
question. The issue had arisen fourteen years before in United
31 6 where the Court
States v. Fisher,
had upheld Congress's power
to give claims of the United States priority in the distribution of
insolvent estates. Marshall had disposed of the issue in two quick
paragraphs. There too he had acknowledged that the federal government had limited powers. 17 There too he had rejected the argument that indispensable necessity was required: "Where various
systems might be adopted for that purpose, it might be said, with
respect to each, that it was not necessary, because the end might
be obtained by other means." 1 " It followed that Congress "must
be empowered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the
exercise of a power granted by the constitution."3 19 Because "the
government is to pay the debt of the Union," it has "a right to
make remittances, by bills or otherwise, and to take those precau3' 20
tions which will render the transaction safe.
It was typical of Marshall not to cite even his own opinions
although they squarely supported him; witness the omission of any

313

Id. at 421.

34

THE FEDERALIST No. 33 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 44 (J. Madison).
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 409, 416-17.
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805).

"'
316

3,1

Id. at 396.

318

Id.

See also Marshall's second "Friend of the Union" letter, The Philadelphia

Union, April 28, 1819, reprinted in G.

GUNTHER, JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF

McCulloch

v. Maryland 95 (1969), giving illustrations including the raising of armies: "A bounty ... is
unconstitutional, because the power may be executed by a draft; and a draft is unconstitutional, because the power may be executed by a bounty."
319 Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 396.
320

Id. See U.S.

CONST.

art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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reference to Fletcher in Dartmouth College.3

1

1

In Dartmouth two

of his brethren stepped in to remind the public that the question
was not new; 22 in McCulloch they stood by while he threw away
his trump card. So far as the report reveals, counsel had not invoked Fisher, and maybe nobody remembered it. That decision
had not raised much dust in 1805;123 that was a long time before

McCulloch, and the indexing of cases was not what it is today.2 4
In fact the Fisher test is subject to serious criticism. Marshall's rejection of a straw man had led him unjustifiably to the
opposite extreme: that Congress has some latitude in the choice of
means need not mean it may employ any "which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a power granted by the constitution.

' 32 5

Vir-

tually anything Congress might want to do could meet that criterion; among other things, it would authorize whatever might bring
the government additional money to pay its debts or to support
armies. It was on this basis that Congress not long ago was permitted to escheat the estates of veterans who die without heirs; 326 the
same argument would seem to support escheat of everyone else's
property, or the operation of any enterprise for profit.2 7 Not only
is such a lax standard difficult to square with the language authorizing laws that are both "necessary and proper," ' but more fundamentally, it contradicts Fisher'ssimultaneous acknowledgement
of the basic principle that the subjects of federal legislation are
limited.
See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
Id.
323 See 1 C. WARREN, supra note 13, at 503-04. It had, however, provoked one congressman to propose a constitutional amendment limiting Congress to the passage of laws bearing a "rational connection with and immediate relation to the powers enumerated." Id. at
502.
3,
See Currie, Federal Courts, 1801-1835, supra note 1, at 680 & n.221.
325 Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 396.
32!

322

United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 645-47 (1961).
See also Jefferson's famous argument:
Congress are authorized to defend the nation. Ships are necessary for defence; copper
is necessary for ships; mines necessary for copper; a company necessary to work the
mines; and who can doubt this reasoning who has ever played at "This is the House
that Jack Built"? Under such a process of filiation of necessities the sweeping clause
makes clean work.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston (April 30, 1800), reprinted in 9 THE
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 132-33 (P. Ford ed. 1905).
228 In McCulloch Marshall argued that the effect of adding the word "proper" was if
anything "to qualify" the "strict and rigorous meaning" that might otherwise have been
suggested by "necessary," 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 418-19, but the use of "and" rather than
"or" seems to imply, as counsel had argued, that it is not enough that a law be merely
"proper," id. at 367 (Mr. Jones).
326

327
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In this critical respect, despite superficial similarities, the Mc3 29 The
Culloch formulation is a vast improvement upon Fisher.
means chosen must be "plainly" adapted to the end, not merely
conducive to it; tenuous connections to granted powers will not
pass muster. It must in addition be "appropriate," which implies
some supervision of the reasonableness of the means. It must not,
Marshall added in a later paragraph, be a mere "pretext ... for
the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government." 3 0 Finally, and most important, it must consist with the
"spirit" as well as the letter of the constitution. In light of earlier
statements in his opinion, the implication seems unmistakable: incidental authority must not be so broadly construed as to subvert
the basic principle that Congress has limited powers.
Though much sweat is often shed over general principles, as it
was in McCulloch, it is not news that they seldom decide actual
cases, 331 and Marshall's formula for determining the necessity and
propriety of incidental legislation left even more than every standard must to the judgment of those who were to apply it. Marshall's effort succeeded, nevertheless, in setting a mood in which
the problem should be approached, and it seems to me he set one
that precisely captured the constitutional spirit. While respecting
the limited nature of federal power, he managed to avoid a construction that would have crippled the ability of Congress to carry
out the purposes for which it had been established.
Marshall was far weaker, however, in applying his exemplary
criteria to the case before him. He mentioned in passing various
enumerated powers to which the creation of a bank might be inciMAlthough Marshall

had dropped less guarded references to means that were "conve-

nient," id. at 413, "conducive," or "appropriate," id. at 415, elsewhere in McCulloch, the
famous passage, supra text accompanying note 313, was the summation of his argument.
330 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423. This is an interesting contrast to Marshall's refusal to
investigate the motive for the Yazoo land grant in Fletcher. See supra notes 18-27 and
accompanying text. The "pretext" concept has since had a checkered career. Compare
United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28-32 (1953) (rejecting pretext argument), overruled
in other respects, Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 54 (1968) and United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941) (same) with United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)
(congressional power denied as pretext).
331 See, e.g., Associated Indus. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 349-50 (2d Cir.
1973) (doubting whether it made any practical difference whether regulations of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration were reviewed under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard or the "substantial evidence" rule). See also Industrial Union Dep't v.
Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("rigorousness" of court's review of Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulation would not be affected by applying a
combined standard of substantial evidence and rationality); Currie, OSHA, 1976 AM. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 1107, 1127 n.112.
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dental: "to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare and conduct a war; and to raise and support armies and navies. ' ' . s 2 What isstriking is that he made no serious
effort to demonstrate how the bank was necessary and proper, or
even conducive, to any one of them. Indeed all he said on this
score was that the bank's utility in "fiscal operations" of the government was "not now a subject of controversy."3 3 3 Hamilton had
done somewhat better in his defense of the first Bank of the
United States: it would facilitate tax collection and commerce by
creating a medium of payment or exchange and by increasing the
money supply; it was a "usual, and in sudden emergencies, an essential instrument, in the obtaining of loans to government. 3 3 4
Even this proved only that some of the Bank's functions were, in
Fisher's terms, "conducive to the exercise of. . .power[s]" given
to Congress; it did not seem to establish that even these functions
were consistent with the federative spirit of the Constitution or to
justify the Bank as a whole. 3 5
I do not mean to suggest that Marshall was wrong to uphold
either the Bank in McCulloch or the government priority in
Fisher.I do suggest that to reach those conclusions on the basis of
the test stated in McCulloch would have required a careful examination of the powers actually granted the Bank, of their relationship to the explicit powers of Congress, and of the degree to which
they undermined the principle of limited federal powers. In short,
Marshall devoted most of his effort to demolishing the straw man
of indispensable necessity and slid over the real question of the

I" McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Hamilton in his
well-known defense of the first national bank had also relied on article IV's authority to
"make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the . . .Property belonging to the
United States," U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, para. 2, i.e., its money. 1 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 138 (New York 1810), quoted in 3 J. STORY, supra note 40, § 1261, at 137 n.4.
"I McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 422. See also 3 J. STORY,supra note 40, § 1261, at
135 (concluding that to reveal why the Bank was a useful and appropriate governmental
institution "would be a waste of time").
33'See 1 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 332, at 138-41. Some of
Hamilton's arguments were repeated by counsel. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 388-90
(Mr. Pinkney).
35 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 334-37 (Mr. Hopkinson) (arguing that the
Bank's branches served merely a profit-making function and could not be sustained). But
see 3 J. STORY, supra note 40, § 1264, at 146-47, implying that anything that made the Bank
more effective was permissible: "All the powers given to the bank are to give efficacy to its
functions of trade and business." For details concerning the Bank's functions and its utility
in carrying out congressional powers, see B. HAMMOND,BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA 25185 (1957); W. SMITH, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE SECOND BANK OF UNITED STATES 99-230
(1953).
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propriety of the Bank itself. 36 Moreover, in so doing he seems to
have undermined the exemplary test he had just laid down. His
cavalier application of the test to the case before him, reinforced
by his explicit refusal to examine the "degree of. . . necessity" of
any law "really calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to
the government, 33 seemed to mean that the limits he had laid
down should not be taken seriously.
Having upheld the existence of the Bank, the Court went on
to hold Maryland could not tax it. The policy basis for this conclusion was plainly stated in the famous aphorism that "the power to
tax involves the power to destroy"; 3 8 to allow the states to tax or
to regulate the activities of the federal government would make it
"dependent on the States."3 3 9 As to the legal basis of his conclusion Marshall was a good deal more obscure. It is not even clear
whether he meant to find tax immunity in the Constitution itself
or in the Bank's statutory charter. 4 0 He phrased the question as a
constitutional one, asserted that the relevant principle "pervades
the constitution," and said a power to destroy the Bank was incompatible with Congress's "power" to create it.34 1 However, the
"principle" to which he referred was federal supremacy; he expressly invoked the supremacy clause,34 2 which merely subordinates state law in the event it conflicts with other federal provisions; and at several points he adverted to the invalidity of state
It was, however, the abstract test Marshall laid down that attracted the most vehement criticism. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 318, at 18-19.
337 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423.
336

338 Id. at 431.
339

Id. at 432; see id. ("They may tax the mail; they may tax the mint;

tax judicial process ....

. . .

they may

_.

340 The distinction may be important, for although Congress may repeal any immunity
it has created, there have been decisions against the power of Congress to confer on states
powers withdrawn from them by the Constitution. See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 299, 317 (1851). More recent commerce clause cases tend to be less exacting.
E.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 421-27 (1946). Cf. Clark v. Barnard, 108
U.S. 436, 447 (1883) (allowing a state to waive the immunity from federal suit afforded by
the eleventh amendment).
34 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 425-26. Here he paraphrased Pinkney's argument
for the Bank. See id. at 391 (Mr. Pinkney). Pinkney had also said both that the power to
tax was the power "to repeal the law, by which the bank was created," id. at 394 (Mr.
Pinkney), and that, like the immunity of a foreign vessel from judicial process, The
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), the Bank's immunity arose
"out of general considerations" "independent of the letter of the constitution, or of any
other written law," McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 395 (Mr. Pinkney). Marshall expressly
declined to hold the federal tax power exclusive, id. at 424; obviously the Framers had not
meant to deprive the states of all revenue. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (A. Hamilton).
342 U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2.
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action incompatible with federal "laws.

'343

In fact, a few years

later, in Osborn v. Bank of the United States,3 44 he would decide a
similar case squarely
on the ground of conflict with the Bank's fed5
34

eral charter.

Whether based upon Constitution or statute, the Bank's immunity was implicit only. The charter law was silent on the question. While a confiscatory tax or one that placed the Bank at a
fatal competitive disadvantage would have contradicted the statute
by destroying what Congress had created, 4 6 Marshall expressly de34 7
clined to investigate whether the Maryland tax was confiscatory,
and he did not rely on its discriminatory nature. Moreover, a few
years later, despite an argument invoking McCulloch, Marshall
was to hold that a state bank charter did not imply immunity from
state taxation-though the power to tax was the power to destroy
a state corporation no less than a federal one. 4 8
To the extent that Marshall relied on the Constitution itself,
the argument was once again that the Framers were reasonable
people who could not have meant to place federal operations at the
mercy of state laws. 49 But a similar argument for implicit immunity had been made in Chisholm v. Georgia,350 and the Court had

rejected it largely on the ground that the words of the Constitution
343 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 425-27; see also id. at 436: "[T]he States have no
power . . . to retard . . . the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress."
Webster had said that the "only inquiry" was whether the state law "be consistent with the
free operation of the law establishing the bank, and the full enjoyment of the privileges
conferred by it." Id. at 327.
34 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
"I Id. at 865-68. See Currie, Federal Courts, 1801-1835, supra note 1, at 695-701. Juslice Stone was later to say that McCulloch itself had been based on the charter. Helvering v.
Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 411 (1938).
3"8 See 1 C. WARREN, supra note 13, at 505 (giving examples of state legislation actually
outlawing the Bank).
31
We are not driven to the perplexing inquiry, so unfit for the judicial department,
what degree of taxation is the legitimate use, and what degree may amount to the
abuse of the power. The attempt to use it on the means employed by the government
of the Union, in pursuance of the constitution, is itself an abuse, because it is the usurpation of a power which the people of a single State cannot give.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 430. See the celebrated riposte of Justice Holmes, in arguing to sustain a state sales tax on sales to the United States: in the days of McCulloch "it
was not recognized as it is today that most of the distinctions of the law are distinctions of
degree. . . . The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits." Panhandle
Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 233 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
38 Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 560 (1830); see supra notes 338-43
and accompanying text.
"'
Cf. supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text (discussing Fletcher v. Peck).
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); see Currie, Supreme Court, 1789-1801, supra note 1, at
831-39.
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did not except suits against states; 51 Marshall made no attempt to
distinguish Chisholm. More basically, McCulloch's argument positing absurd consequences did not hold up on its merits. As another
Justice Marshall has pointed out, no implicit immunity is necessary to protect federal operations; 52 Congress can immunize them
at any time by statute under the necessary and proper clause.3 53
In interesting dicta, Marshall attempted to limit the scope of
McCulloch's immunity decision. First, he denied that state banks
would be free of federal taxation; although a state tax upon federal
operations would fall largely upon outsiders with no voice in determining state policy, the representation of the states in Congress
would prevent abuse of a federal power to tax them. 5 The enumeration of federal powers emphasized by Marshall elsewhere in
the opinion,3 55 however, demonstrates that the Framers were not
content as a general matter to rely solely on political safeguards to
protect the interests of the states. Indeed, Marshall's principal argument for implicit immunity seems far stronger in the converse
case than in McCulloch itself: unlike the United States, the states
cannot protect themselves by enacting an immunity statute; the
supremacy clause is a one-way street.3 56 It was not too long after
311

Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 450-51 (Blair, J.), 466 (Wilson, J.), 467 (Cushing, J.),

476-77 (Jay, C.J.).
352 First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 352 (1968) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Congress could provide. . . statutory immunity from state taxation
for the federal instrumentalities it may establish."). The majority in that case illustrated his
principle by finding national banks immune from the state tax in question under 12 U.S.C. §
548 (1976). First Agricultural Nat'l Bank, 392 U.S. at 345.
"I In McCulloch Marshall essentially ignored counsel's strenuous argument that, if the
government itself was immune from state taxes, the Bank was not because it was basically a
private operation carried on for profit. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 340-41 (Mr.
Hopkinson); Pious & Baker, McCulloch v. Maryland: Right Principle,Wrong Case, 9 STAN.
L. REV. 710, 720-23 (1957). In Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 904, 906 (1824), Marshall was to insist that a suit against a corporation chartered
and partly owned by a state was not a suit against the state barred by the eleventh amendment. See Currie, Federal Courts, 1801-1835, supra note 1, at 700. A parity of reasoning
would suggest that a tax on the Bank was not a tax on the United States. Cf. National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854 n.18 (1976) (acknowledging that Congress could
regulate state-owned railroads because they were "not in an area that the States have regarded as integral parts of their governmental activities"); New York v. United States, 326
U.S. 572, 582-83 (1946) (allowing a federal tax on the state's sale of mineral water while
assuming that other state functions were immune).
'" McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 428, 435. See Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 533, 547-48 (1869) (upholding a federal tax on the issuance of state bank notes). For
an excellent explication of other examples of the same principle of political safeguards, see
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 82-87 (1980).
355 See supra notes 332-33 and accompanying text.
"' See Powell, The Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARv. L. REV.
633, 652-64 (1945).
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McCulloch that the states were held immune from federal taxes as
3 57

well.

Marshall's second reservation was that the opinion did not
preclude nondiscriminatory taxes on "real property of the bank" or
on "the interest which the citizens of Maryland may hold in this
institution." ' This too derives support from his discussion of political checks, though not tied to it in the opinion; that the state
cannot overburden federal activities without doing the same to
those of its own citizens furnishes some degree of protection. If this
was the reason for Marshall's concession concerning property and
stock taxes, it should have permitted a nondiscriminatory tax on
the issuance of banknotes as well; yet in the body of his opinion
Marshall nowhere relied on the fact that the Maryland tax was discriminatory. 5 9 A property tax might be consistent with the notion,

elsewhere found in the opinion, that the Constitution did not "deprive the States of any resources which they originally possessed,"3 0 because the land had not been created by Congress. But
shares of bank stock had been; like the notes taxed in McCulloch
itself, they were "means employed by the government. . . for the
execution of its powers. 3 61 Marshall nowhere explained why stock

was not also governed by his earlier injunction that the state could
not tax such means at all.362 In fact, the concessions for property
and stock did not sit well with the rest of the opinion; Marshall
himself was to ignore them in Weston v. City Council,33 where,
357 Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 126-27 (1871), overruled in part, Graves v.
New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 486 (1939) (holding salaries of government officials
subject to income taxation).
" McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436.
19 Moreover, his distinction of the property and stock cases was simply that the case
before him concerned "a tax on the operations of the bank," id. at 436; and elsewhere he
had flatly limited the state to taxing "every thing which exists by its own authority, or is
introduced by its permission," finding "a total failure of this original power to tax the means
employed by the government of the Union, for the execution of its powers," id. at 429-30. A
nondiscriminatory tax on banknotes would be inconsistent with these passages.
For discussion of the nondiscrimination dictum in McCulloch and its application to a
tax on occupiers of government property in United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452
(1977), see Hellerstein, State Taxation and the Supreme Court: Toward a More Unified
Approach to ConstitutionalAdjudication?, 75 MicH. L. REv. 1426, 1434-41, 1446-54 (1977)
(praising Fresno but concluding for "cogent policy reasons" that "the M'Culloch dictum
concerning nondiscriminatory taxes on federal property may be best left unexhumed," id. at
1454 (emphasis added)).
30 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436.
361 Id. at 430.
62 Id.
363 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449, 468-69 (1829).
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over a pointed Johnson dissent,6 4 he struck down a tax on the
holders of federal securities without discussing whether it was
discriminatory.
B.

Gibbons v. Ogden

Ogden, owner of a steamboat monopoly granted by New York,
obtained a state court injunction restraining Gibbons from operating steamboats across the Hudson River between New York and
New Jersey. 6 5 Gibbons's boats, however, were licensed and enrolled under federal statute; 66 the Supreme Court in 1824 held the
federal license gave Gibbons
a right to operate his boats notwith67
3
standing the state law.

The threshold question was whether Congress had power to
license vessels traveling between two states. The answer seems
easy today: interstate navigation was "Commerce . . . among the

several states,"368 for commerce necessarily involved not only the
exchange of goods but all "commercial intercourse."369 Congress
364 Id. at. 472-73. Johnson argued that the tax was not discriminatory and therefore was

valid. Id. Justice Thompson also dissented. Id. at 473. The tax applied to all interest-bearing obligations except bank stock and those of the state itself. Id. at 449-50. See T. POWELL,
VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 92 (1956), suggesting that the
tax was "to some extent" discriminatory "because it did not apply to all property."
311 Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. 150 (N.Y. Chan. 1819), aff'd, 17 Johns. 488 (N.Y.
1820), rev'd, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). New Jersey and Connecticut had enacted retaliatory legislation against the New York monopoly. See 4 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 13, at 404.
366 Act of Feb. 18, 1793, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 305 (codified as amended in part at 46 U.S.C. §§
251-252 (1976)).
3'7 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). See generally M. BAXTER, THE
STEAMBOAT MONOPOLY (1972) (providing useful and interesting background of the case); 4 A.
BEVERIDGE, supra note 13, at 397-460 (recounting the litigation and Chief Justice Marshall's
construction of the commerce clause). For the interesting observation that repeal of the
increasingly unpopular monopoly by the state legislature was hindered by arguments based
on the contract clause, see Mendelson, New Light on Fletcher v. Peck and Gibbons v.
Ogden, 58 YALE L.J. 567 (1949). See also 28 NILES WEEKLY REGISTER 147 (1825), reporting
the voyage of a new steamboat gratefully christened the "'Chief Justice Marshal' [sic]."
368 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
369 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189-90. Counsel had conceded that the transportation of goods was closely enough connected with their exchange to be considered a part of
commerce. Id. at 76-77 (Mr. Oakley), 89-90 (Mr. Emmet). What Marshall did not clearly
reveal in this connection was that the vessels in question were used for transporting passengers. See 4 Johns. Ch. at 152. Later Justices were to assert, as counsel had argued in Gibbons, that the distinction was important. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 182
(1941) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("the migrations of a human being. . . do not fit easily into
my notions as to what is commerce"); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 473-74, 493
(1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting). Marshall had already said on circuit that the commerce
power authorized Congress to outlaw the importation of persons, The Wilson v. United
States, 30 F. Cas. 239, 243 (C.C.D. Va. 1820) (No. 17,846), while holding that the case before
him did not come within the law, id. at 244-45. As Beveridge said, the fact that counsel did
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had enacted navigation laws at its very first session.3 70 Moreover,
the constitutional provisions forbidding Congress to prefer one
state's ports over another's or to require ships bound for one port
to clear at another3 7 1 would have been unnecessary if navigation
had not been included. 2 Marshall stressed that there was no rea373
son to give the Constitution an unnaturally narrow construction:
the Framers "must be understood. . . to have intended what they
have said. . . [;] [w]e know of no rule for construing the extent of
such powers, other than is given by the language of the instrument
which confers them, taken in connection with the purposes for
which they were conferred."37 4
At the same time Marshall emphasized that federal power extended only to commerce "with foreign Nations, and among the

not invoke this precedent seems to say much about the dissemination of opinions at the
time. 4 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 13, at 427-29. For a documented argument that the Framers had a narrow view of what Congress could do under the interstate commerce clause but
that navigation acts were specifically contemplated, see Abel, The Commerce Clause in the
Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432, 451-59,
478-80 (1941).
'"0 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 190. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 55,
amended by Act of Dec. 31, 1792, ch. 1, 1 Stat. 287 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 11
(1976)).
'" U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 6.
3'' Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 191. But see T. POWELL, supra note 364, at 52
("Marshall . . . does not note that there is another maxim for interpretation, namely, ex
majore cautela-out of an abundance of caution. . . . Obviously, ...
sometimes one
[maxim] is appropriate and at other times the other.").
Justice Johnson, arguing that "[s]hip-building, the carrying trade, and propagation of
seamen, are such vital agents of commercial prosperity, that the nation which could not
legislate over these subjects, would not possess power to regulate commerce," Gibbons, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 230 (Johnson, J., concurring), added a similar inference from the 20-year
moratorium in the same section on federal statutes prohibiting "[tihe Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit," id. at
230 (referring to U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1). As Marshall had said on circuit, The Wilson v.
United States, 30 F. Cas. 239, 243 (C.C.D. Va. 1820) (No. 17,846), this inference was equally
relevant to the question, adumbrated supra note 369, whether "Commerce" included the
transportation of persons, and Johnson expressly referred in Gibbons to "the transportation
of both men and their goods." See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 230-31 (Johnson, J.,
concurring).
"' Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 187-89.
...Id. at 188-89. St. George Tucker had argued that federal powers should be strictly
construed because "[o]therwise the gradual and sometimes imperceptible usurpations of
power, will end in the total disregard of all its intended limitations." St. G. Tucker, 1 Appendix to Blackstone's Commentaries 153, in 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES
OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (St. G. Tucker ed. 1803) [hereinaf-

ter cited as Tucker's Appendix to Blackstone]. It is well that Tucker's profession was law
and not medicine; deliberate undernourishment is a costly safeguard against accidental
overeating.
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several States, and with the Indian Tribes"; 3 5 "the enumeration of
the particular classes of commerce to which the power was to be
extended, would not have been made, had the intention been to
extend the power to every description.

' 37 6

Commerce "among" the

states thus was limited to that "commerce which concerns more
states than one. .

.

.The completely internal commerce of a state,

then, may be considered as reserved for the state itself.'"3 " It bears
emphasizing that in Gibbons, as in McCulloch v. Maryland,3 a7 the
great exponent of national power expressly acknowledged significant limitations on the reach of federal legislation;37 9 it was MarU.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 193.
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194-95.
377 Id.
Professor Crosskey devoted much of his professional life to attacking the traditional understanding that Congress's power was limited to "interstate" commerce. "Commerce," he urged, was not restricted to interchange; "States" meant the people of the
States, not territorial units; and "among," as illustrated by such phrases as "marriage
among the Indian tribes," did not mean from one community to another. See 1 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 226, at 50-83. See also B. POTTER, THE TALE OF PETER RABBIT 25 (1972) (1st
ed. 1903) ("He lost one of his shoes among the cabbages and the other shoe amongst the
potatoes."). Crosskey concluded that Congress was meant to have power to regulate all gainful activity within the United States, 1 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 226, at 83, that it was
therefore not absurd after all to read the contract clause as depriving the states of all power
to legislate with respect to contract, id. at 288-92, and that construing the ex post facto
clause to include civil legislation would therefore not have made the contract clause redundant, id. at 324-51. Thus Crosskey disagreed not only with the limitations the Court found
in the commerce clause but with Ogden v.Saunders and Calder v. Bull as well. Id. at 34851. See supra notes 222-26 and accompanying text; Currie, Supreme Court, 1789-1801,
supra note 1, at 866-73.
Crosskey's work, after a barrage of devastating reviews, has been profoundly ignored.
See, e.g., Brown, Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1954), pointing out among other
things that Crosskey's arguments were almost entirely "lexicographical," id. at 1442, and
eschewed any real effort to reconcile his conclusions with the "larger political and institutional forces which must have had some part in shaping the new government," id. at 1441.
Brown gives numerous examples of eighteenth-century usage contradicting Crosskey, id. at
1446-55 (" 'a league among twelve Grecian cities,'" id. at 1450 (quoting 1 THE WORKS OF
JAMES WILSON 247 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967));" 'hostility among nations,'" id. at 1450 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 6, at 54 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961))). In addition, leading
Federalists such as Washington and Marshall had praised The Federalist, which, as virtually everyone else had, acknowledged that Congress was to have limited powers, id. at 144346. For the view taken in The Federalist,see, for example, THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 235
(J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (speaking of commerce "between State and State").
378 See supra notes 301-31 and accompanying text.
37
In defining "to regulate" as "to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed," Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196, Marshall suggested a second limitation that
seemed to cast doubt on whether the commerce clause supported expenditures for navigation aids or for internal improvements. President Monroe's interpretation had been narrower still, limiting Congress to outlawing state imposts on commerce. See 2 J. RICHARDSON,
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 140, 161-62 (1900). See also Abel, supra note 369,
at 465-81, arguing that Congress was not meant to have the general affirmative regulatory
power that the words seem to convey.
371

376
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shall's successors who were to expand the commerce power to cover
virtually everything.3 80
More questionable was Marshall's conclusion that the federal
licenses were intended to give Gibbons an indefeasible right to
navigate the Hudson River. He seemed to think it self-evident:
"The word 'license,' means permission or authority; and a license
to do any particular thing, is a permission or authority to do that
thing . ... -31 It was immaterial that the particular waters in
question were not mentioned in the licenses; it was enough that
they authorized the boats to engage in "'the coasting trade.' "3,82
Yet other licenses or permits have been construed merely as indicating the absence of federal objection to the proposed activity, not
as affirmative authorizations.38 3 The state court had plausibly
held, 8 4 and Justice Johnson agreed, 8 5 that the licenses in Gibbons
38' See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11 (1942) (upholding federal regulation of
growing wheat for on-farm consumption). Marshall did not clearly say, however, as later
Justices would argue, that Congress's power was strictly limited to interstate commerce. See
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 400 (1849) (opinion of McLean, J.). Note the reference, quoted supra in text accompanying note 377, to commerce that "concerns" more than
one state, the similar mention of that "which does not extend to or affect other states,"
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194 (emphasis added), and the later statement in arguing
against concurrent state power that "[i]f congress license vessels to sail from one port to
another, in the same state, the act is supposed to be, necessarily, incidental to the power
expressly granted to congress, and implies no claim of a direct power to regulate the purely
internal commerce of a state," id. at 204. See F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 41-42, 60-61 (1937); T. POWELL, supra note 364, at 50

("Commerce.

. .

'which concerns more states than one'.

. .

is a much more expansive con-

ception than 'interstate commerce'" (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194)). After
Gibbons, the New York court in a split decision held the federal license authorized intrastate as well as interstate navigation, and upheld its constitutionality in reliance on Gibbons, pointing out that the licensing statute, first enacted in 1789, see supra note 370 and
accompanying text, contained regulations expressly applicable to intrastate voyages. North
River Steamboat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cow. 713 (N.Y. 1825). Beveridge misstates both the
trial court's decision in this case and the effect of the affirmance. See 4 A. BEVERIDGE, supra
note 13, at 447-50.
381 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 213.
38
Id. at 214 (quoting the language of the license).
3E.g., Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 62-64 (1962) (federal permits
to anchor fish traps in National Forest land and to obstruct navigable waters with them do
not prevent state from forbidding their use); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,
362 U.S. 440, 446-48 (1960) (local smoke abatement code enforceable against federally licensed boiler).
3'4 Ogden v. Gibbons, 17 Johns. at 509 ("[T]he only design of the federal government in
regard to the enrolling and licensing of vessels, was to establish a criterion of national character, with a view to enforce the laws which impose discriminating duties on American
vessels, and those of foreign countries." (emphasis in original)).
3" Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 232 (Johnson, J., concurring) ("[I]t is to confer on
her American privileges, as contradistinguished from foreign; and to preserve the government from fraud by foreigners, in surreptitiously intruding themselves into the American
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were merely a means of enforcing a discrimination against foreign
vessels;3 86 Marshall himself was to hold a few years later, quite
without explanation, that an identical license did not prevent a
state from obstructing the passage of the licensee by authorizing
3 87
the damming of a navigable stream.
More important than the holding that the New York monopoly contravened a federal statute were Marshall's dicta suggesting
that in the absence of statute it, might have offended the commerce
clause itself. "It has been contended," said Marshall,
that, as the word "to regulate" implies in its nature, full
power over the thing to be regulated, it excludes, necessarily,
the action of all others that would perform the same operation
on the same thing. . . .There is great force in this argument,
and the court is not satisfied that it has been refuted."",
Justice Johnson went further: rejecting the argument based upon
the licenses,38 s he based his concurrence on the ground that the
3 90
federal commerce power was exclusive.

commercial marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue, in the trade coastwise, that this
whole system is projected.").
386 From the outset foreign vessels had been subjected to grossly discriminatory duties.
See, e.g., Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 135 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 121
(1976)). Section 6 of the statute involved in Gibbons provided for payment of the higher
foreign duties by ships not enrolled or licensed. Act of Feb. 18, 1793, ch. 8,§ 6, 1 Stat. 305,
307-08 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 318 (1976)). In 1817 foreign ships were excluded
from the coasting trade entirely. Act of March 1, 1817, ch. 31, 3 Stat. 351, repealedin part
by Act of June 28, 1864, ch. 170, 13 Stat. 201, remainder repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1933,
ch. 202, 47 Stat. 1428.
Chancellor Kent, who had given the license a narrow reading in the state trial court,
Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns Ch. at 156-59, stuck to his guns after the Supreme Court's
decision:
The great objects and policy of the coasting act were, to exclude foreign vessels from
commerce between the states, in order to cherish the growth of our marine, and to
provide that the coasting trade should be conducted with security to the revenue. The
register and enrolment of the vessel were to ascertain the national character; and the
license was only evidence that the vessel had complied with the requisites of the law,
and was qualified for the coasting trade under American privileges.
1 J. KENT, supra note 109, at 435. For approving views of Kent's conclusion, see, for example, F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 380, at 15-16; T. POWELL, supra note 364, at 53, 142;
Campbell, ChancellorKent, Chief Justice Marshall and the Steamboat Cases, 25 SYaAcusE
L. REV. 497, 525-28 (1974).
3S7 Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829); see infra notes
410-17 and accompanying text. See also Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 27577 (1977), casting aspersions on Marshall's interpretation in Gibbons and recasting the license's effect as a (still questionable) prohibition of discriminatory treatment.
386 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 209 (Marshall, C.J.).
389 Id. at 231-33 (Johnson, J., concurring).
380 Id. at 226-29 (Johnson, J., concurring).
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This was the beginning of incessant litigation over the extent
to which state legislation is precluded by the commerce clause.39 1
The wording of the clause suggests no limitation on the states; it
merely grants Congress the authority to "regulate Commerce. 392
This language contrasts vividly with Congress's power of "exclusive
9 and with the various
Legislation" over the District of Columbia s3
provisions of article I, section 10, expressly forbidding states to invade such federal preserves as the making of treaties or the coining
of money. 9 4 Moreover, though Marshall did not say so, Gibbons
was not the first case confronting the Court with a question of the
exclusivity of a grant of federal power. Four years earlier the Court
had allowed a state to punish failure to respond to a call-up of the

The power of a sovereign state over commerce . . . amounts to nothing more than a
power to limit and restrain it at pleasure. And since the power to prescribe the limits to
its freedom, necessarily implies the power to determine what shall remain unrestrained,
it follows, that the power must be exclusive ....
Id. at 227. But no one denied that Congress had power to insist that commerce be free; the
argument was that the states retained concurrent authority until Congress insisted. Johnson
on circuit had already held the commerce power exclusive in striking down a South Carolina
law imprisoning and in many cases enslaving black seamen arriving in South Carolina ports,
Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4366), partly in evident reliance
on the unpromising text, id. at 495 ("the words of the grant sweep away the whole subject,
and leave nothing for the states to act upon"), and partly because exclusivity was desirable,
id. ("If this law were enforced. . . retaliation would follow; and the commerce of this city
. . . might be fatally injured."). Johnson also found the black-sailor law contrary to federal
law and a treaty, and added that the powers to fix the value of foreign coins and to set
standards of weights and measures were also exclusive. Id.
William Rawle, writing shortly after Gibbons, quoted at length from Marshall's opinion,
W. RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 82-84 (2d ed.
Philadelphia 1829) (1st ed. Philadelphia 1825), and argued that the risk of varying and obstructive state regulations, "mutual rivalries, and other obvious inconveniences" meant that
only Congress could regulate foreign commerce or commerce "between the different states,"
id. at 82. More significantly, the Virginia Republican St. George Tucker had reached the
same conclusion without explanation as early as 1803. 1 Tucker's Appendix to Blackstone,
supra note 374, at 180. Story disingenuously professed that Gibbons had settled the question. 2 J. STORY, supra note 40, §§ 1067-1068, at 12-13. Professor Corwin agreed that the
Framers had meant the commerce power to be exclusive, E. CORWIN, supra note 36, at 142,
but gave no reasons for the conclusion. See also Abel, supra note 369, at 484-94 (arguing for
the same conclusion largely on the basis of scattered hints in the federal and state conventions). But see F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 380, at 12-13 ("[t]he conception that the mere
grant of the commerce power to congress dislodged state power finds no expression"t in either state or federal conventions); 2 J. THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2190-91
(1895) (arguing the commerce power was not exclusive).
3" For one recent example see Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662
(1981) (invalidating an Iowa law limiting the length of trucks).
391 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
301 Id. § 8, cl. 17. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text (discussing Terrett v.
Taylor).
3,, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, para. 1 ("No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance,
Confederation; . . . coin money" (emphasis added)).
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federal militia, despite the argument that both federal legislative
and judicial powers were exclusive. 9 5 In 1819 Marshall himself had
written for the Court in holding the federal bankruptcy power not
exclusive; 9 ' the unexplained contrary suggestion respecting naturalization in an earlier case could easily have been based upon a
preemptive federal statute.9 ' Chief Justice Taney was later to argue with great plausibility,9 " as had Chancellor Kent and his
brethren in an earlier New York case,399 that the commerce clause
did not limit the states.40 0 What is most significant for present pur-

"' Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820), discussed in Currie, Federal Courts,
1801-1835, supra note 1, at 702-05.
" Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819); see supra notes 155-202
and accompanying text. Both Sturges and Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820),
had been urged on the Court in Gibbons by counsel as decisive. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
at 35 (Mr. Oakley), 86 (Mr. Emmet).
"I See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text (discussing Chirac v. Chirac). Later
cases also have held the federal patent and copyright powers not to be exclusive. E.g.,
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546
(1973). The New York court had held the patent power not exclusive in Livingston v. Van
Ingen, 9 Johns. 507 (N.Y. 1812), which also involved the steamboat monopoly. The question
was litigated but not decided in Gibbons. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 221. As he had
in McCulloch, see supra note 341, Marshall conceded that the federal tax power was not
exclusive, but he distinguished the taxing power from the commerce power, Gibbons, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 198-200. See also id. at 199 ("In imposing taxes for state purposes, [the
states] are not doing what congress is empowered to do," for Congress may tax only "to pay
the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States.").
"' License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 579 (1847) (Taney, C.J., concurring).
399Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507 (N.Y. 1812). See especially the argument of
Judge (later Justice) Thompson that federal powers were impliedly exclusive only if, as with
borrowing on federal credit and establishing federal courts, id. at 565-66, they "did not antecedently form a part of state sovereignty," id. at 565, or their objects "from their nature, are
beyond the reach and control of the state governments," id. Though appointed to the Supreme Court in 1823, Thompson did not arrive in time to participate in Gibbons v. Ogden.
See 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at iii. For his later views on the commerce clause, see infra notes
425-30 and accompanying text (discussing Brown v. Maryland).
400 The Court seems right in its subsequent conclusion that one purpose of the commerce clause was to prevent untenable state obstructions to the free flow of goods. See H.P.
Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534 (1949) (citing 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra

note 74, at 547 (Madison's explanation)); THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 144-45 (A. Hamilton)
(C. Rossiter ed. 1961):
The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States, contrary to the true
spirit of the Union, have, in different instances, given just cause of umbrage and complaint to others, and it is to be feared that examples of this nature, if not restrained by
national control, would be multiplied and extended till they became not less serious
sources of animosity and discord than injurious impediments to the intercourse between the different parts of the Confederacy.
See also 2 J. STORY, supra note 40, § 1066, at 11. But see Kitch, Regulation and the American Common Market, in REGULATION, FEDERALISM AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 11-19 (A.

Tarlock ed. 1981), arguing that the Framers' perceptions of substantial state interference
lacked support in either theory or practice. In any event, the Constitution on its face suggests that the means of national control the Framers selected was to authorize Congress, not
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poses, however, is Marshall's willingness once again to reach out
and make one-sided suggestions about an issue that he conceded
he did not have to resolve.
Both Marshall and Johnson took pains to emphasize that the
states were not without all power to impede interstate or foreign
commerce. Article I itself recognized, for example, that states
might pass laws requiring inspection of goods to be exported,0 1
but these, Marshall insisted, were not regulations of commerce.
Their object was
to improve the quality of articles produced by the labor of a
country . . . .They act upon the subject, before it becomes
an article of foreign commerce, or of commerce among the
states ...
.They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation, which embraces everything within the territory of a
state, not surrendered to the general government ... 4 o0
Similarly, state "quarantine and health laws," explicitly recognized
by Congress, 40 "are considered as flowing from the acknowledged
power of a state, to provide for the health of its citizens. ' 40 4 Johnson was of the same opinion:
The same bale of goods, the same cask of provisions, or the
same ship, that may be the subject of commercial regulation,
may also be the vehicle of disease. And the health laws that
require them to be stopped and ventilated, are no more intended as regulations on commerce, than the laws which perthe Court, to keep open the channels of trade. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl.3.
Justice Johnson declared in his concurrence that the entire panoply of state commercial
regulations "dropped lifeless from their statute books" when the Constitution was adopted,
implying a general agreement that federal power was exclusive. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
at 226 (Johnson, J., concurring). Accord B. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 52 (1942). Others, however, have disputed Johnson's version of the facts. See,
e.g., F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 380, at 51 ("From the beginning of the Union, the states
had woven a network of regulatory measures over foreign and interstate commerce."). Counsel in Gibbons cited these past state practices to the Court. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at
63-64 (Mr. Oakley), 97 n.(a) (Mr. Emmet). Marshall attempted to distinguish some of them
as police power regulations rather than regulations of commerce, see infra notes 401-04 and
accompanying text, but he said nothing about counsel's examples relating to trade with the
Indians, Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 82-83 (Mr. Oakley), or regulation of stagecoach
fares, id. at 97 n.(a)(2) (Mr. Emmet).
401 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, para. 2. ("No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing its inspection Laws .... ").
I" Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 203 (Marshall, C.J.).
403 Act of May 27, 1796, ch. 31, 1 Stat. 474, repealedby Act of Feb. 25, 1799, ch. 12, § 8,
1 Stat. 619, 621 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 88-91, 97, 112 (1976)).
404 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 205 (Marshall, C.J.).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[49:887

mit their importation, are intended to innoculate the commu4
nity with disease. 05

The reader may well find the resulting "exclusivity" of congressional authority in the sphere of commerce a peculiar one. If the
purpose of the Framers was to create a self-executing safeguard
against state interference with commerce, one might expect them
to have done so without regard to the name of the power the state
purported to exercise. 40 6 Fifty years later the Court was to recognize that the federal interest that had led to Marshall's suggestion
of exclusivity was threatened equally by state action under the police-power label 40 7 and to reject, at least for the time being,408 the
4
Gibbons distinction. 09
Five years after Gibbons, in WilIson v. Black Bird Creek
Marsh Co.,410 Marshall wrote for a unanimous Court in upholding
a state law that authorized construction of a dam obstructing a
small navigable creek. Stressing that Congress had passed no law
affecting the question, Marshall concluded that the state law could
not, "under all the circumstances of the case, be considered as re405 Id. at 235 (Johnson, J., concurring).
406

Cf. License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 583 (1847) (Taney, C.J., separate opinion)

(objecting that if the states are "absolutely prohibited . . . from making any regulations of
foreign commerce. . . such regulations are null and void, whatever may have been the motive of the State"); F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 380, at 52-53 (concluding that "Taney's
analysis destroys the illusive simplicity of Marshall's concession of a 'police' power to the
states" (footnote omitted)); T. POWELL, supra note 364, at 51 (characterizing Marshall's distinction as an "exercise in verbalisms"), 150 (suggesting that Marshall's police-power exceptions were so sweeping that it hardly mattered whether the states could "regulate
commerce").
107 Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 271-72 (1876) ("Nothing is gained
in
the argument by calling it the police power. . . . [Wihenever the statute of a State invades
the domain of legislation which belongs exclusively to the Congress of the United States, it
is void, no matter under what class of powers it may fall ....").
408 Although a later Court was to note that over the years the Court had "consistently
. . .rebuffed attempts of states to advance their own commercial interests by curtailing the
movement of articles of commerce. . . while generally supporting their right to impose even
burdensome regulations in the interest of local health and safety," H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du
Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949), the Court already had stopped viewing the matter as one of
simple labeling. In fact, the Court has struck down health and safety regulations whose
burden on commerce it has found unjustified. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v.
Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Southern
Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
409 Like Marshall's concession respecting the imprisonment of debtors in Sturges, see
supra notes 164-77 and accompanying text, the distinction drawn in Gibbons seems an afterthought employed to avoid the many examples that seemed to contradict his theory. See
F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 380, at 27 (Marshall's "doctrine of a completely exclusive commerce power could not be rigorously applied without changing the whole political character
of the states").
410 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
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pugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant
state."4 1 1 That Congress had passed no relevant law was not clear
after Gibbons, for Willson had a federal license to engage in the
coasting trade.4 12 Counsel had argued with some force that if,
under Gibbons, "Delaware has no right to restrain particular vessels from using her navigable streams, she cannot stop the navigation of those streams" altogether.1 3
The more interesting question was why, after Gibbons, the
dam did not offend the commerce clause itself. Some of Marshall's
contemporaries thought he meant to retract the feelers of exclusivity he had put out in Gibbons.1 4 More likely, since Johnson did
not dissent, the key lay in Marshall's statement that the "value of
the property on [the creek's] banks must be enhanced by excluding
the water from the marsh, and the health of the inhabitants probably improved. ' 41 5 "Measures calculated to produce these objects,"
he added in an evident reference to his discussion of inspection
and quarantine laws in Gibbons,41 6 were allowable-"provided," he
added ambiguously, "they do not come into collision with the powers of the general government. 41 7 The important point is that he
made no real effort to explain, though this was the first case in
which he had to face the issue of the preemptive effect of the commerce clause itself; he left us to wonder what was the basis of the
decision.41 8
"I Id. at 252.
412 Id.

at 246, 248 (Mr. Coxe). See supra note 387.
M, Willson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 249 (Mr. Coxe). Marshall did not answer this contention

in his opinion. Frankfurter read Willson as holding that the license conveyed no right to
navigate unimportant small streams. F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 380, at 20-21. Taney

thought Willson meant the license gave a right to navigate only those streams which were
not obstructed. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518,
585-87 (1852) (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
44 See New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 149-50 (1837) (Thompson, J., concurring). Thompson had participated in Willson. See also F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 380, at
28 (suggesting that Willson was a retreat from Marshall's earlier conception of an exclusive
commerce power).
"I Willson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 251.
416 See supra notes 403-04 and accompanying text.
4"

Willson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 251. Story explained Willson as holding that the state's

authority to act under "other powers, beside that of regulating commerce," was not destroyed by the commerce clause. 2 J. STORY, supra note 40, § 1069, at 517. See also F.
FRANKFURTER, supra note 380, at 29 n.37 (citing Story with approval).
418 Justice Frankfurter put the point somewhat less critically: Marshall "did little more

than decide, stating hardly any doctrine but hinting enough to foreshadow, certainly in direction, the vitally important accommodation between national and state needs formulated
more than 20 years later in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 319 (1851)." Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARv. L. REv. 217, 223 (1955).
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C. Brown v. Maryland
Brown had imported goods from abroad and sold them in the
original package. Maryland convicted him for selling them without
paying a fifty dollar license tax for the privilege of selling imported
goods. In 1827 the Supreme Court reversed. 19
Much of the opinion was devoted to showing that Maryland's
law offended the provision of article I, section 10, forbidding a
state, without congressional consent, "to lay any Imposts or Duties
on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary
for executing its inspection Laws. ' 42 0 "[I]mports," said Marshall,
invoking the "lexicons" and "usage," are "things imported"; a
"'duty on imports' then, is not merely a duty on the act of importation, but is a duty on the thing imported. ' 421 Whatever the purpose of the clause, a tax on the sale of imported goods would undermine it as effectively as a tax on the act of importation; for
"[n]o goods would be imported if none could be sold." '2 2 Thus an
import remained an import, immune from state taxation, "while
remaining the property of the importer, in his warehouse, in the
original form or package in which it was imported. ' 42 3 Finally, a
tax on the business of selling imported goods was in effect a tax on
the goods themselves: "It must add to the price of the article, and
be paid by the consumer, or by the importer himself, in like manner as a direct duty on the article itself ....
All of this sounds very plausible. Surely the Framers had not
meant to allow the free entry of goods to be sabotaged by nominally distinguishable taxes levied after importation. The trouble
was, as pointed out by Justice Thompson's dissent, that Marshall's
reasoning proved too much: a tax on a later resale of the goods at
retail
would equally increase the burden, and enhance the expense
of the article. . . . [I]t will necessarily affect the importation.
So that nothing short of a total exemption from State charges
or taxes, under all circumstances, will answer the supposed
object of the constitution. And to push the principle to such
lengths, would be a restriction upon State authority, not war419 Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827). See 4 A. BEvERIDGE, supra note
13, at 454-60; 1 C. WARREN, supra note 13, at 693-96.
420 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, para. 2.
421 Brown, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 437-38 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, para. 2).
422 Id. at 439.
423 Id. at 442.
424 Id. at 444.
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ranted by the constitution.42 5
Thompson therefore would have restricted the prohibition to "foreign duties, and not to taxes imposed by the States, after the imports became articles of internal trade, and for domestic use and
consumption."' 2
Marshall conceded that "there must be a point of time when
the prohibition ceases. ' 42 7 He then stated:
when the importer has so acted upon the thing imported, that
it has become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of
property in the country, it has, perhaps, lost its distinctive
character as an import, and has become subject to the taxing
power of the State; but while remaining the property of the
importer, in his warehouse, in the original form or package in
which it was imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a duty on
imports, to escape the prohibition ....
The arbitrariness of the line drawn is evident; 429 it can be derived
neither from the words nor from the purpose of the import-export
clause. Nevertheless, neither alternative seemed palatable: on the
one hand it seems unlikely the Framers meant to give imported
goods a perpetual tax exemption, and on the other Marshall seems
right that Thompson's narrow interpretation would drain the
clause of all meaning.
To the extent the clause was meant to protect citizens of inland states from tolls exacted by states through which their goods
were imported,3 0 the tax in Brown was arguably all right, for there
was no suggestion that Brown had sold the goods for transport to
another state. But the language of the clause forbids imposts and
duties on all imports, whether or not destined for other states. To
42l Id. at 455 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
12 Id. at 456 (Thompson, J., dissenting).

,27 Id. at 441.
4 Id. at 441-42.
'2' See T. POWELL, supra note 364, at 181 ("So far as I know, the removal of one pasteboard box from the wooden shipping case ends the immunity of other pasteboard boxes still
left in the traveling container."); Trickett, The Original Package Ineptitude, 6 COLUM. L.

REv. 161 (1906).
450 See THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 267 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (arguing that
"[a] very material object" of the federal commerce power "was the relief of the States which
import and export through other States, from the improper contributions levied on them by
the latter"); id. No. 44, at 283 (J. Madison) ("The restraint on the power of the States over
imports and exports is enforced by all the arguments which prove the necessity of submitting the regulation of trade to the federal councils."); see also Marshall's statement in
Brown, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 440 ("The great importing states would thus levy a tax on the
non-importing states ....
).
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the extent this language reflects a policy "to maintain unimpaired
our commercial connexions [sic] with foreign nations, or to confer
this source of revenue on the government of the Union, '431 the Maryland tax seems particularly offensive, because it placed imports
at a disadvantage-it did not apply to sellers of local products. At
a minimum, as the Court was to say with the hindsight of 150 more
years, the import-export clause "prohibits state taxation based on
the foreign origin of the imported goods" 432-regardless, I should
have thought, of whether they are singled out for taxation at the
wholesale or the retail stage or in the hands of the ultimate consumer. 43 s From this perspective, the original-package distinction
not only was unnecessary as a means of keeping the clause from
overly infringing the reserved powers of the states, but it also left
the clause incapable of achieving its purposes and subjected it to
patent evasion. Although the validity of a nondiscriminatory property tax on imported goods may not be as easy a question as the
Court recently made it, 434 that is another reason why Marshall

"3

Brown, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 439. See also Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S.

276 (1976):
The Framers of the Constitution thus sought to alleviate three main concerns by
committing sole power to lay imposts and duties on imports in the Federal Govern:
ment, with no concurrent state power: the Federal Government must speak with one
voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments, and tariffs,
which might affect foreign relations, could not be implemented by the States consistently with that exclusive power; import revenues were to be the major source of revenue of the Federal Government and should not be diverted to the States; and harmony
among the States might be disturbed unless seaboard States, with their crucial ports of
entry, were prohibited from levying taxes on citizens of other States by taxing goods
merely flowing through their ports to the other States not situated as favorably
geographically.
Id. at 285-86 (footnote omitted).
432 Michelin, 423 U.S. at 287.
43 See 1 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 226, at 296-97 (arguing that while "Imposts" were
understood as restricted to "customs duties," which were "duties collected ... at the time
and place of importation or exportation," "Duties" included "excises" and "all state taxes
. . . save property taxes only" (emphases in original)). Crosskey buttressed these conclusions with the persuasive example of Connecticut's 1790 repeal of a discriminatory excise on
the retail sale of imported goods after arguments that it offended the import-export clause.
Id. at 306-11.
44 See Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976). As the Court acknowledged
in Michelin Tire Corp., a nondiscriminatory tax on goods imported for shipment to another
state at least arguably offends the avowed purpose of preventing coastal states from levying
tolls on their inland neighbors, id. at 290; and there is a semantic difficulty in holding that
nondiscriminatory property taxes are "Duties on Imports" only when applied to goods to be
exported after arrival, see Hellerstein, Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages: Enhanced State
Power to Tax Imports, 1976 Sup. CT. REv. 99, 115-17. Furthermore, as Hellerstein also
points out, it is not entirely clear that nondiscriminatory taxes even on those goods consumed in the importing state are consistent with the assumed purposes of freedom of for-
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would have done better to avoid deciding Brown on a basis that
seemed to embrace it. It would have sufficed to hold that the state
could not levy taxes that applied only to imported goods.
Typically, Marshall was not content to rest the invalidity of
Maryland's license requirement on the import-export clause alone;
he went on to add, unnecessarily, that it was unconstitutional on a
second ground. 43' The commerce clause empowered Congress to

authorize importation; since "[s]ale is the object of importation,
and is an essential ingredient of that intercourse, of which importation constitutes a part," Congress may also "authorize the importer to sell.

'436

The tariff act, which "offers the privilege" of im-

portation "for sale at a fixed price," implicitly conveyed also the
right to sell, without which the right to import was of no value. 37
Marshall concluded accordingly:
Any penalty inflicted on the importer for selling the article in
his character of importer, must be in opposition to the act of
Congress which authorizes importation. Any charge on the introduction and incorporation of the articles into and with the
mass of property in the country, must be hostile to the power
given to congress to regulate commerce ....438
Thus the case was governed by precedent: 439 McCulloch v.
Maryland.

4 40
McCulMcCulloch v. Maryland?! As the dissent shouted,

loch was not a commerce clause case; it had held a state could not
tax the operations of the federal government.441 One might have
eign commerce and of protecting federal revenue. See id. at 108-09. On the other hand, it is
not clear that the Framers meant to give foreign goods a competitive advantage or to free
those dealing in them from bearing the cost of state services such as police and fire protection. See Michelin, 423 U.S. at 287; Early & Weitzman, A Century of Dissent: The Immunity of Goods Imported for Resale from NondiscriminatoryState PersonalProperty Taxes,
7 Sw. U.L. REv. 247, 247, 252 (1975).
435 See T. POWELL, supra note 364, at 182 ("[I]t was an adventure in supererogation to

wield the club of the commerce clause for a second lethal blow after the import clause had
successfully committed legicide.").
436 Brown, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 447. This was an interesting step beyond Gibbons,
where Congress had been held to have power to regulate interstate movement. As Thompson observed in his Brown dissent, the resale of goods after importation was a wholly intrastate transaction if viewed in isolation. Id. at 453 (Thompson, J., dissenting). Gibbons, of
course, had refused to view the New York and New Jersey portions of a single journey as
separate transactions. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195-96.
437 Brown, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 447.
413

Id. at 448.
Id. at 449.

440 Id. at 457-58 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
441 See supra notes 292-364 and accompanying text.
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thought the proper starting point was Gibbons v. Ogden, in which
Marshall had hinted but not decided that the commerce power was
exclusive.4 42 But one then would have encountered Marshall's explicit concession in Gibbons that this arguable exclusivity did not
preclude the states from affecting commerce by the exercise of distinct reserved powers. 443 Indeed, in rejecting the argument that the
import-export clause itself implied that, apart from its strictures,
the states were free to regulate commerce, Gibbons had as much as
said that the commerce clause did not preclude state taxation:
"This prohibition ...
is an exception from the acknowledged
power of the states to levy taxes, not from the questionable power
to regulate commerce"; 444 it and the limitation of state tonnage duties 44" "presuppose the existence of that which they restrain, not of
that which they do not purport to restrain. '446 McCulloch's precept that the power to tax involved the power to destroy thus
could not be applied to the commerce clause itself without undermining the basis of the Gibbons opinion.
What Brown had in common with McCulloch was that Congress had exercised its legislative power, in the one case by chartering a national bank, in the other by imposing a tariff. In both decisions Marshall obscured the basis of his holding by declaring
alternately that the state law offended federal "law" and that it
conflicted with congressional "power. ' 44 1 In Brown, at least, the inference seems strong that it was the federal statute that Marshall
found decisive. 448 For, as recounted above, he went into some de442 See supra notes 388-418 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 401-04 and accompanying text.
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 201-02.
441 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, para. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress,
lay any Duty of Tonnage ....
).
4" Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 203. See THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 199 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (arguing that the import-export clause "implies ... that as to all
other taxes, the authority of the States remains undiminished"); 1 W. CROSSKEY, supra note
226, at 320 (adding that powers to tax and to regulate had been considered distinct since
colonial days).
441 See, e.g., supra notes 420-24, 427-28, 437-39, and accompanying text (discussing
Brown v. Maryland); cf. supra notes 340-43 and accompanying text (discussing McCulloch
v. Maryland).
4" See Sholley, The Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 U. CHI. L. REv.
556, 572 (1936) (adding, however, that dicta in Brown suggest that Marshall meant to recede
from the distinction between regulation and taxation he had drawn in Gibbons). But see
1 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 226, at 311 (concluding Brown "rested solely on the Imports and
Exports Clause"); T. POWELL, supra note 364, at 54, 181-82 (acknowledging the "uncertainty" of the opinion); B. WRIGHT, supra note 400, at 54 (concluding that "the dormant
commerce power" was "insufficient" for Marshall in Brown "as in the Gibbons case").
Both Beveridge and Story seemed to think the decision was based on the commerce
"'

'44
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tail to show that the tariff act gave the importer a right to sell,4 "
as he had held the steamboat license in Gibbons gave a right to
navigate the Hudson. 50 That McCulloch was invoked in Brown
adds strength to the conclusion that the immunity of the Bank
also had been inferred from the statute.
As in Gibbons and McCulloch, the argument for a statutory
immunity in Brown is weak; the tariff act seems rather a revenue
measure than an affirmative grant of the privilege of importing the
goods, let alone that of selling them.451 And of course the fictitious
statutory right, like the immunity under the import-export clause,
had to be limited arbitrarily so that the states could exclude unhealthful products and tax the retailer.45 2 In the last analysis, however, it does seem that the Court in Brown was taking liberties
only with a statute and not with the commerce clause itself.5 3
D.

Worcester v. Georgia

After the Cherokees' effort to enjoin the enforcement of Georgia laws regulating reservation affairs had failed on the ground that
the tribe was not a "foreign State" entitled to sue under article
III,454 the state prosecuted and convicted Worcester for living on
Cherokee land without a license. The Supreme Court reversed in
1832 in a famous Marshall opinion.45

clause itself. See 4 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 13, at 457; 2 J. STORY, supra note 40, §§ 10681069, at 515-17. See also F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 380, at 50 & n.6 (concluding that
although both Gibbons and Brown "rest on a finding of conflict between Congressional and
state statutes . . . Marshall intended these opinions to develop a doctrine of limitations
upon state authority implied from the commerce clause").
4" See supra notes 436-39 and accompanying text.
450 See supra notes 381-82 and accompanying text.
451 See F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 380, at 20 (terming Brown's statutory construction
"esoteric"); T. POWELL, supra note 364, at 54 (describing it as "imaginative"), at 182 (calling
it "as questionable as Marshall's invocation of the Coasting License in Gibbons v. Ogden"
(footnote omitted)).
"I See Brown, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 443-44.
"3 Marshall added quite gratuitously "that we suppose the principles laid down in this
case, to apply equally to importations from a sister state." Id. at 449. Since the tariff statute
did not apply to interstate shipments and the decision seems not to have been based on the
commerce clause itself, this passage seems to mean the Court thought the imports clause
applied to goods coming from the other states. The Supreme Court later denied this application in Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1869). Crosskey and Powell, however,
argued that Marshall was right. See 1 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 226, at 297-301, 315; T.
POWELL, supra note 364, at 281. But see F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 380, at 37 (disagreeing
with Crosskey and Powell).
"' Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), discussed in Currie, Federal
Courts, 1801-1835, supra note 1, at 719-22.
'5 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). See 4 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note
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Some later decisions determining the limits of state power
over Indian affairs have spoken mystically about the inherent sovereignty of the Indian nations, as if that extra-constitutional thesis
somehow limited state authority. 45 Though it is possible to pluck
statements from Worcester that, separated from their context, appear to look in that direction,5 7 Marshall explicitly rejected such a
conclusion: "If the objection to [Georgia's] . . .legislation. . was
confined to its extra-territorial operation, the objection, though
complete, so far as respected mere right, would give this court no
power over the subject. 4 58 Instead, he flatly held the state law "in
direct hostility with treaties [that] . . .recognise the pre-existing
power of the [Cherokee] nation to govern itself"'459 and with "acts
of congress" 46 0 that "manifestly consider the several Indian nations
as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries,
within which their authority is exclusive, ' 461 both of which he had
earlier discussed in considerable detail.
Georgia had denied the power of the federal government to
bind it by an Indian treaty.462 Although the state did not appear in

13, at 539-51 (reporting that "the mandate" in Worcester "was never obeyed," id. at 551);
2 C. WAREN, supra note 13, at 189-239 (pointing to serious procedural obstacles to the
coercive enforcement of a Supreme Court mandate in a state criminal case and noting that
after Jackson's stern reaction to South Carolina's Ordinance of Nullification, Worcester and
his fellow defendants were pardoned by the Governor of Georgia). Warren also doubted that
President Jackson ever said "'John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce
it.'" Id. at 219 (footnote omitted).
450 See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (adding that "the trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to
state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-emption"). That "inherent. . .sovereignty" remains a basis for upholding the governmental authority of Indian tribes was dramatically confirmed in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 332 (1978), which concluded
for this reason that the double jeopardy clause did not bar successive prosecutions by a tribe
and by the United States; but Justice Rehnquist affirmed for the Court in Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootena Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 481 n.17 (1976), that Indian immunities from
state law derive from the supremacy clause alone, i.e., from conflicts between state law and

federal statutes and treaties. See also F.

COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW

117

(1942) (noting the basis of the federal government's authority over Indian affairs rests in
statutes and treaties).
" E.g., Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559 ("The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent, political communities, retaining their original natural
rights from time immemorial . . . . "), 561 ("The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory ... in which the laws of Georgia can have no force
458Id. at 561.
45 Id. at 561-62.
460Id. at 562.
461 Id. at 557.

462 See 2 C. WARREN, supra note 13, at 190.
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the Supreme Court, Marshall unambiguously posed the question4 63
and rejected Georgia's answer: "The constitution, by declaring
treaties already made, as well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous
treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently, admits their
rank among those powers who are capable of making treaties.' 4
This important constitutional question need not have been
reached, since Marshall had found the state laws contrary to statutes as well as to treaties, 6 5 and since Congress had explicit au'466
thority "[t]o regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.
Out of the blue, however, and wholly without amplification, Marshall added that Georgia's actions "interfere forcibly with the relations established between the United States and the Cherokee nation, the regulation of which, according to the settled principles of
our constitution, are committed exclusively to the government of
the Union. ' '4 7 Justice McLean's long-winded concurrence 46 expressly and unnecessarily 46 9 jumped to the essentially unexplained
conclusion that Congress's power over Indian commerce was exclusive; 470 possibly that is what Marshall had in mind as well, though

01

Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 541, 557-58.

414Id. at 559. It was in this context that Marshall declared that Indian nations were

"distinct, independent, political communities." Id.
465 Id. at 561-62.
4,1U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl. 3.
4'7Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
4"' Id. at 563-96 (McLean, J., concurring). McLean had been appointed by President
Jackson in 1829. The Worcester opinion contains a rather complete statement of McLean's
judicial philosophy, including his favorable opinions of such chestnuts as Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), and Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264
(1821). Since Georgia had denied the Supreme Court's authority to review its criminal convictions, see 2 C. WARREN, supra note 13, at 213-14, the latter observation was not entirely
out of place, see Currie, Federal Courts, 1801-1835, supra note 1 at 687-94 (discussing Cohens). Marshall may have been alluding to this situation when he wrote that the statute
gave the Court both the "power" and the "duty" to decide the case: "This duty, however
unpleasant, cannot be avoided." Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 541.
Justice Baldwin dissented on procedural grounds, id. at 596 (Baldwin, J., dissenting),
saying that his opinion on the merits was the same one he had expressed in the Cherokee
Nation case, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 31-50, where he had concluded that Georgia had full sovereignty over the Cherokee territory. Baldwin's conclusions are summarily reported, for the
interesting reason that (as late as 1832) his opinion "was not delivered to the reporter."
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 596.
4" McLean, like Marshall, found the Georgia laws contrary to treaty and federal statute. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 578-79.
470 Id. at 580-81. The reason given was simply that this power was "enumerated in the
same section" with Congress's authority "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, to coin
money, to establish post-offices, and to declare war" and "belongs to the same class of powers." Id. Coinage and war are easily distinguishable, because the Constitution expressly limits state power in these fields, U.S. CONsT. art. I,§ 10, paras. 1, 3, and the Court never had

The University of Chicago Law Review

[49:887

his well-documented conclusions regarding the statutes and treaties were quite ample to dispose of the case. If Marshall meant to
reach still another important and avoidable constitutional question, to resolve a difficult issue without discussion, and to give
three grounds where one would have sufficed, it would not be for
the first time. If, more charitably, we read the exclusivity remark
as an aside and the reference to interference with "the relations
established" as relying on the statutes and treaties, then, despite
its well-known hints, the Court seems never to have invalidated a
state law on the basis of the unimplemented commerce clause during Marshall's tenure,
and it would be a long time before his suc471
So.
did
cessors
E. Other Cases
The limits of federal power, apart from those of the judiciary,
were not often litigated in the days of Marshall. McCulloch and
47 2
Gibbons were of course the great cases; in upholding the Bank
and the power to license steamboats,7 3 Marshall gave a liberal but
restrained direction to the interpretation of grants of congressional
authority. In the same tradition, United States v. Fisher'74 upheld
priority for government claims against an insolvent estate; Loughborough v. Blake47 5 held that direct taxes could be extended to the

held either the postal power or that over foreign commerce to be exclusive. The difficulties
posed by an implied exclusion of state authority over interstate commerce are considered
supra notes 388-417 and accompanying text (discussing Gibbons v. Ogden); they seem
equally applicable to Indian commerce. Justice Story, citing Worcester, described the Indian-commerce power as exclusive, 2 J. STORY, supra note 40, §§ 1094-1095, at 540-42;
Rawle had reached the same conclusion before Worcester, evidently on the basis of Gibbons,
W. RAWLE, supra note 390, at 82, 84. For recent statements casting doubt on this notion
without ruling out negative effects on state law entirely, see Washington v. Confederated
Tribes, 447 U.S. 125, 150-62 (1980), and cases cited; Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 481 n.17 (1976).
" The first unequivocal example seems to have been Case of the State Freight Tax, 82
U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873). See also Southern S.S. Co. v. Portwardens, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31
(1867) (alternative holding).
472 See supra notes 292-364 and accompanying text (discussing McCulloch v.
Maryland).
See supra notes 365-418 and accompanying text (discussing Gibbons v. Ogden).
4' 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805); see supra notes 316-28 and accompanying text.
' ' 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317 (1820). The power "'to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts
and excises,'" said Marshall, was "without limitation as to place." Id. at 318 (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1). The requirement that direct taxes be "apportioned among the
several-States ...
according to their respective Numbers," U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, para. 3.
was meant "to furnish a standard by which taxes are to be apportioned, not to exempt from
their operation any part of our country," Loughborough, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 320. The
further requirement of apportionment "in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration" of the
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7 declared that congresDistrict of Columbia; and Martin v. Mott7'
sional power "'to provide for calling forth the militia, to. . . repel

invasions'" supported a statute empowering the President to do so
when, in the Court's words, there was "imminent danger of
invasion.""47

The relationship between Congress and the other federal
branches was inconclusively touched upon in three cases. The
Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States478 and Wayman v.
Southard47 9 conclusorily upheld statutes giving authority to the
President and to the courts, respectively, over objections that they
delegated legislative power. The Flying Fish8 0 enforced a statute
that the Court read to limit the President's right to seize vessels
operated in violation of an embargo, despite Marshall's concession
states' respective populations, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 4, neither forbade nor required
inclusion of the District of Columbia, Loughborough, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 321-22. The
contrary implication derived from the well-known American aversion to taxation without
representation was untenable, for it would deprive Congress of all power to tax residents of
the District, contrary to the requirement that duties, imposts, and excises be "uniform
throughout the United States," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, which admittedly "not only
allows, but enjoins the government to extend the ordinary revenue system to this district,"
Loughborough, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 325. This last dictum may seem debatable, but the
holding itself seems convincing.
More questionable seems Marshall's additional conclusion, apparently unnecessary to
the decision, that if the District was included in a direct tax its share would have to be
proportional to its own population, id. at 321-22, 325, because the census by which such a
tax must be apportioned is the one "herein before directed to be taken," U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 9, cl. 4. Marshall correctly had emphasized that the latter clause need not include the
District at all: "The census referred to is admitted to be a census exhibiting the numbers of
the respective States." Loughborough, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 321.
Marshall's resolution has much to commend it in policy, for it extended the Framers'
ideas of tax equity to a case for which, as was generally true of the territories and the
District of Columbia, they had failed adequately to provide. Cf. Currie, Federal Courts,
1801-1835, supra note 1, at 666-67 (discussing United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159
(1805); Hepburn v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1805); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264 (1821); American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828)). For the
Court's first encounter with the direct tax provisions see Currie, Supreme Court, 1789-1801,
supra note 1, at 853-60 (discussing Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 DalU.) 171 (1796)).
476

25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).

Id. at 28-29 (Story, J.) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 15). Story stated that
"[o]ne of the best means to repel invasion is to provide the requisite force for action, before
the invader himself has reached the soil." Id. at 29. The point had not been contested. Story
added that the statute gave the President unreviewable discretion to determine whether
there was an imminent danger, id. at 29-32; the latter passage was to be used to support the
conclusion in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 44-45 (1849), denying judicial authority
to determine which was the legitimate government of Rhode Island.
478 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813); see Currie, FederalCourts, 1801-1835, supra note 1,
at 715-16.
4' 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825); see Currie, Federal Courts, 1801-1835, supra note 1, at
713-16.
477

480

6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
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that the President might have had power to make such seizures in
the absence of the statute under his constitutional duty to "'take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.' ",481
What most of these decisions save McCulloch and Gibbons
have in common is a lack of serious attention to the constitutional
issue. Fisher leapt to a broad interpretation of the necessary and
proper clause simply because it rejected the straw man of indispensable necessity; Wayman and The Cargo of the Brig Aurora were
purely conclusory, and The Flying Fish did not advert to any
question of Congress's power to limit the methods by which the
President executes the laws.
Of greater interest is Justice Johnson's opinion for a unanimous Court in Anderson v. Dunn,482 upholding the implicit power
of the House of Representatives to punish nonmembers for contempt. He began with a ringing endorsement of McCulloch's principle of incidental powers:
Had the faculties of man been competent to the framing of a
system of government which would have left nothing to implication, it cannot be doubted, that the effort would have been
made by the framers of the constitution. But what is the fact?
There is not in the whole of that admirable instrument, a
grant of power which does not draw after it others, not expressed, but vital to their exercise .... '111
The principal basis for inferring a legislative contempt power was
necessity:
[I]f there is one maxim which necessarily rides over all others,
in the practical application of government, it is, that the public functionaries must be left at liberty to exercise the powers
which the people have intrusted to them .... 14'41 That a deliberate assembly . . . should not possess the power to sup-

press rudeness, or repel insult is a supposition too wild to be
suggested.485
Johnson invoked analogy as well: it was on the same principle that
the courts were "universally acknowledged" to have inherent contempt power, though Congress had expressly confirmed that auId. at 177 (quoting U.S.

CONST.

art. II, § 3).

482 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821). For a brief explanation of the facts see D. MORGAN,

supra note 201, at 119.
"I Anderson, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 225-26.
484

Id. at 226.
at 228-29.

485 Id.
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thority by statute out of "abundant caution." 86 The existence of
an explicit provision enabling each House to "punish its Members
for disorderly Behaviour, ''48 Johnson concluded, did not negate
the power to punish others: no one thought the express authority
to punish piracy meant that Congress could not create other criminal offenses, and "the exercise of the powers given over their own
members, was of such a delicate nature, that a constitutional provision became necessary to assert or communicate it."4 as Arguments based upon the constitutional jury provisions and upon article III's vesting of the "judicial Power" in the courts489 were simply
ignored.9 s
This- was a remarkable performance in which Jefferson's first
appointee, who was to acquire a reputation as dissenter and upholder of state rights,9 1 proved himself the spittin' image of John
Marshall. 92 What the Constitution ought to provide, it pro49 3
vides-even though, as with the tax immunity in McCulloch,
Congress's authority under the necessary and proper clause seems
to render the necessity argument hollow. It is noteworthy that
Johnson elected to announce a broad principle of inherent powers
rather than more modestly to find contempt authority in the provi181 Id. at 227-28. Marshall had proclaimed an inherent judicial contempt power in Ex
parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 94 (1807). See Currie, Federal Courts, 1801-1835,
supra note 1, at 688-70. So had Johnson himself in the course of denying that federal courts
had implicit authority to punish common law crimes. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). Johnson cited neither Marshall nor himself; indeed, he cited nothing
in the entire Anderson opinion.
187U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, para. 2.
Anderson, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 233.
4" See id. at 214, 218 (Mr. Hall). See also 1 Tucker's Appendix to Blackstone, supra
note 374, at 200 (criticizing an earlier exercise by the House of the power to punish nonmembers on these grounds as well as for want of a grand jury and of due process, and
arguing that the enumerated powers of each House, like those of Congress itself, were a
barrier to the discovery of unlisted powers).
490 For an approving view of Anderson, see 1 J. KENT, supra note 109, at 235-36 & 236
n.a., invoking not only "the principle of self-preservation," id. at 236, but also the practice
of Parliament, id. at 235"hich had been noted by counsel in Anderson, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
at 219-20, but not relied (on in the opinion. Anderson was distinguished in Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881) (casting aspersions on the Parliamentary analogy while
holding a particular contempt citation beyond the House's power). But see Potts, Power of
Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt (pts. 1 & 2), 74 U. PA. L. REV. 691, 780 (1926)
(criticizing Kilbourn's approach and endorsing Anderson). The Court relied on Anderson in
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 160-78 (1927), in upholding the implicit investigatory
power of the Senate.
4" See generally D. MORGAN, supra note 201.
"I See id. at 120, speaking of Anderson: "William Johnson had turned his back on
strict construction."
4'3See supra notes 349-53 and accompanying text.
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sion empowering each House to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings. '494 It is also notable that Johnson undertook in best
Marshall fashion to lay down obiter limitations on the implicit
power determined much as a legislature would have determined
them: imprisonment was the only permissible sanction, because it
was "'the least possible power adequate to the end proposed' -1;495
even imprisonment "must terminate with. . . adjournment," since
'496
when it adjourns "the legislative body ceases to exist.
"[N]either analogy nor precedent would support the assertion of
such powers in any other than a legislative or judicial body" since
it would never "be necessary to the executive, or any other depart'497
ment, to hold a public deliberative assembly.

III.
A.

BILLS OF CREDIT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS

Craig v. Missouri

Two more great cases remain for consideration; both came
near the end of Marshall's service, and in both, as usual, he wrote
the opinion. The first ranks with McCulloch as one of the early
landmarks in defining what Kenneth Dam has called our "fiscal
constitution";4 9 8 it involved the important but now forgotten clause
of article I, section 10, forbidding the states to "emit Bills of
49
Credit."
Missouri had issued to Craig, in return for a promissory note,
a certificate in the amount of $199.99 plus interest. The state had
agreed to accept such certificates in payment of taxes and debts,
had announced its intention of paying its officers' salaries with
them, and had pledged for their redemption the proceeds of state
operations in the salt market, all debts owing to the state, and the
faith of the state itself. The state sued Craig to collect on his
promissory note and prevailed in state court. In 1830 the Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the note had been issued for an illegal
consideration: the certificate was a prohibited bill of credit5 0°
Craig is another typical Marshall opinion, devoted primarily
44 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, para. 2.
Anderson, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 230-31.
4

Id. at 231.

Id. at 233-34. Examples of greater puhishm'ents by Parliament were brushed aside as
merely "historical facts, not ... precedents for imitation." Id. at 231.
4" Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 271 (1977).
41' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, para. 1. In the indexes to at least two modern treatises, the
clause is not listed at all. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 967
(1978); L. TRIBE, supra note 40, at 1176 (1978).
'oo Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410, 437 (1830).
411
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to the dissection of a red herring. Counsel had argued that the certificates were not bills of credit because they were not legal
tender.501 Marshall spent some time giving historical examples of
bills of credit issued before 1789 that were not legal tender but
"were productive of the same effects." 02 Though he referred to
particular issues of bills, he recited no evidence to prove his conclusory assertions as to their effects; and he had already disposed
of the legal-tender argument by showing that it would render the
bill-of-credit clause superfluous in light of the independent provision forbidding states to "make anything but gold or silver a legal
tender." 503
Establishing that bills of credit are forbidden even if not legal
tender does not tell us what a bill of credit is; to answer that question Marshall resorted again to history. "The term has acquired an
appropriate meaning"; there was a "sense in which the terms have
been always understood.

' 504

Before 1789

the attempt to supply the want of the precious metals by a
paper medium was made to a considerable extent; and the
bills emitted for this purpose have been frequently denominated bills of credit. .

.

.Such a medium has been always lia-

ble to considerable fluctuation. Its value is continually changing; and these changes, often great and sudden, expose
individuals to immense loss, are the sources of ruinous speculations, and destroy all confidence between man and man5
Thus the prohibition was directed toward paper money; "it must
comprehend the emission of any paper medium, by a state government, for the purpose of common circulation."50 The small denominations of the bills in question, he concluded, "fitted them for
the purpose of ordinary circulation; and their reception in payment
of taxes, and debts to the government and to corporations, and of
salaries and fees, would give them currency."5' 07
All this sounds, as Marshall usually did, very plausible. 8 One
1* Id. at 421-22 (Mr. Benton) ("Free to refuse them, the citizen may protect himself
from loss by their depreciation, by rejecting them.").
.0.Id. at 435 (Marshall, C.J.); see id. at 434-36.
803 Id. at 433-34. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, para. 1.
50 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 432. Cf. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390-94 (1798), em-

ploying a similar argument in construing the ex post facto clause. See Currie, Supreme
Court, 1789-1801, supra note 1, at 867-69.
80. Craig, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 432.
506 Id.
87 Id. at 433.
118 See E. CORWIN, supra note 39, at 92, declaring without elaboration that the certifi-

The University of Chicago Law Review

[49:887

notices at once, however, that as usual his history was stated as a
simple conclusion with virtually no reference to supporting materials 509 We have essentially only his word for it either that paper
money was commonly known as a bill of credit or that its evils
were the "mischief" the clause was designed to prevent.5 10 Moreover, although rejection of tender as an essential ingredient makes
attractive his conclusion that these certificates shared the relevant
attributes of paper money, his concession that the state could issue
an instrument promising "to pay money at a future day for services actually received, or for money borrowed"5 11 raises serious
questions as to whether he drew the line at the right place. Surely,
as he admitted, the state was not forbidden to issue promissory
notes when it borrowed money. The hard problem in the case was
to define the difference between such a note and the forbidden bill,
and Marshall made no real effort to wrestle with it.
The difficulty was highlighted by the interesting dissent of
Justice Johnson,51 2 which demonstrates the respect that he held
for Marshall, despite occasional disagreement, after many years of
joint labor. Entirely missing is the strident tone of today's dissents,
which characterize the majority as a band of unprincipled brigands; Johnson's is a measured, statesmanlike opinion. He agreed
with Marshall that history furnished the guide to the meaning of
the constitutional terms: since the terms were "vague and general,
and, at the present day, almost dismissed from our language," it
was "only by resorting to the nomenclature of the day of the constitution, that we can hope to get at the idea which the framers of
the constitution attached to it." 513 He agreed that" 'bill of credit'"
meant "paper money" and that it was not limited to legal
tender.5 14 But he also agreed with Marshall that the clause did not

cates in Craig were plainly unconstitutional.
"I' He did cite "Hutchinson's History of Massachusetts, vol. 1, p. 402," for his examples
of early issues of bills of credit. Craig, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 434.
510 THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (J. Madison), which counsel had cited, Craig, 29 U.S. (4
Pet.) at 418-19, not only had confirmed that the bill-of-credit provision was aimed at "the
pestilent effects of paper money," THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 281 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter
ed. 1961), but was the evident source of Marshall's reference to "confidence between man
and man," Craig, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 432. St. George Tucker had equated bills of credit with
"paper money" and had explained the clause as directed against its "depreciation." 1 Tucker's Appendix to Blackstone, supra note 374, at 312. Marshall cited neither.
' Craig, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 431-32.
512 Id. at 438-44 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
513 Id. at 442.
" Id. Johnson added that the certificates in question were made "tender" for salaries
of state officials, which might imply their invalidity under the legal tender clause, but he

dropped the suggestion and voted to uphold them. Id. Counsel had argued that the require-
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forbid the state to borrow, and he thought that was what the state
had done in Craig. ' it had given its certificates in exchange for
private notes, which could then be discounted to produce cash for
state expenditures.5 16 He added that the fact the certificates bore
interest "disqualifies them for the uses and purposes of a circulating medium" by giving them a variable value, and that the state
had promised not to pay certificate holders but to receive the certificates in satisfaction of taxes; "the objection to a mere paper medium is, that its value depends upon mere national faith," while
the certificate holder "has a better dependence" in that he may
tender it for paying his taxes.
This is not the place to determine whether Johnson was right
in any of these distinctions; what is important for present purposes
is that Marshall loftily ignored them all.518 Thompson also dissented, arguing that there was a difference "between a bill drawn
on a fund.

. .

constituted or pledged for.

. .

payment," as he said

was the case in Craig, and one "resting merely upon the credit of
the drawer.

51

He added that the decision appeared to outlaw all

notes issued by state-chartered banks, since "the states cannot certainly do that indirectly which they cannot do directly"; 5 0 Marshall ignored him too. Finally, the newcomer McLean added a
wordy dissent in which he seemed to suggest, contrary to Johnson,
that the state was essentially lending money to the certificate
holders,5 21 but he agreed with Johnson that the certificates were
ment that the bills be accepted by state officers was "not before the court," id. at 422 (Mr.
Benton), and Thompson in dissent agreed, id. at 446-47.
5, Counsel had so argued. Id. at 421 (Mr. Benton).
526 Id. at 443-44 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (terming the transaction an "amphibious" one
and affording what seems to be a rather rare example of the application of Justice Chase's
familiar maxim that a law is to be upheld if it is not clearly unconstitutional).
Id. at 444.
618 Marshall of course spoke first, and, in a day in which not all opinions were written
out in advance, see supra note 202, there may have been less opportunity than there is
today to respond to dissent; yet it is hard to believe Johnson had not revealed his views in
the course of deliberation before decision.
" Craig,29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 447 (Thompson, J., dissenting). See also id. at 448 ("when
a fund is pledged, or ample provision made for the redemption of a bill or voucher, .
there is but little danger of a depreciation or loss").
I20 Id. at 449. This passage sheds interesting light on the modern question of the degree
to which ostensibly private action is subject to constitutional provisions applicable in terms
only to states. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
521 Id. at 456-57 (McLean, J., dissenting). McLean stated the object was "to furnish the
citizens of Missouri with the means of paying to the state the taxes which it imposed, and
other debts due to it," at a time when bank failures had destroyed the value of existing
currency. Id. Thus, he argued that Missouri was trying to alleviate the very dangers the
clause was designed to prevent. This was a clever argument but rather disingenuous, for he
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not bills of credit because they contained only a promise of acceptance in -satisfaction of taxes, not a promise to pay.5 22
All this ferment suggests that Craigwas a pretty difficult case;
Marshall sailed right over the top of it without acknowledging any
of the difficult problems. 2 3
B. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore
Our final case was one of enormous significance. Barron argued that the city had taken his property without compensation by
destroying the navigability of a stream and rendering his wharf
unusable. Marshall's brief 1833 opinion declined to review the
state court's denial of relief, holding despite the apparently all-embracing terminology of the fifth amendment provision ("nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation")5 24 that it did not apply to the states. 25
Marshall began by suggesting that the answer was inherent in
the very nature of the document: "The constitution was ordained
and established by the people of the United States for themselves,
for their own government, and not for the government of the individual states. ' 52 6 This did not get him very far, for it proved too
much: the entire tenth section of article I was explicitly devoted to
limitations on state power. In attempting to explain these away he
came perilously close to misrepresentation, suggesting that they
"generally restrain state legislation on subjects intrusted to the
general government, or in which the people of all the states feel an
interest. ' 527 Neither the prohibition of ex post facto laws and bills

had earlier said the same was true of early issues of paper money that the clause was
designed to preclude. Id. at 452.
2' Id. at 457-58 (McLean, J., dissenting). McLean also concluded that the Court's decision that the certificates were invalid did not justify a reversal of the state court's judgment:
whether a contract was void because its consideration was illegal was a matter of state law.
Id. at 459-63. For Justice Story's belated response that most of the allegedly distinguishing
features pointed out by the dissenters had been shared by bills of credit issued before 1789,
see 3 J. STORY, supra note 40, §§ 1362-1365, at 232-37 & 235 n.2.
"S"Craig was reaffirmed without dissent in Byrne v. Missouri, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 40
(1834), shortly before Marshall's death. But one of the first acts of the Court after his departure was to uphold state bank notes on the basis of narrow distinctions of Craig,Briscoe
v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837), leading Story in dissent to complain that
that case had been overruled, id. at 328-50 (Story, J., dissenting). Marshall's cavalier treatment of the real issues in Craig made the task of overruling much easier.
521 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5' Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833). There were no
dissents.
526 Id. at 247.
127 Id. at 249 (instancing coinage, letters of marque and reprisal, and international and
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of attainder nor the contract clause as it had been construed 52 8 -neither of which he bothered mentioning in this connection 529 -_fitMarshall's description any better than did the taking

clause itself.
Somewhat more appealing was his argument that when the
Framers had meant to limit state power they had specifically said
so: despite its general language, the provision in article I, section 9,
that "'no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed' ,'53o
could not apply to the states because section 10 expressly provided
that "[n]o State shall

. . .

pass any Bill of Attainder, [or] ex post

facto Law."5 ' That the original document did not limit states
without mentioning them, however, does not prove the same was
true of the amendments, which contained no separate provisions
naming states; indeed the contrast between the taking clause and
the first 532 and seventh amendments," 3 which spoke expressly of

"Congress" and of "any Court of the United States," arguably suggested that when the amendments limited only federal departments they said so expressly.534 But, as Marshall noted in passing, 53 5 although article I, section 9, similarly limited the powers of
"Congress" over the "Migration or Importation of.

.

. Persons,"53'

that phraseology does not seem to rebut the inference that the
more general provisions of that section apply only to the federal
government. Though far from conclusive, the contrast between sections 9 and 10 helped to confirm Marshall's initial presumption
interstate treaties, the last of which "can scarcely fail to interfere with the general purpose
and intent of the constitution").
"' See supra notes 203-58 and accompanying text (discussing Ogden v. Saunders);
supra notes 226, 377 (discussing Professor Crosskey's dissenting view).
,"' It would be tedious to recapitulate the several limitations on the powers of the
states which are contained in this section." Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 249.
:so Id. at 248 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cI. 3).
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, para. 1.
I32
Id. amend. I ("Congress shall make no Law respecting an Establishment of Religion
533 Id. amend. VII ("no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law").
63, See W. RAWLE, supra note 390, at 124 (the first amendment "expressly refers to the
powers of congress alone, but some of those which follow are to be more generally construed,
and considered as applying to the state legislatures as well as that of the Union"), 127 (discussing the fourth amendment and stating "[h]ere again we find the general terms which
prohibit all violations of these personal rights, and of course extend both to the state and
the United States" (emphasis in original)). See also 2 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 226, at 105758 (arguing that because most of the amendments were to apply to the states, those that
were to bind only the federal government were explicitly so limited).
:" Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 248.
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
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that "limitations on power, if expressed in general terms, are naturally ...
applicable [only] to the government created by the
5' 7
instrument. ,
Marshall put his best argument last, and it was based on history: the amendments had been adopted in response to a demand
for "security against the apprehended encroachments of the gen538
eral government-not against those of the local governments."
Typically, this crucial conclusion was essentially unsubstantiated.
Marshall did refer generally to the recommendations of the various
state ratifying conventions without quoting them, 53 9 and there is
support in them for his position."0 Moreover, it was clear that as
originally proposed the amendments would have limited only federal action; for though none was expressly so restricted, they were
offered as additions to article I, section 9, together with a separate
provision that "[n]o State shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal
cases," which was to go with other limitations on state power in
section 10. 5 " The vagaries that befell this proposal during its odyssey through Congress obscured both its terminology and its structure with respect to the Barron question. Yet the most significant
change-the decision to append the amendments at the end of the
Constitution rather than inserting them more comprehensively in
article I-was plainly motivated by purely formal or technical considerations quite divorced from the breadth of their application. 2

"'

Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 247.
538 Id. at 250.
539 Id.
"I New Hampshire and Massachusetts, for example, had both asked for amendments
to "more effectually guard against an undue administration of the federal Government";
some of their specific proposals spoke of "Congress," while others were phrased in general
terms. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 9396, 141-44 (U.S. Dep't of State comp. 1894). The Virginia proposals, cited by Professor
Crosskey as asking for limitations on the states as well, were similar in phrasing but substituted for the preliminary references to the "federal Government" an unilluminating desire
for provisions "'asserting and securing from encroachment the essential and unalienable
Rights of the People.'" 2 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 226, at 1061; see id. at 1061-64. Crosskey
did not cite the New Hampshire or Massachusetts recommendations, leading one respected
reviewer to the conclusion that "Mr. Crosskey suppressed this important evidence." Fairman, The Supreme Court and the ConstitutionalLimitations on State GovernmentalAuthority, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 40, 51 (1953) (emphasis in original).
"I 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451-52 (J. Gales ed. 1789). Professor Crosskey conceded as much.
2 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 193, at 1066-67.
52 In the House of Representatives Sherman argued that "to interweave our propositions into the work itself" would be "destructive of the whole fabric" and would go beyond
the amending authority given by article V because it would "establish a new constitution."
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 734-35 (J. Gales ed. 1789). Clymer added that separate amendments
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If either the addition of language making clear that certain of the
new provisions did not apply to the states or the elimination of the
only provision expressly naming them was meant to have the paradoxical effect of expanding the reach of other provisions whose language was not altered, one would expect to find some evidence of
that intention. Professor Fairman has shown, however, that the
subsequent actions of numerous members of the Congress in proposing the amendments were inconsistent with the notion that the
Bill of Rights was applicable to the states.4 3 Indeed the Senate
attached to the proposal a preamble that seemed rather to confirm
that its purpose was to limit federal power. 4 4 In addition, despite
two equivocal hints by Justice Johnson, 54 5 a flat statement in an

would preserve the original text as "a monument to justify those who made it." Id. at 737.
On the other side, Madison argued sensibly that discrete amendments would make the document harder to understand. Id. at 735. Gerry saw no advantage save "to give every one the
trouble of erasing out of his copy of the constitution certain words and sentences, and inserting others." Id. at 738. A variety of speakers lamented the investment of so much time
in what Gerry termed "matters of little consequence." Id. See id. at 735-44.
M For example, several of them participated actively in state constitutional conventions after 1791 in which, without apparent objection, grand jury provisions were drafted
that did not measure up to those in the fifth amendment. See generally Fairman, supra
note 540. Professor Crosskey, who believed that Barron was "without any warrant at all,"
mentioned none of these episodes and came up with no counterexamples of his own. 2 W.
CROSSKEY, supra note 226, at 1067.
"' The preamble recited that the amendments were proposed because "[t]he Conventions of a number of the States [had] at the time of their adopting the Constitution expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further
declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added" and in hopes that "extending the
ground of public confidence in the government [would] best insure the beneficent ends of its
institution." 1 Stat. 97 (1789) (the preamble never became part of the Constitution). Crosskey argued that "its Powers" might mean state as well as federal powers, since the Constitution "was, in fact, a scheme of 'Government' through state 'Powers' as well as national 'Powers,'" and since state authority had been limited by the original instrument. 2 W. CaossKEY,
supra note 226, at 1065 (emphasis in original) (quoting 1 Stat. 97).
1'3 See Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 242-44 (1819), discussed in
Currie, Federal Courts, 1801-1835, supra note 1, at 707-09, where Johnson for the Court
held that a federal statute incorporating Maryland law did so only to the extent the state
law was valid and proceeded to measure it, "as a law of Maryland," against the seventh
amendment; Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820), where Johnson argued in a
concurrence that the states had concurrent power to punish the failure to report when the
militia was called into federal service:
I cannot imagine a reason why the States may not also, if they feel themselves injured
by the same offence, assert their right of inflicting punishment also. In cases affecting
life or member, there is an express restraint upon the exercise of the punishing power.
But it is a restriction which operates equally upon both governments; and according to
a very familiar principle of construction, this exception would seem to establish the
existence of the general right.
Id. at 34. For a possibly too skeptical dismissal of these passages, see Fairman, supra note
540, at 76-77. Johnson acceded to Barron, without naming it, in his opinion for the Court in
Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469, 551-52 (1833), applying its reasoning to the re-
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1829 treatise, 5 " and an "inclination" in one New York decision,5 4 7
the result Marshall reached in Barron was supported by a respectable body of previous state-court authority 548-which characteristically was not noted in Marshall's opinion.4
Thus Marshall's last great opinion brings us full circle to the
strengths and weaknesses of his first one. As in Marbury v.
Madison,550 his instincts seem as usual to have led him to a sound
result, and as in Marbury he began with an overstatement from

quirement of a civil jury, U.S. CONST. amend. VII, and due process, id. amend. V: "As to the
amendments of the constitution of the United States, they must be put out of the case;
since it is now settled, that those amendments do not extend to the states ....
" Morgan
said that Johnson was absent from the "session of the Court" in which Barron was decided,
D. MORGAN, supra note 201, at 135 n.33, but he misstated -the date of Barron as 1832, and in
fact Livingston and Barron were decided during the same Term. Later cases applying the
Barron principle to additional Bill of Rights provisions include Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 71, 76 (1855) (search and seizure) and Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
589 (1845) (freedom of religion); Barron itself was reaffirmed in Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S.
(20 How.) 84, 90 (1858). Today it is understood to be the fourteenth amendment that makes
much of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
147-49 (1968).
"I W. RAWLE, supra note 390, at 124, quoted supra note 534.
U People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. 187, 201 (N.Y. 1820), where Chief Justice Spencer
"inclined" to the view that, because of its "unrestricted . . . terms," the double jeopardy
clause applied to the states, but found it unnecessary to resolve the question because the
same principles governed under New York law. Although Professor Fairman argued that
Spencer spoke for himself alone, Fairman, supra note 540, at 74, the opinion not only is
titled that of the court but adds that the other judges "entirely concur," 18 Johns. at 200,
207. But see infra note 548 (later New York decisions rejecting Spencer's inclination in
Goodwin).
I" Maurin v. Martinez, 5 Mart. 432, 436 (La. 1818) (civil jury); Renthorp v. Bourg,
4 Mart. 97, 131-32 (La. 1816) (taking); Livingston v. Mayor of New York, 8 Wend. 85, 10001 (N.Y. 1831) (opinion of Chancellor Walworth; not mentioned in parallel opinion of Senator Sherman) (due process, taking, and civil jury); Jackson v. Wood, 2 Cow. 819, 820-21
(N.Y. 1824) (grand jury and criminal jury); Murphy v. People, 2 Cow. 815, 818 (N.Y. 1824)
(grand jury and criminal jury). See also id. at 818 (reporter's note that although the other
members of the court did not discuss the case they "agreed clearly"); Huntington v. Bishop,
5 Vt. 186, 193-94 (1832) (terming it "very doubtful" that the civil jury requirement of the
seventh amendment applied to the states). Professor Crosskey cited none of these cases.
5'9 It also seems significant that in neither Fletcher v. Peck, supra notes 17-79 and
accompanying text, nor Trustees of Dartmouth College, supra notes 125-54 and accompanying text, where the Court performed considerable surgical feats to prove that a taking of
property was an impairment of contract, did it occur to the eminent attorneys to suggest the
applicability of the fifth amendment. Furthermore, for what it is worth, the Constitution of
the short-lived Confederate States of America, drafted after Barron and displaying a remarkable likeness to that of the United States, inserted the first eight amendments unambiguously in article I, section 9, with other limitations applicable (by contrast with section
10) only to the central government. CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA CONST., art. I, §§ 9-10,
reprinted in THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THECONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA 15-17 (J. Mathews ed. 1864).
550 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See Currie, Federal Courts, 1801-1835, supra note 1,
at 651-61.
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the nature of the Constitution
and disdained serious explication of
51
5
supporting materials.

CONCLUSION

We all knew beforehand that Marshall's time was a time of
great decisions; to see them all together makes quite an impression. 552 Substantively the cases tend to confirm the popular view
that the Court under Marshall construed federal powers generously and put teeth into constitutional limits on the states. The
Court may have pushed beyond the Framers in attempting to
make the contract clause cover certain takings of private property,
in finding an implicit immunity of federal instrumentalities from
taxation, in circumventing the apparent purpose of the eleventh
amendment, and in suggesting, without holding, that the commerce clause implicitly limited state power. Nevertheless, it is difficult to say with any certainty that the Marshall Court was ever
clearly wrong. Nor was the Court unfailingly nationalistic. In its
later years it held back from pushing the logic of the contract
clause to extreme conclusions; it resolved a debatable issue against
the exclusivity of the federal bankruptcy power; its interpretations
of the diversity and admiralty clauses were quite modest; and in
551 The Annals of Congress were not published until 1834; their title page reveals sim-

ply that they were "compiled from authentic materials." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. (J. Gales ed.
1789).
To be mentioned for the sake of completeness are Hampton v. McConnell, 16 U.S. (3
Wheat.) 234 (1818), and Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813). These decisions
held that the 1790 statute requiring "every court within the United States" to give to
records and judicial proceedings "such faith and credit as they have ... in the court of the
state from whence [they] ... are ... taken," Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122, 122,
amended by Act of Mar. 27, 1804, ch. 56, §§ 1, 2, 2 Stat. 298, 298-99 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (1976)), gave judgments the same effect as in the state rendering them. Because the statutory terms "faith and credit" parrot those of U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, these
decisions are of relevance in construing the Constitution itself; there are scholars who endorse Justice Johnson's dissenting view in Mills that "faith and credit" referred only to
admissibility in evidence, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 485-87; see, e.g., Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-CourtJurisdiction:A Historical-InterpretativeReexamination
of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (pt. 1), 14 CREIGHTON L. REv. 499,
566-67 (1980). Yet as a constitutional question the issue seems unimportant, since article IV
expressly authorizes Congress to prescribe not only "the Manner in which such Acts,
Records, and Proceedings shall be proved," but also the "Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 1; see Cook, The Powers of Congress under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 YALE
L.J. 421 (1919). The opinions in Hampton and Mills are brief and conclusory.
552 This Conclusion concerns the Marshall era generally; it refers to cases that have
been discussed in this article, in my earlier article on the Marshall Court (Currie, Federal
Courts, 1801-1835, supra note 1), or in both. Further citation and cross-references will be
dispensed with, therefore, except in the few instances where the reference would be unclear
otherwise or where the case has not been cited in full elsewhere in this article.
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both McCulloch and in Gibbons, the two great decisions sustaining
federal legislative power, Marshall emphasized the limited nature
of Congress's authority. On the whole the Marshall Court seems to
have steered a statesmanlike course between the competing
centrifugal and centripetal forces; at Marshall's death it could still
be said, as in 1789, that the federal government was neither feeble
nor of unlimited powers.
When we attempt to analyze the work of individual Justices,
the most striking fact is that most of Marshall's brethren were
nearly invisible. The old Federalists appointed before Marshall
(Cushing, Paterson, Chase, and Moore) spoke a total of three
paragraphs in constitutional cases after he was appointed. 553 Todd,
Livingston, and Duvall passed through without writing a single
constitutional opinion, though together they sat for a total of sixty
years. Washington wrote a handful of opinions in thirty years,
nearly all of them about the contract clause and only two of them
for the Court.5 54 Trimble wrote once, for himself alone, to uphold
the prospective bankruptcy law. 55 Thompson, another relative
latecomer, dissented from several decisions striking down state
laws 556 and joined the majority, also on behalf of state rights, in
the one case in which Marshall openly dissented;557 yet he also dis-

sented from the denial of jurisdiction in the first Cherokee case. 58
McLean, appointed in 1829, showed signs of independence and
strength in two important separate opinions, vigorously nationalist
in arguing for exclusive powers concerning Indians but lenient toward the states on bills of credit.5 59 Baldwin, appointed in 1830,
took the opposite position from McLean on both these issues. Both
Justices belonged essentially to the Taney period, as did Wayne,
who participated in none of the constitutional decisions under
Marshall.
"5'

See Currie, Federal Courts, 1801-1835, supra note 1, at 662 (discussing Stuart v.

Laird).
554 See supra notes 169, 173-74, 203-37, 276-87, and accompanying text (discussing Mason v. Haile, Green v. Biddle, Ogden v. Saunders, and Satterlee v. Mathewson); Currie,
Federal Courts, 1801-1835, supra note 1, at 702-05 (discussing Houston v. Moore).
51' See supra notes 213-37 and accompanying text (discussing Ogden v. Saunders).
556 See supra notes 363-64, 419-53, 519-20, and accompanying text (discussing Weston
v. City Council, Brown v. Maryland, and Craig v. Missouri). Thompson also wrote for the
Court in upholding a state law opening debtors' prisons in Mason v. Haile. See supra notes
168-69 and accompanying text.
557 See supra notes 203-58 and accompanying text (discussing Ogden v. Saunders).
858 See Currie, Federal Courts, 1801-1835, supra note 1, at 719-22 (discussing Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia).
559 See supra notes 468-70, 521-22, and accompanying text (discussing Worcester v.
Georgia and Craig v. Missouri).
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Of Marshall's fifteen colleagues only Story and Johnson wrote
enough to demonstrate much in the way of individual style, and
even they were minor figures. Story could write a more lawyerlike
opinion than Marshall could, as his opinions in Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee and in Trustees of Dartmouth College showed, with more
concern for precedent and for the purposes underlying the Constitution. Terrett v. Taylor and The Thomas Jefferson,se0 however,
showed him equally capable of resolving critical issues by bald fiat
and equally susceptible to the siren song of natural law. With the
possible exception of Houston v. Moore, where Marshall's vote was
not disclosed, Story seems to have disagreed only once with his
Chief Justice in a constitutional case: he would have upheld jurisdiction in Cherokee Nation.561
Johnson was more interesting than Story because he was more
independent, differing with Marshall more often than any of his
colleagues, 8 2 though often only with respect to the reasons supporting the decision. Sometimes Johnson was less willing than the
majority to extend federal judicial power: he voted against a broad
view of the arising-under jurisdiction in Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, in favor of state sovereign immunity in Bank of the
United States v. Planters'Bank, against original habeas corpus jurisdiction in Ex parte Bollman, and he wrote separately in Martin
v. Hunter's Lessee to say the state court could not be ordered to
obey the Supreme Court's mandate. Moreover, sometimes he was
less vigorous than Marshall in enforcing limitations on the states:
he voted to uphold prospective bankruptcy laws in Ogden, taxation
of federal securities in Weston, and the loan certificates in Craigv.
Missouri.
Far more remarkable than these divergences, however, were
the wide area of Johnson's agreement with Marshall and the respectful manner in which he usually couched his occasional dissentient views, as exemplified by Craig. Indeed, when it came to the
protection of vested rights from state action he was more interventionist than Marshall, resting his concurrence in Fletchersquarely
on natural law and fighting a futile rearguard action in Satterlee.
56O
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825); see Currie, Federal Courts, 1801-1835, supra note 1,
at 709-13.
"' Story's 1833 treatise is largely a compendium of Marshall opinions and of excerpts
from The Federalist.See generally J. STORY, supra note 40. But see J. MCCLELLAN, supra
note 114, at 307, arguing that Story was the "pillar of the Marshall Court" and that Marshall was "so unsure of himself that he must constantly exploit the mind of Mr. Justice
Story."
" See D. MORGAN, supra note 201, at 178-79, 188.
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He alone argued in Ogden v. Saunders that the diversity jurisdiction was exclusive, and it was he, not Marshall, who wanted to rest
Gibbons v. Ogden on the exclusivity of the federal commerce
power. Johnson could be as conclusory as Marshall (The Aurora),
as inattentive to detail (Bank of Columbia v. Okely), as confused
as any other Justice (Ogden v. Saunders); at times he could point
out serious flaws in Marshall's reasoning (Craig, Planters' Bank).
In general his opinions do not come across as high on the scale of
legal craftsmanship; he seems to have been led less by his head
than by his heart.5 63
This brings us to the man at center stage, who impressed
thirty-four years of constitutional decision with his own personality as no one else has ever come close to doing. In later years the
cognoscenti have rightly come to think of Chief Justices as essentially one voice among nine. But from 1801 to 1835 the Supreme
Court was the Marshall Court; this utter domination is perhaps the
greatest tribute to the force of John Marshall.
And his opinions? The sample is extensive and varied. Often,
like his predecessors, he would toss off a constitutional issue in a
single conclusory paragraph or less, as with the original jurisdiction
in Ex parte Bollman, the complete-diversity rule in Strawbridge v.
Curtiss, 564 the delegation issue in Wayman v. Southard, the exclusivity of the naturalization power in Chirac, and the legality of
damming a navigable stream in Willson. At the opposite extreme
he would write at great length on issues that seemed frivolous, as
in Dartmouth College, or that were foreclosed by precedent, as in
Cohens v. Virginia.
His disdain for precedent in general was extraordinary, even
when it squarely supported him; neither McCulloch, nor Cohens,
nor Dartmouth, nor Hodgson v. Bowerbank,5 5 nor even Marbury
v. Madison was, as Marshall led us to believe, essentially a case of
first impression. In contrast, there were early cases such as Bollman and The CharmingBetsy 6 6 in which he gave excessive weight
663 For a fascinating account of the temporal variations in Johnson's pattern of expressing his own opinions, see id. at 168-89. Morgan attributed the marked increase in separate
opinions after 1823 to a letter from Johnson's old mentor Thomas Jefferson urging that
every judge "'prove by his reasoning that he had read the papers, that he has considered
the case, and that in the application of the law to it, he uses his own judgment.'" Id. at 183
(quoting letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (Mar. 4, 1823)).
564 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806); see Currie, Federal Courts, 1801-1835, supra note 1, at
674-75.
86 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809); see Currie, Federal Courts, 1801-1835, supra note 1, at
679-80.
6 Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). See Currie,
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to precedents in which the issue had not been argued-a position
he seems to have soon outgrown.
In contrast to his predecessors, who had construed a statute
narrowly to avoid holding it unconstitutional," 7 Marshall went out
of his way in Marbury to create a conflict by statutory interpretation. Similarly, although in Cohens he felt impelled in retracting
some careless dicta to inveigh against the dangers of obiter comments, he seldom missed the opportunity to rest a decision on two
or three grounds when one would have sufficed, as in Planters'
Bank, or to pick the more difficult ground for decision, as on the
question of the state as a party in Cohens, or to pass on issues not
necessarily presented, like the merits in Marbury, the exclusivity
of the commerce clause in Gibbons, and the possible extra-constitutional limitations in Fletcher v. Peck.
Sometimes Marshall was highly literal in his reliance on the
constitutional text, as in denying diversity jurisdiction for the District of Columbia in the face of powerful arguments respecting the
Framers' purposes; at other times, like Jay and Wilson in the earlier Chisholm case, he reduced the applicable text to an afterthought, most prominently in Marbury v. Madison. He succeeded
in Marbury in persuading us not so much that judicial review
could be found in the Constitution, but that it ought to have been
put there; time and again he seems to have been writing a brief for
a conclusion reached independently of the Constitution. Repeatedly he ran oblivious over obvious difficulties raised by dissenting
opinions, as in the bill-of-credit case and on the sovereign immunity question in Planters'Bank. At other times he endorsed unsatisfying distinctions that would prove troublesome to his successors
in order to explain away embarrassing precedents: witness the concessions for state health laws in Gibbons, for state taxation of bank
stock in McCulloch, for retail taxes in Brown, and for remedial
laws affecting contracts in Sturges. In McCulloch, Brown, and
Worcester he failed to identify clearly just what it was that state
law conflicted with: the Constitution itself, a statute, or treaty.
When he relied on history he tended to state it on his own authority without supporting citations. He had a strong tendency, as seen
in McCulloch, Fisher, and Craig, to devote his energies to straw
men and to shortchange the difficult issue. In short, though MarFederal Courts, 1801-1835, supra note 1, at 668-70 (discussing Ex parte Bollman).
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shall has been generally admired,6 8 it is difficult to find a single
Marshall opinion that puts together the relevant legal arguments
in a convincing way.
Andrew McLaughlin once wrote that if Marshall had been a
better lawyer, he would not have been so great a judge.5 19 Just
what this means I am not certain; if the suggestion is that the law
is of marginal relevance to judges, I would have to dissent on the
basis of the supremacy clause. In any event, while it is always risky
to judge the past by modern standards, it seems to me Marshall
would have lost nothing in his eminence as a judge if he had refrained from such blatant overstatements as that written constitutions necessarily contemplate judicial review, strengthened Cohens
and Dartmouth by invoking precedent, avoided reaching out for
issues that did not need to be decided, as in Gibbons,57 0 or told his
audience in McCulloch whether the state tax offended the statute
or the Constitution.
Marshall was a strong man with a fascinating style, a strong
sense of where he was going, and wonderfully sound instincts in
the building of a constitution. Whatever his technical shortcomings, one who reads many of Marshall's opinions seems likely to
find merit in Thayer's verdict that Marshall was "one of the great571
est, noblest and most engaging characters in American history.1
Marshall's time was one of those in which it would be exciting to
568See, e.g., J. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 57 (1901) (calling Marshall "preeminent" in
the constitutional field: "first, with no one second"); Esterline, Acts of Congress Declared
Unconstitutional,38 AM. L. REV. 21, 41 (1904):
[If at this hour the world were called upon to close and render up its account to the
Creator ... and the United States of America were reached on the roll, and its inhabitants from the beginning were signaled to nominate one personage as their loftiest illustration of man who was created in His image, how well, oh, how well, they could
stand unanimously agreed in awarding the glory, and sending up... the revered, magisterial and immortal name - John Marshall!
Justice Frankfurter echoed Holmes's view that Marshall was the "'one alone' to be chosen
'if American law were to be represented by a single figure,'" Frankfurter, supra note 418, at
217 (quoting O.W. HOLMES, John Marshall, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 270 (1920)).
569 A. McLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 300 (1935) (adding that "his duties called for the talent and insight of a statesman capable of looking
beyond the confines of legal learning"). See also E. CORWIN, supra note 39, at 42 (1919),
arguing that Marshall's unstudious habits contributed to his achievement: "he made more
use of his brain than of his bookshelf."
"" But see Frankfurter, supra note 418, at 221 ("To slight these phases of his opinion
as dicta, though such they were on a technical view, is to disregard significant aspects of his
labors and the way in which constitutional law develops.") But cf. Frankfurter, Note on
Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002 (1924) (discussing the dangers of advisory
opinions).
571 J.THAYER, supra note 568, at 157.
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have lived; and Marshall was one of those people it would be nice
to have been.

